| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
The new implementation will not allow passing the same values more than
once, so clean up first.
|
|
journal-gatewayd: timeout journal wait to allow thread cleanup
|
|
tests: test-resolve: wait until all queries are completed
|
|
resolved: query_process_cname - make fully recursive
|
|
This is a follow-up for 4a134c4903dbf6ef6c6a
Fixes:
$ ./test-resolve
209.132.183.105:80
209.132.183.105:80
canonical name: n/a
193.99.144.85:0
[2a02:2e0:3fe:1001:7777:772e:2:85]:0
canonical name: www.heise.de
Host: web.heise.de -- Serv: http
$ ./test-resolve
193.99.144.85:0
[2a02:2e0:3fe:1001:7777:772e:2:85]:0
canonical name: www.heise.de
Host: web.heise.de -- Serv: http
$ ./test-resolve
...
|
|
Twelfth DNSSEC PR
|
|
This ensures we properly resolve the CNAME chain as far as we can, rather
than only CNAME chains of length one.
|
|
|
|
|
|
On errors, mention the functions that really failed.
|
|
Fstab gen fix device timeout
|
|
tests: don't change hard limit in test-rlimit-util
|
|
tests: use sd_bus_flush_close_unref instead of sd_bus_unref in test-bus-cleanup
|
|
Now that we populate the trust database by default with a larger number
of entires, we better make sure to output a more readable version.
|
|
Let's increase compatibility with many private domains by default, and
ship a default NTA list of wel-known private domains, where it is
unlikely they will be deployed as official TLD anytime soon.
|
|
|
|
|
|
After all, when we don't support the algorithm we cannot determine
validity.
|
|
non-DNSSEC mode for them
This adds logic to detect cases like the Fritz!Box routers which serve
a private DNS domain "fritz.box" under the TLD "box" that does not
exist in the root servers. If this is detected DNSSEC validation is
turned off for this private domain, thus improving compatibility with
such private DNS zones.
This should be fairly secure as we first rely on the proof that .box
does not exist before this logic is applied. Nevertheless the logic is
only enabled for DNSSEC=allow-downgrade mode.
This logic does not work for routers that set up a full DNS zone directly
under a non-existing TLD, as in that case we cannot prove
that the domain is truly non-existing according to the root servers.
|
|
|
|
We followed the wrong connection. This only worked sometimes at all, because we
also return the wrong error code.
|
|
|
|
This adds a DNSSEC= setting to .network files, and makes resolved honour
them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
After discussing this with Tom, we figured out "allow-downgrade" sounds
nicer.
|
|
The option is already there, but wasn't exported in the configuration
file so far. Fix that.
|
|
|
|
networkd previously knew an enum "ResolveSupport" for configuring
per-interface LLMNR support, resolved had a similar enum just called
"Support", with the same value and similar pasers.
Unify this, call the enum ResolveSupport, and port both daemons to it.
|
|
In a couple of cases we maintain configuration settings that know an on
and off state, like a boolean, plus some additional states. We generally
parse them as booleans first, and if that fails check for specific
additional values.
This adds a generalized set of macros for parsing such settings, and
ports one use in resolved and another in networkd over to it.
|
|
|
|
Fixes:
$ make valgrind-tests TESTS=test-bus-cleanup
==6363== 9 bytes in 1 blocks are possibly lost in loss record 1 of 28
==6363== at 0x4C2BBCF: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)
==6363== by 0x197D12: hexmem (hexdecoct.c:79)
==6363== by 0x183083: bus_socket_start_auth_client (bus-socket.c:639)
==6363== by 0x1832A0: bus_socket_start_auth (bus-socket.c:678)
==6363== by 0x183438: bus_socket_connect (bus-socket.c:705)
==6363== by 0x14B0F2: bus_start_address (sd-bus.c:1053)
==6363== by 0x14B592: sd_bus_start (sd-bus.c:1134)
==6363== by 0x14B95E: sd_bus_open_system (sd-bus.c:1235)
==6363== by 0x1127E2: test_bus_open (test-bus-cleanup.c:42)
==6363== by 0x112AAE: main (test-bus-cleanup.c:87)
==6363==
...
$ ./libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./test-bus-cleanup
==6584== LEAK SUMMARY:
...
==6584== possibly lost: 10,566 bytes in 27 blocks
|
|
|
|
Eleventh DNSSEC patch set
|
|
for the root domain defined
We already skip this when the trust anchor files define a DS RR for the
root domain, now also skip it if there's a DNSKEY RR.
|
|
These files are not specific to resolved really, and this is then more
in-line with how /etc/sysctl.d and suchlike is handled.
|
|
The code introduced in f8c1a81c51 (= systemd 227) failed for me with:
Failed to copy smack label from net_cls to /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls: No such file or directory
There is no need for a symlink in this case because source and target
are identical. The symlink() call is allowed to fail when the target
already exists. When that happens, copying the Smack label must be
skipped.
But the code also failed when there is a symlink, like "cpu ->
cpu,cpuacct", because mac_smack_copy() got called with
src="cpu,cpuacct" which fails to find the entry because the current
directory is not inside /sys/fs/cgroup. The absolute path to the existing
entry must be used instead.
|
|
When storing negative responses, clamp the SOA minimum TTL (as suggested
by RFC2308) to the TTL of the NSEC/NSEC3 RRs we used to prove
non-existance, if it there is any.
This is necessary since otherwise an attacker might put together a faked
negative response for one of our question including a high-ttl SOA RR
for any parent zone, and we'd use trust the TTL.
|
|
|
|
Since we honour RFC5011 revoked keys it might happen we end up with an
empty trust anchor, or one where there's no entry for the root left.
With this patch the logic is changed what to do in this case.
Before this patch we'd end up requesting the root DS, which returns with
NODATA but a signed NSEC we cannot verify, since the trust anchor is
empty after all. Thus we'd return a DNSSEC result of "missing-key", as
we lack a verified version of the key.
With this patch in place, look-ups for the root DS are explicitly
recognized, and not passed on to the DNS servers. Instead, if
downgrade-ok mode is on an unsigned NODATA response is synthesized, so
that the validator code continues under the assumption the root zone was
unsigned. If downgrade-ok mode is off a new transaction failure is
generated, that makes this case recognizable.
|
|
|
|
We already try hard not to create cyclic transaction dependencies, where
a transaction requires another one for DNSSEC validation purposes, which
in turn (possibly indirectly) pulls in the original transaction again,
thus resulting in a cyclic dependency and ultimately a deadlock since
each transaction waits for another one forever.
So far we wanted to avoid such cyclic dependencies by only going "up the
tree" when requesting auxiliary RRs and only going from one RR type to
another, but never back. However this turned out to be insufficient.
Consider a domain that publishes one or more DNSKEY but which has no DS
for it. A request for the domain's DNSKEY triggers a request for the
domain's DS, which will then fail, but return an NSEC, signed by the
DNSKEY. To validate that we'd request the DNSKEY again. Thus a DNSKEY
request results in a DS request which results in the original DNSKEY
request again. If the original lookup had been a DS lookup we'd end up
in the same cyclic dependency, hence we cannot statically break one of
them, since both requests are of course fully valid. Hence, do full
cyclic dependency checking: each time we are about to add a dependency
to a transaction, check if the transaction is already a dependency of
the dependency (recursively down the tree).
|
|
dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys() is running
If any of the transactions started by
dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys() finishes promptly without
requiring asynchronous operation this is reported back to the issuing
transaction from the same stackframe. This might ultimately result in
this transaction to be freed while we are still in its
_request_dnssec_keys() stack frame. To avoid memory corruption block the
transaction GC while in the call, and manually issue a GC after it
returned.
|
|
|
|
With this patch resolved will properly handle revoked keys, but not
augment the locally configured trust anchor database with newly learned
keys.
Specifically, resolved now refuses validating RRsets with
revoked keys, and it will remove revoked keys from the configured trust
anchors (only until reboot).
This patch does not add logic for adding new keys to the set of trust
anchors. This is a deliberate decision as this only can work with
persistent disk storage, and would result in a different update logic
for stateful and stateless systems. Since we have to support stateless
systems anyway, and don't want to encourage two independent upgrade
paths we focus on upgrading the trust anchor database via the usual OS
upgrade logic.
Whenever a trust anchor entry is found revoked and removed from the
trust anchor a recognizable log message is written, encouraging the user
to update the trust anchor or update his operating system.
|
|
When applying canonical DNSSEC ordering for an RRset only order by the
wire format of the RRs' RDATA, not by the full wire formatting. The RFC
isn't particularly clear about this, but this is apparently how it is
done. This fixes validation of pentagon.gov's DS RRset.
|
|
validation
|
|
core: only skip setup of "special" signals in test mode
|
|
Fixes:
$ systemd-analyze verify ...
Failed to open /dev/tty0: Permission denied
|
|
|
