From ce31ec116f9bf4ad45952b6a200f4181fac311a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Shumaker Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 21:24:07 -0400 Subject: ./tools/notsd-move --- src/systemd-cryptsetup/Makefile | 59 ++ src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c | 509 ++++++++++++++ src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pre.target | 11 + src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c | 756 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.target | 10 + src/systemd-cryptsetup/crypttab.xml | 416 ++++++++++++ .../systemd-cryptsetup-generator.xml | 193 ++++++ .../systemd-cryptsetup@.service.xml | 85 +++ 8 files changed, 2039 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/Makefile create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pre.target create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.target create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/crypttab.xml create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup-generator.xml create mode 100644 src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup@.service.xml (limited to 'src/systemd-cryptsetup') diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/Makefile b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a39c01e41e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# -*- Mode: makefile; indent-tabs-mode: t -*- +# +# This file is part of systemd. +# +# Copyright 2010-2012 Lennart Poettering +# Copyright 2010-2012 Kay Sievers +# Copyright 2013 Zbigniew JÄ™drzejewski-Szmek +# Copyright 2013 David Strauss +# Copyright 2016 Luke Shumaker +# +# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +# along with systemd; If not, see . +include $(dir $(lastword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)))/../../config.mk +include $(topsrcdir)/build-aux/Makefile.head.mk + +ifneq ($(HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP),) +rootlibexec_PROGRAMS += \ + systemd-cryptsetup + +systemgenerator_PROGRAMS += \ + systemd-cryptsetup-generator + +dist_systemunit_DATA += \ + units/cryptsetup.target \ + units/cryptsetup-pre.target + +systemd_cryptsetup_SOURCES = \ + src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c + +systemd_cryptsetup_CFLAGS = \ + $(AM_CFLAGS) \ + $(LIBCRYPTSETUP_CFLAGS) + +systemd_cryptsetup_LDADD = \ + libsystemd-shared.la \ + $(LIBCRYPTSETUP_LIBS) + +systemd_cryptsetup_generator_SOURCES = \ + src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c + +systemd_cryptsetup_generator_LDADD = \ + libsystemd-shared.la + +SYSINIT_TARGET_WANTS += \ + cryptsetup.target + +endif # HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP + +include $(topsrcdir)/build-aux/Makefile.tail.mk diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ad6d34a98 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-generator.c @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see . +***/ + +#include + +#include "basic/alloc-util.h" +#include "basic/fd-util.h" +#include "basic/fileio.h" +#include "basic/hashmap.h" +#include "basic/log.h" +#include "basic/mkdir.h" +#include "basic/parse-util.h" +#include "basic/path-util.h" +#include "basic/proc-cmdline.h" +#include "basic/string-util.h" +#include "basic/strv.h" +#include "basic/unit-name.h" +#include "basic/util.h" +#include "shared/dropin.h" +#include "shared/fstab-util.h" +#include "shared/generator.h" + +typedef struct crypto_device { + char *uuid; + char *keyfile; + char *name; + char *options; + bool create; +} crypto_device; + +static const char *arg_dest = "/tmp"; +static bool arg_enabled = true; +static bool arg_read_crypttab = true; +static bool arg_whitelist = false; +static Hashmap *arg_disks = NULL; +static char *arg_default_options = NULL; +static char *arg_default_keyfile = NULL; + +static int create_disk( + const char *name, + const char *device, + const char *password, + const char *options) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *n = NULL, *d = NULL, *u = NULL, *to = NULL, *e = NULL, + *filtered = NULL; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + bool noauto, nofail, tmp, swap; + char *from; + int r; + + assert(name); + assert(device); + + noauto = fstab_test_yes_no_option(options, "noauto\0" "auto\0"); + nofail = fstab_test_yes_no_option(options, "nofail\0" "fail\0"); + tmp = fstab_test_option(options, "tmp\0"); + swap = fstab_test_option(options, "swap\0"); + + if (tmp && swap) { + log_error("Device '%s' cannot be both 'tmp' and 'swap'. Ignoring.", name); + return -EINVAL; + } + + e = unit_name_escape(name); + if (!e) + return log_oom(); + + r = unit_name_build("systemd-cryptsetup", e, ".service", &n); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate unit name: %m"); + + p = strjoin(arg_dest, "/", n, NULL); + if (!p) + return log_oom(); + + u = fstab_node_to_udev_node(device); + if (!u) + return log_oom(); + + r = unit_name_from_path(u, ".device", &d); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate unit name: %m"); + + f = fopen(p, "wxe"); + if (!f) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create unit file %s: %m", p); + + fputs( + "# Automatically generated by systemd-cryptsetup-generator\n\n" + "[Unit]\n" + "Description=Cryptography Setup for %I\n" + "Documentation=man:crypttab(5) man:systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8) man:systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8)\n" + "SourcePath=/etc/crypttab\n" + "DefaultDependencies=no\n" + "Conflicts=umount.target\n" + "BindsTo=dev-mapper-%i.device\n" + "IgnoreOnIsolate=true\n" + "After=cryptsetup-pre.target\n", + f); + + if (!nofail) + fprintf(f, + "Before=cryptsetup.target\n"); + + if (password) { + if (STR_IN_SET(password, "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/hw_random")) + fputs("After=systemd-random-seed.service\n", f); + else if (!streq(password, "-") && !streq(password, "none")) { + _cleanup_free_ char *uu; + + uu = fstab_node_to_udev_node(password); + if (!uu) + return log_oom(); + + if (!path_equal(uu, "/dev/null")) { + + if (is_device_path(uu)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *dd = NULL; + + r = unit_name_from_path(uu, ".device", &dd); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate unit name: %m"); + + fprintf(f, "After=%1$s\nRequires=%1$s\n", dd); + } else + fprintf(f, "RequiresMountsFor=%s\n", password); + } + } + } + + if (is_device_path(u)) + fprintf(f, + "BindsTo=%s\n" + "After=%s\n" + "Before=umount.target\n", + d, d); + else + fprintf(f, + "RequiresMountsFor=%s\n", + u); + + r = generator_write_timeouts(arg_dest, device, name, options, &filtered); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + fprintf(f, + "\n[Service]\n" + "Type=oneshot\n" + "RemainAfterExit=yes\n" + "TimeoutSec=0\n" /* the binary handles timeouts anyway */ + "ExecStart=" SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_PATH " attach '%s' '%s' '%s' '%s'\n" + "ExecStop=" SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_PATH " detach '%s'\n", + name, u, strempty(password), strempty(filtered), + name); + + if (tmp) + fprintf(f, + "ExecStartPost=/sbin/mke2fs '/dev/mapper/%s'\n", + name); + + if (swap) + fprintf(f, + "ExecStartPost=/sbin/mkswap '/dev/mapper/%s'\n", + name); + + r = fflush_and_check(f); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write file %s: %m", p); + + from = strjoina("../", n); + + if (!noauto) { + + to = strjoin(arg_dest, "/", d, ".wants/", n, NULL); + if (!to) + return log_oom(); + + mkdir_parents_label(to, 0755); + if (symlink(from, to) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create symlink %s: %m", to); + + free(to); + if (!nofail) + to = strjoin(arg_dest, "/cryptsetup.target.requires/", n, NULL); + else + to = strjoin(arg_dest, "/cryptsetup.target.wants/", n, NULL); + if (!to) + return log_oom(); + + mkdir_parents_label(to, 0755); + if (symlink(from, to) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create symlink %s: %m", to); + } + + free(to); + to = strjoin(arg_dest, "/dev-mapper-", e, ".device.requires/", n, NULL); + if (!to) + return log_oom(); + + mkdir_parents_label(to, 0755); + if (symlink(from, to) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create symlink %s: %m", to); + + if (!noauto && !nofail) { + _cleanup_free_ char *dmname; + dmname = strjoin("dev-mapper-", e, ".device", NULL); + if (!dmname) + return log_oom(); + + r = write_drop_in(arg_dest, dmname, 90, "device-timeout", + "# Automatically generated by systemd-cryptsetup-generator \n\n" + "[Unit]\nJobTimeoutSec=0"); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write device drop-in: %m"); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void free_arg_disks(void) { + crypto_device *d; + + while ((d = hashmap_steal_first(arg_disks))) { + free(d->uuid); + free(d->keyfile); + free(d->name); + free(d->options); + free(d); + } + + hashmap_free(arg_disks); +} + +static crypto_device *get_crypto_device(const char *uuid) { + int r; + crypto_device *d; + + assert(uuid); + + d = hashmap_get(arg_disks, uuid); + if (!d) { + d = new0(struct crypto_device, 1); + if (!d) + return NULL; + + d->create = false; + d->keyfile = d->options = d->name = NULL; + + d->uuid = strdup(uuid); + if (!d->uuid) { + free(d); + return NULL; + } + + r = hashmap_put(arg_disks, d->uuid, d); + if (r < 0) { + free(d->uuid); + free(d); + return NULL; + } + } + + return d; +} + +static int parse_proc_cmdline_item(const char *key, const char *value) { + int r; + crypto_device *d; + _cleanup_free_ char *uuid = NULL, *uuid_value = NULL; + + if (STR_IN_SET(key, "luks", "rd.luks") && value) { + + r = parse_boolean(value); + if (r < 0) + log_warning("Failed to parse luks switch %s. Ignoring.", value); + else + arg_enabled = r; + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(key, "luks.crypttab", "rd.luks.crypttab") && value) { + + r = parse_boolean(value); + if (r < 0) + log_warning("Failed to parse luks crypttab switch %s. Ignoring.", value); + else + arg_read_crypttab = r; + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(key, "luks.uuid", "rd.luks.uuid") && value) { + + d = get_crypto_device(startswith(value, "luks-") ? value+5 : value); + if (!d) + return log_oom(); + + d->create = arg_whitelist = true; + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(key, "luks.options", "rd.luks.options") && value) { + + r = sscanf(value, "%m[0-9a-fA-F-]=%ms", &uuid, &uuid_value); + if (r == 2) { + d = get_crypto_device(uuid); + if (!d) + return log_oom(); + + free(d->options); + d->options = uuid_value; + uuid_value = NULL; + } else if (free_and_strdup(&arg_default_options, value) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(key, "luks.key", "rd.luks.key") && value) { + + r = sscanf(value, "%m[0-9a-fA-F-]=%ms", &uuid, &uuid_value); + if (r == 2) { + d = get_crypto_device(uuid); + if (!d) + return log_oom(); + + free(d->keyfile); + d->keyfile = uuid_value; + uuid_value = NULL; + } else if (free_and_strdup(&arg_default_keyfile, value) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(key, "luks.name", "rd.luks.name") && value) { + + r = sscanf(value, "%m[0-9a-fA-F-]=%ms", &uuid, &uuid_value); + if (r == 2) { + d = get_crypto_device(uuid); + if (!d) + return log_oom(); + + d->create = arg_whitelist = true; + + free(d->name); + d->name = uuid_value; + uuid_value = NULL; + } else + log_warning("Failed to parse luks name switch %s. Ignoring.", value); + + } + + return 0; +} + +static int add_crypttab_devices(void) { + struct stat st; + unsigned crypttab_line = 0; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + + if (!arg_read_crypttab) + return 0; + + f = fopen("/etc/crypttab", "re"); + if (!f) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open /etc/crypttab: %m"); + return 0; + } + + if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { + log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to stat /etc/crypttab: %m"); + return 0; + } + + for (;;) { + int r, k; + char line[LINE_MAX], *l, *uuid; + crypto_device *d = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL, *device = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *options = NULL; + + if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) + break; + + crypttab_line++; + + l = strstrip(line); + if (*l == '#' || *l == 0) + continue; + + k = sscanf(l, "%ms %ms %ms %ms", &name, &device, &keyfile, &options); + if (k < 2 || k > 4) { + log_error("Failed to parse /etc/crypttab:%u, ignoring.", crypttab_line); + continue; + } + + uuid = startswith(device, "UUID="); + if (!uuid) + uuid = path_startswith(device, "/dev/disk/by-uuid/"); + if (!uuid) + uuid = startswith(name, "luks-"); + if (uuid) + d = hashmap_get(arg_disks, uuid); + + if (arg_whitelist && !d) { + log_info("Not creating device '%s' because it was not specified on the kernel command line.", name); + continue; + } + + r = create_disk(name, device, keyfile, (d && d->options) ? d->options : options); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (d) + d->create = false; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int add_proc_cmdline_devices(void) { + int r; + Iterator i; + crypto_device *d; + + HASHMAP_FOREACH(d, arg_disks, i) { + const char *options; + _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL; + + if (!d->create) + continue; + + if (!d->name) { + d->name = strappend("luks-", d->uuid); + if (!d->name) + return log_oom(); + } + + device = strappend("UUID=", d->uuid); + if (!device) + return log_oom(); + + if (d->options) + options = d->options; + else if (arg_default_options) + options = arg_default_options; + else + options = "timeout=0"; + + r = create_disk(d->name, device, d->keyfile ?: arg_default_keyfile, options); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + int r = EXIT_FAILURE; + + if (argc > 1 && argc != 4) { + log_error("This program takes three or no arguments."); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (argc > 1) + arg_dest = argv[1]; + + log_set_target(LOG_TARGET_SAFE); + log_parse_environment(); + log_open(); + + umask(0022); + + arg_disks = hashmap_new(&string_hash_ops); + if (!arg_disks) + goto cleanup; + + r = parse_proc_cmdline(parse_proc_cmdline_item); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse kernel command line, ignoring: %m"); + r = EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (!arg_enabled) { + r = EXIT_SUCCESS; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (add_crypttab_devices() < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (add_proc_cmdline_devices() < 0) + goto cleanup; + + r = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + free_arg_disks(); + free(arg_default_options); + free(arg_default_keyfile); + + return r; +} diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pre.target b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pre.target new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..65353419fc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pre.target @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# This file is part of systemd. +# +# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. + +[Unit] +Description=Encrypted Volumes (Pre) +Documentation=man:systemd.special(7) +RefuseManualStart=yes diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eef2b1954c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c @@ -0,0 +1,756 @@ +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see . +***/ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "basic/alloc-util.h" +#include "basic/escape.h" +#include "basic/fileio.h" +#include "basic/log.h" +#include "basic/mount-util.h" +#include "basic/parse-util.h" +#include "basic/path-util.h" +#include "basic/string-util.h" +#include "basic/strv.h" +#include "basic/util.h" +#include "sd-device/device-util.h" +#include "sd-device/sd-device.h" +#include "shared/ask-password-api.h" + +static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_TCRYPT or CRYPT_PLAIN */ +static char *arg_cipher = NULL; +static unsigned arg_key_size = 0; +static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT; +static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0; +static unsigned arg_keyfile_offset = 0; +static char *arg_hash = NULL; +static char *arg_header = NULL; +static unsigned arg_tries = 3; +static bool arg_readonly = false; +static bool arg_verify = false; +static bool arg_discards = false; +static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false; +static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false; +static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL; +static uint64_t arg_offset = 0; +static uint64_t arg_skip = 0; +static usec_t arg_timeout = 0; + +/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't: + + precheck= + check= + checkargs= + noearly= + loud= + keyscript= +*/ + +static int parse_one_option(const char *option) { + assert(option); + + /* Handled outside of this tool */ + if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail")) + return 0; + + if (startswith(option, "cipher=")) { + char *t; + + t = strdup(option+7); + if (!t) + return log_oom(); + + free(arg_cipher); + arg_cipher = t; + + } else if (startswith(option, "size=")) { + + if (safe_atou(option+5, &arg_key_size) < 0) { + log_error("size= parse failure, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + if (arg_key_size % 8) { + log_error("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + arg_key_size /= 8; + + } else if (startswith(option, "key-slot=")) { + + arg_type = CRYPT_LUKS1; + if (safe_atoi(option+9, &arg_key_slot) < 0) { + log_error("key-slot= parse failure, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + } else if (startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile=")) { + + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + if (path_is_absolute(option+15)) { + if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, option + 15) < 0) + return log_oom(); + } else + log_error("Key file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", option+15); + + } else if (startswith(option, "keyfile-size=")) { + + if (safe_atou(option+13, &arg_keyfile_size) < 0) { + log_error("keyfile-size= parse failure, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + } else if (startswith(option, "keyfile-offset=")) { + + if (safe_atou(option+15, &arg_keyfile_offset) < 0) { + log_error("keyfile-offset= parse failure, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + } else if (startswith(option, "hash=")) { + char *t; + + t = strdup(option+5); + if (!t) + return log_oom(); + + free(arg_hash); + arg_hash = t; + + } else if (startswith(option, "header=")) { + arg_type = CRYPT_LUKS1; + + if (!path_is_absolute(option+7)) { + log_error("Header path '%s' is not absolute, refusing.", option+7); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (arg_header) { + log_error("Duplicate header= options, refusing."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + arg_header = strdup(option+7); + if (!arg_header) + return log_oom(); + + } else if (startswith(option, "tries=")) { + + if (safe_atou(option+6, &arg_tries) < 0) { + log_error("tries= parse failure, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only")) + arg_readonly = true; + else if (streq(option, "verify")) + arg_verify = true; + else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard")) + arg_discards = true; + else if (streq(option, "luks")) + arg_type = CRYPT_LUKS1; + else if (streq(option, "tcrypt")) + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-hidden")) { + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + arg_tcrypt_hidden = true; + } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) { + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + arg_tcrypt_system = true; + } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp")) + arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN; + else if (startswith(option, "timeout=")) { + + if (parse_sec(option+8, &arg_timeout) < 0) { + log_error("timeout= parse failure, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + } else if (startswith(option, "offset=")) { + + if (safe_atou64(option+7, &arg_offset) < 0) { + log_error("offset= parse failure, refusing."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + } else if (startswith(option, "skip=")) { + + if (safe_atou64(option+5, &arg_skip) < 0) { + log_error("skip= parse failure, refusing."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + } else if (!streq(option, "none")) + log_error("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option); + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_options(const char *options) { + const char *word, *state; + size_t l; + int r; + + assert(options); + + FOREACH_WORD_SEPARATOR(word, l, options, ",", state) { + _cleanup_free_ char *o; + + o = strndup(word, l); + if (!o) + return -ENOMEM; + r = parse_one_option(o); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + /* sanity-check options */ + if (arg_type != NULL && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { + if (arg_offset) + log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type); + if (arg_skip) + log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void log_glue(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) { + log_debug("%s", msg); +} + +static int disk_major_minor(const char *path, char **ret) { + struct stat st; + + assert(path); + + if (stat(path, &st) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (asprintf(ret, "/dev/block/%d:%d", major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0) + return -errno; + + return 0; +} + +static char* disk_description(const char *path) { + + static const char name_fields[] = + "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME\0" + "DM_NAME\0" + "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0" + "ID_MODEL\0"; + + _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL; + struct stat st; + const char *i; + int r; + + assert(path); + + if (stat(path, &st) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) + return NULL; + + r = sd_device_new_from_devnum(&device, 'b', st.st_rdev); + if (r < 0) + return NULL; + + NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields) { + const char *name; + + r = sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name); + if (r >= 0 && !isempty(name)) + return strdup(name); + } + + return NULL; +} + +static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) { + _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL; + _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL; + struct mntent *m; + + /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */ + + if (asprintf(&device, "/dev/mapper/%s", label) < 0) + return NULL; + + f = setmntent("/etc/fstab", "r"); + if (!f) + return NULL; + + while ((m = getmntent(f))) + if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device)) + return strdup(m->mnt_dir); + + return NULL; +} + +static int get_password(const char *vol, const char *src, usec_t until, bool accept_cached, char ***ret) { + _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *name_buffer = NULL, *mount_point = NULL, *maj_min = NULL, *text = NULL, *escaped_name = NULL; + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; + const char *name = NULL; + char **p, *id; + int r = 0; + + assert(vol); + assert(src); + assert(ret); + + description = disk_description(src); + mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol); + + if (description && streq(vol, description)) + /* If the description string is simply the + * volume name, then let's not show this + * twice */ + description = mfree(description); + + if (mount_point && description) + r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point); + else if (mount_point) + r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point); + else if (description) + r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol); + + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + name = name_buffer ? name_buffer : vol; + + if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s!", name) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + if (src) + (void) disk_major_minor(src, &maj_min); + + if (maj_min) { + escaped_name = maj_min; + maj_min = NULL; + } else + escaped_name = cescape(name); + + if (!escaped_name) + return log_oom(); + + id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", escaped_name); + + r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until, + ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED), + &passwords); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m"); + + if (arg_verify) { + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL; + + assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1); + + if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s! (verification)", name) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", escaped_name); + + r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until, ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, &passwords2); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m"); + + assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1); + + if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0])) { + log_warning("Passwords did not match, retrying."); + return -EAGAIN; + } + } + + strv_uniq(passwords); + + STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { + char *c; + + if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size) + continue; + + /* Pad password if necessary */ + c = new(char, arg_key_size); + if (!c) + return log_oom(); + + strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size); + free(*p); + *p = c; + } + + *ret = passwords; + passwords = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int attach_tcrypt( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + char **passwords, + uint32_t flags) { + + int r = 0; + _cleanup_free_ char *passphrase = NULL; + struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = { + .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES, + .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, + .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles) + }; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(key_file || (passwords && passwords[0])); + + if (arg_tcrypt_hidden) + params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER; + + if (arg_tcrypt_system) + params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER; + + if (key_file) { + r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase); + if (r < 0) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + params.passphrase = passphrase; + } else + params.passphrase = passwords[0]; + params.passphrase_size = strlen(params.passphrase); + + r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); + if (r < 0) { + if (key_file && r == -EPERM) { + log_error("Failed to activate using password file '%s'.", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + return r; + } + + return crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags); +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain(struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + const char *data_device, + char **passwords, + uint32_t flags) { + int r = 0; + bool pass_volume_key = false; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(key_file || passwords); + + if (!arg_type || streq(arg_type, CRYPT_LUKS1)) { + r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL); + if (r < 0) { + log_error("crypt_load() failed on device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + return r; + } + + if (data_device) + r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, data_device); + } + + if ((!arg_type && r < 0) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { + struct crypt_params_plain params = { + .offset = arg_offset, + .skip = arg_skip, + }; + const char *cipher, *cipher_mode; + _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL; + + if (arg_hash) { + /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */ + if (!streq(arg_hash, "plain")) + params.hash = arg_hash; + } else if (!key_file) + /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup + * package is to not hash when a key file is provided */ + params.hash = "ripemd160"; + + if (arg_cipher) { + size_t l; + + l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-"); + truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l); + if (!truncated_cipher) + return log_oom(); + + cipher = truncated_cipher; + cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain"; + } else { + cipher = "aes"; + cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256"; + } + + /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads + * from keyfile to key length, and + * ignore keyfile-size */ + arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size; + + /* In contrast to what the name + * crypt_setup() might suggest this + * doesn't actually format anything, + * it just configures encryption + * parameters when used for plain + * mode. */ + r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms); + + /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */ + pass_volume_key = (params.hash == NULL); + } + + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m"); + + log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.", + crypt_get_cipher(cd), + crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), + crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8, + crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + + if (key_file) { + r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, flags); + if (r < 0) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + } else { + char **p; + + STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { + if (pass_volume_key) + r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags); + else + r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags); + + if (r >= 0) + break; + } + } + + return r; +} + +static int help(void) { + + printf("%s attach VOLUME SOURCEDEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS]\n" + "%s detach VOLUME\n\n" + "Attaches or detaches an encrypted block device.\n", + program_invocation_short_name, + program_invocation_short_name); + + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + int r = EXIT_FAILURE; + struct crypt_device *cd = NULL; + + if (argc <= 1) { + help(); + return EXIT_SUCCESS; + } + + if (argc < 3) { + log_error("This program requires at least two arguments."); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + log_set_target(LOG_TARGET_AUTO); + log_parse_environment(); + log_open(); + + umask(0022); + + if (streq(argv[1], "attach")) { + uint32_t flags = 0; + int k; + unsigned tries; + usec_t until; + crypt_status_info status; + const char *key_file = NULL; + + /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS] */ + + if (argc < 4) { + log_error("attach requires at least two arguments."); + goto finish; + } + + if (argc >= 5 && + argv[4][0] && + !streq(argv[4], "-") && + !streq(argv[4], "none")) { + + if (!path_is_absolute(argv[4])) + log_error("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", argv[4]); + else + key_file = argv[4]; + } + + if (argc >= 6 && argv[5][0] && !streq(argv[5], "-")) { + if (parse_options(argv[5]) < 0) + goto finish; + } + + /* A delicious drop of snake oil */ + mlockall(MCL_FUTURE); + + if (arg_header) { + log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header); + k = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header); + } else + k = crypt_init(&cd, argv[3]); + if (k) { + log_error_errno(k, "crypt_init() failed: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + crypt_set_log_callback(cd, log_glue, NULL); + + status = crypt_status(cd, argv[2]); + if (status == CRYPT_ACTIVE || status == CRYPT_BUSY) { + log_info("Volume %s already active.", argv[2]); + r = EXIT_SUCCESS; + goto finish; + } + + if (arg_readonly) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY; + + if (arg_discards) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS; + + if (arg_timeout > 0) + until = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) + arg_timeout; + else + until = 0; + + arg_key_size = (arg_key_size > 0 ? arg_key_size : (256 / 8)); + + if (key_file) { + struct stat st; + + /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a + * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */ + if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005)) + log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file); + } + + for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) { + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; + + if (!key_file) { + k = get_password(argv[2], argv[3], until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, &passwords); + if (k == -EAGAIN) + continue; + else if (k < 0) + goto finish; + } + + if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) + k = attach_tcrypt(cd, argv[2], key_file, passwords, flags); + else + k = attach_luks_or_plain(cd, + argv[2], + key_file, + arg_header ? argv[3] : NULL, + passwords, + flags); + if (k >= 0) + break; + else if (k == -EAGAIN) { + key_file = NULL; + continue; + } else if (k != -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(k, "Failed to activate: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + log_warning("Invalid passphrase."); + } + + if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries) { + log_error("Too many attempts; giving up."); + r = EXIT_FAILURE; + goto finish; + } + + } else if (streq(argv[1], "detach")) { + int k; + + k = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, argv[2]); + if (k == -ENODEV) { + log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", argv[2]); + r = EXIT_SUCCESS; + goto finish; + } else if (k) { + log_error_errno(k, "crypt_init_by_name() failed: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + crypt_set_log_callback(cd, log_glue, NULL); + + k = crypt_deactivate(cd, argv[2]); + if (k < 0) { + log_error_errno(k, "Failed to deactivate: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + } else { + log_error("Unknown verb %s.", argv[1]); + goto finish; + } + + r = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +finish: + + if (cd) + crypt_free(cd); + + free(arg_cipher); + free(arg_hash); + free(arg_header); + strv_free(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles); + + return r; +} diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.target b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.target new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..25d3e33f6a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/cryptsetup.target @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# This file is part of systemd. +# +# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. + +[Unit] +Description=Encrypted Volumes +Documentation=man:systemd.special(7) diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/crypttab.xml b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/crypttab.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b8d4aa3d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/crypttab.xml @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ + + + + + + + + crypttab + systemd + + + + Documentation + Miloslav + Trmac + mitr@redhat.com + + + Documentation + Lennart + Poettering + lennart@poettering.net + + + + + + crypttab + 5 + + + + crypttab + Configuration for encrypted block devices + + + + /etc/crypttab + + + + Description + + The /etc/crypttab file describes + encrypted block devices that are set up during system boot. + + Empty lines and lines starting with the # + character are ignored. Each of the remaining lines describes one + encrypted block device, fields on the line are delimited by white + space. The first two fields are mandatory, the remaining two are + optional. + + Setting up encrypted block devices using this file supports + three encryption modes: LUKS, TrueCrypt and plain. See + cryptsetup8 + for more information about each mode. When no mode is specified in + the options field and the block device contains a LUKS signature, + it is opened as a LUKS device; otherwise, it is assumed to be in + raw dm-crypt (plain mode) format. + + The first field contains the name of the resulting encrypted + block device; the device is set up within + /dev/mapper/. + + The second field contains a path to the underlying block + device or file, or a specification of a block device via + UUID= followed by the UUID. + + The third field specifies the encryption password. If the + field is not present or the password is set to + none or -, the password has + to be manually entered during system boot. Otherwise, the field is + interpreted as an absolute path to a file containing the encryption + password. For swap encryption, /dev/urandom + or the hardware device /dev/hw_random can be + used as the password file; using /dev/random + may prevent boot completion if the system does not have enough + entropy to generate a truly random encryption key. + + The fourth field, if present, is a comma-delimited list of + options. The following options are recognized: + + + + + + + Allow discard requests to be passed through + the encrypted block device. This improves performance on SSD + storage but has security implications. + + + + + + Specifies the cipher to use. See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values and the default value of this option. A + cipher with unpredictable IV values, such as + aes-cbc-essiv:sha256, is + recommended. + + + + + + Specifies the hash to use for password + hashing. See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values and the default value of this + option. + + + + + + Use a detached (separated) metadata device or + file where the LUKS header is stored. This option is only + relevant for LUKS devices. See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values and the default value of this + option. + + + + + + Start offset in the backend device, in 512-byte sectors. + This option is only relevant for plain devices. + + + + + + + How many 512-byte sectors of the encrypted data to skip + at the beginning. This is different from the + option with respect to the sector numbers used in initialization vector + (IV) calculation. Using will shift the IV + calculation by the same negative amount. Hence, if is given, + sector n will get a sector number of 0 for the IV calculation. + Using causes sector n to also be the first + sector of the mapped device, but with its number for IV generation being n. + + This option is only relevant for plain devices. + + + + + + + Specifies the number of bytes to skip at the + start of the key file. See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values and the default value of this + option. + + + + + + Specifies the maximum number of bytes to read + from the key file. See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values and the default value of this option. This + option is ignored in plain encryption mode, as the key file + size is then given by the key size. + + + + + + Specifies the key slot to compare the + passphrase or key against. If the key slot does not match the + given passphrase or key, but another would, the setup of the + device will fail regardless. This option implies + . See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values. The default is to try all key slots in + sequential order. + + + + + + Force LUKS mode. When this mode is used, the + following options are ignored since they are provided by the + LUKS header on the device: , + , + . + + + + + + This device will not be automatically unlocked + on boot. + + + + + + The system will not wait for the device to + show up and be unlocked at boot, and not fail the boot if it + does not show up. + + + + + + Force plain encryption mode. + + + + + + Set up the encrypted block device in read-only + mode. + + + + + + Specifies the key size in bits. See + cryptsetup8 + for possible values and the default value of this + option. + + + + + + The encrypted block device will be used as a + swap device, and will be formatted accordingly after setting + up the encrypted block device, with + mkswap8. + This option implies . + + WARNING: Using the option will + destroy the contents of the named partition during every boot, + so make sure the underlying block device is specified + correctly. + + + + + + Use TrueCrypt encryption mode. When this mode + is used, the following options are ignored since they are + provided by the TrueCrypt header on the device or do not + apply: + , + , + , + , + . + + When this mode is used, the passphrase is read from the + key file given in the third field. Only the first line of this + file is read, excluding the new line character. + + Note that the TrueCrypt format uses both passphrase and + key files to derive a password for the volume. Therefore, the + passphrase and all key files need to be provided. Use + to provide the absolute path + to all key files. When using an empty passphrase in + combination with one or more key files, use + /dev/null as the password file in the third + field. + + + + + + Use the hidden TrueCrypt volume. This option + implies . + + This will map the hidden volume that is inside of the + volume provided in the second field. Please note that there is + no protection for the hidden volume if the outer volume is + mounted instead. See + cryptsetup8 + for more information on this limitation. + + + + + + Specifies the absolute path to a key file to + use for a TrueCrypt volume. This implies + and can be used more than once to + provide several key files. + + See the entry for on the + behavior of the passphrase and key files when using TrueCrypt + encryption mode. + + + + + + Use TrueCrypt in system encryption mode. This + option implies . + + + + + + Specifies the timeout for querying for a + password. If no unit is specified, seconds is used. Supported + units are s, ms, us, min, h, d. A timeout of 0 waits + indefinitely (which is the default). + + + + + + Specifies how long systemd should wait for a + device to show up before giving up on the entry. The argument + is a time in seconds or explicitly specified units of + s, + min, + h, + ms. + + + + + + + The encrypted block device will be prepared + for using it as /tmp; it will be + formatted using + mke2fs8. + This option implies . + + WARNING: Using the option will + destroy the contents of the named partition during every boot, + so make sure the underlying block device is specified + correctly. + + + + + + Specifies the maximum number of times the user + is queried for a password. The default is 3. If set to 0, the + user is queried for a password indefinitely. + + + + + + If the encryption password is read from + console, it has to be entered twice to prevent + typos. + + + + + At early boot and when the system manager configuration is + reloaded, this file is translated into native systemd units by + systemd-cryptsetup-generator8. + + + + Example + + /etc/crypttab example + Set up four encrypted block devices. One using LUKS for + normal storage, another one for usage as a swap device and two + TrueCrypt volumes. + + luks UUID=2505567a-9e27-4efe-a4d5-15ad146c258b +swap /dev/sda7 /dev/urandom swap +truecrypt /dev/sda2 /etc/container_password tcrypt +hidden /mnt/tc_hidden /dev/null tcrypt-hidden,tcrypt-keyfile=/etc/keyfile + + + + + See Also + + systemd1, + systemd-cryptsetup@.service8, + systemd-cryptsetup-generator8, + cryptsetup8, + mkswap8, + mke2fs8 + + + + diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup-generator.xml b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup-generator.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f036ab9744 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup-generator.xml @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ + + + + + + + + systemd-cryptsetup-generator + systemd + + + + Developer + Lennart + Poettering + lennart@poettering.net + + + + + + systemd-cryptsetup-generator + 8 + + + + systemd-cryptsetup-generator + Unit generator for /etc/crypttab + + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/systemd-cryptsetup-generator + + + + Description + + systemd-cryptsetup-generator is a + generator that translates /etc/crypttab into + native systemd units early at boot and when configuration of the + system manager is reloaded. This will create + systemd-cryptsetup@.service8 + units as necessary. + + systemd-cryptsetup-generator implements + systemd.generator7. + + + + Kernel Command Line + + systemd-cryptsetup-generator + understands the following kernel command line parameters: + + + + luks= + rd.luks= + + Takes a boolean argument. Defaults to + yes. If no, disables the + generator entirely. rd.luks= is honored + only by initial RAM disk (initrd) while + luks= is honored by both the main system + and the initrd. + + + + luks.crypttab= + rd.luks.crypttab= + + Takes a boolean argument. Defaults to + yes. If no, causes the + generator to ignore any devices configured in + /etc/crypttab + (luks.uuid= will still work however). + rd.luks.crypttab= is honored only by + initial RAM disk (initrd) while + luks.crypttab= is honored by both the main + system and the initrd. + + + + luks.uuid= + rd.luks.uuid= + + Takes a LUKS superblock UUID as argument. This + will activate the specified device as part of the boot process + as if it was listed in /etc/crypttab. + This option may be specified more than once in order to set up + multiple devices. rd.luks.uuid= is honored + only by initial RAM disk (initrd) while + luks.uuid= is honored by both the main + system and the initrd. + If /etc/crypttab contains entries with the same UUID, + then the name, keyfile and options specified there will be + used. Otherwise, the device will have the name + luks-UUID. + If /etc/crypttab exists, only those UUIDs + specified on the kernel command line + will be activated in the initrd or the real root. + + + + + luks.name= + rd.luks.name= + + Takes a LUKS super block UUID followed by an + = and a name. This implies + rd.luks.uuid= or + luks.uuid= and will additionally make the + LUKS device given by the UUID appear under the provided + name. + + rd.luks.name= is honored only by + initial RAM disk (initrd) while luks.name= + is honored by both the main system and the initrd. + + + + + luks.options= + rd.luks.options= + + Takes a LUKS super block UUID followed by an + = and a string of options separated by + commas as argument. This will override the options for the + given UUID. + If only a list of options, without an UUID, is + specified, they apply to any UUIDs not specified elsewhere, + and without an entry in + /etc/crypttab. + rd.luks.options= is honored only by initial + RAM disk (initrd) while luks.options= is + honored by both the main system and the initrd. + + + + + luks.key= + rd.luks.key= + + Takes a password file name as argument or a + LUKS super block UUID followed by a = and a + password file name. + + For those entries specified with + rd.luks.uuid= or + luks.uuid=, the password file will be set + to the one specified by rd.luks.key= or + luks.key= of the corresponding UUID, or the + password file that was specified without a UUID. + rd.luks.key= + is honored only by initial RAM disk + (initrd) while + luks.key= is + honored by both the main system and + the initrd. + + + + + + + See Also + + systemd1, + crypttab5, + systemd-cryptsetup@.service8, + cryptsetup8, + systemd-fstab-generator8 + + + + diff --git a/src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup@.service.xml b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup@.service.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea524851eb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-cryptsetup@.service.xml @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ + + + + + + + + systemd-cryptsetup@.service + systemd + + + + Developer + Lennart + Poettering + lennart@poettering.net + + + + + + systemd-cryptsetup@.service + 8 + + + + systemd-cryptsetup@.service + systemd-cryptsetup + Full disk decryption logic + + + + systemd-cryptsetup@.service + /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup + + + + Description + + systemd-cryptsetup@.service is a + service responsible for setting up encrypted block devices. It is + instantiated for each device that requires decryption for + access. + + systemd-cryptsetup@.service will ask + for hard disk passwords via the + password agent logic, in order to query the user for the + password using the right mechanism at boot and during + runtime. + + At early boot and when the system manager configuration is + reloaded this /etc/crypttab is translated + into systemd-cryptsetup@.service units by + systemd-cryptsetup-generator8. + + + + See Also + + systemd1, + systemd-cryptsetup-generator8, + crypttab5, + cryptsetup8 + + + + -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf