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to us, no need to convert to uid_t manually
This way, we can save one allocation and avoid copying the array
unnecesarily.
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We changed creds to u32, so fix systemd sd-bus to acknowledge that.
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This makes udevadm trigger mirror udevadm info, except that multiple
device names can be specified. Instructions in 60-keyboard.hwdb should
now actually work.
udevadm(8) is updated, but it could use a bit more polishing.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=82311
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The idea is to unify the way that devices can be specified.
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attached to incoming messages
We don't know what the activated service might want in the end, hence
enable everything current and future, just to be sure.
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On the system and user busses we create it's the receiver that chooses
which metadata is attched, not the sender, hence set the requirement
mask to ANY, to allow any current of future credential bit to be
attached.
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This simplifies things a bit and makes sure we free any previously set
creds component before writing in a new one.
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dropped broadcast messages and proceeding
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Also, properly keep track of incoming additional service names.
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kernel messages
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creds object
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bus owner
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selinux context
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credential data shall be augment with data from /proc
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KDBUS_ITEM_PIDS structure from KDBUS_ITEM_CREDS
Also:
- adds support for euid, suid, fsuid, egid, sgid, fsgid fields.
- makes augmentation of creds with data from /proc explicitly
controllable to give apps better control over this, given that this is
racy.
- enables augmentation for kdbus connections (previously we only did it
for dbus1). This is useful since with recent kdbus versions it is
possible for clients to control the metadata they want to send.
- changes sd_bus_query_sender_privilege() to take the euid of the client
into consideration, if known
- when we don't have permissions to read augmentation data from /proc,
don't fail, just don't add the data in
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constructing message
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Make sure not to run xkb-keymap validation twice if pk-queries are used.
Move it below pk-checks.
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Properly forward all XKB messages. You can use XKB_LOG_VERBOSITY= to
control the amount of messages sent by XKB. We explicitly set
XKB_LOG_LEVEL to 7 you can use SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL to control the log-level
generically.
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Use XKB_CONTEXT_NO_FLAGS instead of magic 0.
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Before forwarding keyboard events, feed them into possible compose tables.
This enables Compose-key and Dead-key features.
Few notes:
* REPEAT events are never fed into compose tables. It just doesn't make
sense and is usually not wanted. Compose-sequences are usually hard to
remember and take time to type. Thus, the REPEAT event of the
Compose-key itself would often cancel the compose sequence already.
* Stop resolving symbols for UP events. Anything but keycodes is never
associated to a physical key, but is a one-time action. There is
nothing like UP events for key-symbols!
* Cancel compose-sequences on Multi-Key UP. See the inline comment. We
should make this configurable!
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Add support for compose files to idev-keyboard. This requires
libxkbcommon-0.5.0, which is pretty new, but should be fine.
We don't use the compose-files, yet. Further commits will put life into
them.
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In service file, if the file has some of special SMACK label in
ExecStart= and systemd has no permission for the special SMACK label
then permission error will occurred. To resolve this, systemd should
be able to set its SMACK label to something accessible of ExecStart=.
So introduce new SmackProcessLabel. If label is specified with
SmackProcessLabel= then the child systemd will set its label to
that. To successfully execute the ExecStart=, accessible label should
be specified with SmackProcessLabel=.
Additionally, by SMACK policy, if the file in ExecStart= has no
SMACK64EXEC then the executed process will have given label by
SmackProcessLabel=. But if the file has SMACK64EXEC then the
SMACK64EXEC label will be overridden.
[zj: reword man page]
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A negative return code was treated as a true value.
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Introduce a new optional dependency on libxkbcommon for systemd-localed.
Whenever the x11 keymap settings are changed, use libxkbcommon to compile
the keymap. If the compilation fails, print a warning so users will get
notified.
On compilation failure, we still update the keymap settings for now. This
patch just introduces the xkbcommon infrastructure to have keymap
validation in place. We can later decide if/how we want to enforce this.
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For plain dm-crypt devices, the behavior of cryptsetup package is to
ignore the hash algorithm when a key file is provided. It seems wrong
to ignore a hash when it is explicitly specified, but we should default
to no hash if the keyfile is specified.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=52630
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If for any reason the check failed (selinux?), we would still issue
the warning. Check the return status.
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This makes the calling code a bit simpler.
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strv_extend returns 0 in the case of success which means that
else if (bus_track_deserialize_item(&m->deserialized_subscribed, l) == 0)
log_warning("Unknown serialization item '%s'", l);
will be printed when value is added correctly.
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Also update TODO, empty environment variables in Environment= and
EnvironmentFile= options work.
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Suggested-by: Peter Mattern <matternp@arcor.de>
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2014-November/025437.html
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commit 79d80fc1466512d0ca211f4bfcd9de5f2f816a5a introduced a regression that
prevents mounting a tmpfs if the mount point already exits in the container's
root file system. This commit fixes the problem by ignoring EEXIST.
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systemd-run would fail when run with -M or -H and an absolute path,
if this path did not exists locally. Allow it to continue, since we
don't have a nice way of checking if the binary exists remotely.
The case where -M or -H is used and a local path is unchanged, and we
still iterate over $PATH to find the binary. We need to convert to an
absolute path, and we don't have a nice mechanism to check remotely,
so we assume that the binary will be located in the same place locally
and remotely.
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2014-November/025418.html
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IFLA_BRPORT_LEARNING was added in v3.10-rc4-583-g9ba18891f7,
and IFLA_BRPORT_UNICAST_FLOOD in v3.10-rc4-584-g867a59436f.
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Mips has getrandom() too, but there's just too many variants
for me too care. Either someone who cares does it, or they get
compile-time warnings with old kernel headers.
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it seems to be a typo introduced by ebcf1f97de4f6b1580ae55eb56b1a3939fe6b602
- _r = selinux_access_check(_b, _m, _u->source_path ?:_u->fragment_path, (permission), &_error); \
+ ({ Unit *_unit = (unit); selinux_generic_access_check(bus,message, _unit->fragment_path ?: _unit->fragment_path, permission,error); })
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