diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'testing/coreutils')
| -rw-r--r-- | testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD | 69 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch | 428 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch | 173 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | testing/coreutils/coreutils.install | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | testing/coreutils/su.pam | 9 |
5 files changed, 0 insertions, 700 deletions
diff --git a/testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD b/testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD deleted file mode 100644 index 6d75f0659..000000000 --- a/testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -# $Id: PKGBUILD 127042 2011-06-10 00:56:53Z bisson $ -# Maintainer: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org> -# Contributor: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org> - -pkgname=coreutils -pkgver=8.12 -pkgrel=3 -pkgdesc="The basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities of the GNU operating system" -arch=('i686' 'x86_64') -license=('GPL3') -url="http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils" -groups=('base') -depends=('glibc' 'shadow' 'pam' 'acl' 'gmp' 'libcap') -replaces=('mktemp') -backup=('etc/pam.d/su') -install=${pkgname}.install -options=('!emptydirs') -source=(ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz - coreutils-uname.patch - coreutils-pam.patch - su.pam) -md5sums=('0f7d43c2d2e24314b43a6c6267e25b90' - 'c4fcca138b6abf6d443d48a6f0cd8833' - 'aad79a2aa6d566c375d7bdd1b0767278' - 'fa85e5cce5d723275b14365ba71a8aad') - -build() { - cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver} - - # added su wheel group pam patch (from fedora git) - patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-pam.patch - - # linux specific uname improvement (from gentoo portage) - patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-uname.patch - - autoreconf -v - ./configure --prefix=/usr \ - --enable-install-program=su \ - --enable-no-install-program=groups,hostname,kill,uptime \ - --enable-pam - make -} - -check() { - cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver} - make RUN_EXPENSIVE_TESTS=yes check -} - -package() { - cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver} - make DESTDIR=${pkgdir} install - - cd ${pkgdir}/usr/bin - install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/{bin,usr/sbin} - - # binaries required by FHS - _fhs="cat chgrp chmod chown cp date dd df echo false ln ls \ - mkdir mknod mv pwd rm rmdir stty su sync true uname" - mv ${_fhs} ${pkgdir}/bin - - # binaries required by various Arch scripts - _bin="cut dir dircolors du install mkfifo readlink shred \ - sleep touch tr vdir" - mv ${_bin} ${pkgdir}/bin - ln -sf /bin/sleep ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/sleep - - mv chroot ${pkgdir}/usr/sbin - install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/su.pam ${pkgdir}/etc/pam.d/su -} diff --git a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch b/testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e61908f3f..000000000 --- a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,428 +0,0 @@ -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac 2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100 -@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then - AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS]) - fi - -+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM -+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl -+[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries], -+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM]) -+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc" -+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)]) -+ - AC_FUNC_FORK - - optional_bin_progs= -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100 -@@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.). - @findex syslog - @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report - failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts. (If the system --supports @code{syslog}.) However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the --user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below. -+supports @code{syslog}.) -+ -+This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for -+authentication. You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its -+behaviour. - - The program accepts the following options. Also see @ref{Common options}. - -@@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM}, - @env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value. Change to @var{user}'s home - directory. Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it - read its login startup file(s). -+Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables -+are preserved as well for PAM functionality. - - @item -m - @itemx -p -@@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status: - the exit status of the subshell otherwise - @end display - --@cindex wheel group, not supported --@cindex group wheel, not supported --@cindex fascism --@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group -- --(This section is by Richard Stallman.) -- --@cindex Twenex --@cindex MIT AI lab --Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the --rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to --seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and --keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup --and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I --wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.) -- --However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual --@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who --sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The --``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the --power of the rulers. -- --I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are --used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you --might find this idea strange at first. -- -- - @node timeout invocation - @section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit - -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100 -@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP) - uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS) - - # for crypt --su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) -+su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@ - - # for various ACL functions - copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL) -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100 -@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ - restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to - be fascist. - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ -+ Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a -+ wheel group is enforced by su. RMS tries to restrict your access -+ to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that -+ to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to -+ enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf -+ -+#endif -+ - Compile-time options: - -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog. - -DSYSLOG_FAILURE Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog. -@@ -53,6 +63,15 @@ - #include <pwd.h> - #include <grp.h> - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+# include <signal.h> -+# include <sys/wait.h> -+# include <sys/fsuid.h> -+# include <unistd.h> -+# include <security/pam_appl.h> -+# include <security/pam_misc.h> -+#endif /* USE_PAM */ -+ - #include "system.h" - #include "getpass.h" - -@@ -120,10 +139,17 @@ - /* The user to become if none is specified. */ - #define DEFAULT_USER "root" - -+#ifndef USE_PAM - char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt); -+#endif - --static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t) -+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t, -+ const struct passwd *) -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ ; -+#else - ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN; -+#endif - - /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell. */ - static bool fast_startup; -@@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su - } - #endif - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+static int retval; -+static struct pam_conv conv = { -+ misc_conv, -+ NULL -+}; -+ -+#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \ -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \ -+ return 0; \ -+} -+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) { \ -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \ -+return; \ -+} -+#endif -+ - /* Ask the user for a password. -+ If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary. - Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW, - false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0 - or if PW has an empty password. */ -@@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su - static bool - correct_password (const struct passwd *pw) - { -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ struct passwd *caller; -+ char *tty_name, *ttyn; -+ retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ -+ if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ caller = getpwuid(getuid()); -+ if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) { -+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ } -+ -+ ttyn = ttyname(0); -+ if (ttyn) { -+ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0) -+ tty_name = ttyn+5; -+ else -+ tty_name = ttyn; -+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ } -+ retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); -+ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { -+ /* password has expired. Offer option to change it. */ -+ retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ } -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */ -+ return 1; -+#else /* !USE_PAM */ - char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct; - #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP - /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */ -@@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p - encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct); - memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted)); - return STREQ (encrypted, correct); -+#endif /* !USE_PAM */ - } - - /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being -@@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd - /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH. - Unset all other environment variables. */ - char const *term = getenv ("TERM"); -+ char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY"); -+ char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY"); - if (term) - term = xstrdup (term); - environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *)); - environ[0] = NULL; - if (term) - xsetenv ("TERM", term); -+ if (display) -+ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display); -+ if (xauthority) -+ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority); - xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir); - xsetenv ("SHELL", shell); - xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name); -@@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw - { - #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS - errno = 0; -- if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) -+ if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) { -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT); -+#endif - error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups")); -+ } - endgrent (); - #endif - if (setgid (pw->pw_gid)) -@@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw - error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id")); - } - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static int caught=0; -+/* Signal handler for parent process later */ -+static void su_catch_sig(int sig) -+{ -+ ++caught; -+} -+ -+int -+pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh) -+{ -+ char **env; -+ -+ env = pam_getenvlist(pamh); -+ if(env) { -+ while(*env) { -+ if (putenv (*env)) -+ xalloc_die (); -+ env++; -+ } -+ } -+ return(0); -+} -+#endif -+ - /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty. - If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option. - Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there -@@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw - - static void - run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args, -- size_t n_additional_args) -+ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw) - { - size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1; - char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args); - size_t argno = 1; -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ int child; -+ sigset_t ourset; -+ int status; -+ -+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n"); -+ exit (1); -+ } -+ -+/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may -+ be passed even in the session phase -+*/ -+ if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS) -+ fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n"); -+ -+ /* Credentials should be set in the parent */ -+ if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ child = fork(); -+ if (child == 0) { /* child shell */ -+ change_identity (pw); -+ pam_end(pamh, 0); -+#endif - - if (simulate_login) - { - char *arg0; - char *shell_basename; - -+ if(chdir(pw->pw_dir)) -+ error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir); -+ - shell_basename = last_component (shell); - arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2); - arg0[0] = '-'; -@@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const - error (0, errno, "%s", shell); - exit (exit_status); - } -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ } else if (child == -1) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT); -+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ /* parent only */ -+ sigfillset(&ourset); -+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME); -+ caught = 1; -+ } -+ if (!caught) { -+ struct sigaction action; -+ action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig; -+ sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask); -+ action.sa_flags = 0; -+ sigemptyset(&ourset); -+ if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM) -+ || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM) -+ || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL) -+ || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME); -+ caught = 1; -+ } -+ } -+ if (!caught) { -+ do { -+ int pid; -+ -+ pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED); -+ -+ if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) { -+ kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status)); -+ /* once we get here, we must have resumed */ -+ kill(pid, SIGCONT); -+ } -+ } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status)); -+ } -+ -+ if (caught) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell..."); -+ kill (child, SIGTERM); -+ } -+ /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */ -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT); -+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID; -+ retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); -+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID; -+ if (caught) { -+ sleep(2); -+ kill(child, SIGKILL); -+ fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n"); -+ exit(-1); -+ } -+ exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status) -+ : WTERMSIG (status) + 128); -+#endif /* USE_PAM */ - } - - /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by -@@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) - shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell); - modify_environment (pw, shell); - -+#ifndef USE_PAM - change_identity (pw); -- if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0) -- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir); -+#endif - - /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure. - Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of -@@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) - if (ferror (stderr)) - exit (EXIT_CANCELED); - -- run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind)); -+ run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw); - } diff --git a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch b/testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b458abeba..000000000 --- a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,173 +0,0 @@ -On linux platforms, grok /proc/cpuinfo for the CPU/vendor info. - -Prob not suitable for upstream seeing as how it's 100% linux-specific -http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-coreutils/2005-09/msg00063.html - -Patch originally by Carlos E. Gorges <carlos@techlinux.com.br>, but -heavily reworked to suck less. - -To add support for additional platforms, check out the show_cpuinfo() -func in the linux/arch/<ARCH>/ source tree of the kernel. - ---- coreutils/src/uname.c -+++ coreutils/src/uname.c -@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ - # include <mach-o/arch.h> - #endif - -+#if defined(__linux__) -+# define USE_PROCINFO -+# define UNAME_HARDWARE_PLATFORM -+#endif -+ - #include "system.h" - #include "error.h" - #include "quote.h" -@@ -138,6 +143,117 @@ - exit (status); - } - -+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO) -+ -+# if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) -+# define CPUINFO_FILE "/proc/sysinfo" -+# define CPUINFO_FORMAT "%64[^\t :]%*[ :]%256[^\n]%c" -+# else -+# define CPUINFO_FILE "/proc/cpuinfo" -+# define CPUINFO_FORMAT "%64[^\t:]\t:%256[^\n]%c" -+# endif -+ -+# define PROCINFO_PROCESSOR 0 -+# define PROCINFO_HARDWARE_PLATFORM 1 -+ -+static void __eat_cpuinfo_space(char *buf) -+{ -+ /* first eat trailing space */ -+ char *tmp = buf + strlen(buf) - 1; -+ while (tmp > buf && isspace(*tmp)) -+ *tmp-- = '\0'; -+ /* then eat leading space */ -+ tmp = buf; -+ while (*tmp && isspace(*tmp)) -+ tmp++; -+ if (tmp != buf) -+ memmove(buf, tmp, strlen(tmp)+1); -+ /* finally collapse whitespace */ -+ tmp = buf; -+ while (tmp[0] && tmp[1]) { -+ if (isspace(tmp[0]) && isspace(tmp[1])) { -+ memmove(tmp, tmp+1, strlen(tmp)); -+ continue; -+ } -+ ++tmp; -+ } -+} -+ -+static int __linux_procinfo(int x, char *fstr, size_t s) -+{ -+ FILE *fp; -+ -+ char *procinfo_keys[] = { -+ /* --processor --hardware-platform */ -+ #if defined(__alpha__) -+ "cpu model", "system type" -+ #elif defined(__arm__) -+ "Processor", "Hardware" -+ #elif defined(__avr32__) -+ "processor", "cpu family" -+ #elif defined(__bfin__) -+ "CPU", "BOARD Name" -+ #elif defined(__cris__) -+ "cpu", "cpu model" -+ #elif defined(__frv__) -+ "CPU-Core", "System" -+ #elif defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) -+ "model name", "vendor_id" -+ #elif defined(__ia64__) -+ "family", "vendor" -+ #elif defined(__hppa__) -+ "cpu", "model" -+ #elif defined(__m68k__) -+ "CPU", "MMU" -+ #elif defined(__mips__) -+ "cpu model", "system type" -+ #elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__) -+ "cpu", "machine" -+ #elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) -+ "Type", "Manufacturer" -+ #elif defined(__sh__) -+ "cpu type", "machine" -+ #elif defined(sparc) || defined(__sparc__) -+ "type", "cpu" -+ #elif defined(__vax__) -+ "cpu type", "cpu" -+ #else -+ "unknown", "unknown" -+ #endif -+ }; -+ -+ if ((fp = fopen(CPUINFO_FILE, "r")) != NULL) { -+ char key[65], value[257], eol, *ret = NULL; -+ -+ while (fscanf(fp, CPUINFO_FORMAT, key, value, &eol) != EOF) { -+ __eat_cpuinfo_space(key); -+ if (!strcmp(key, procinfo_keys[x])) { -+ __eat_cpuinfo_space(value); -+ ret = value; -+ break; -+ } -+ if (eol != '\n') { -+ /* we need two fscanf's here in case the previous -+ * length limit caused us to read right up to the -+ * newline ... doing "%*[^\n]\n" wont eat the newline -+ */ -+ fscanf(fp, "%*[^\n]"); -+ fscanf(fp, "\n"); -+ } -+ } -+ fclose(fp); -+ -+ if (ret) { -+ strncpy(fstr, ret, s); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return -1; -+} -+ -+#endif -+ - /* Print ELEMENT, preceded by a space if something has already been - printed. */ - -@@ -250,10 +344,14 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) - if (toprint & PRINT_PROCESSOR) - { - char const *element = unknown; --#if HAVE_SYSINFO && defined SI_ARCHITECTURE -+#if ( HAVE_SYSINFO && defined SI_ARCHITECTURE ) || defined(USE_PROCINFO) - { - static char processor[257]; -+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO) -+ if (0 <= __linux_procinfo (PROCINFO_PROCESSOR, processor, sizeof processor)) -+#else - if (0 <= sysinfo (SI_ARCHITECTURE, processor, sizeof processor)) -+#endif - element = processor; - } - #endif -@@ -306,9 +404,13 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) - if (element == unknown) - { - static char hardware_platform[257]; -+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO) -+ if (0 <= __linux_procinfo (PROCINFO_HARDWARE_PLATFORM, hardware_platform, sizeof hardware_platform)) -+#else - size_t s = sizeof hardware_platform; - static int mib[] = { CTL_HW, UNAME_HARDWARE_PLATFORM }; - if (sysctl (mib, 2, hardware_platform, &s, 0, 0) >= 0) -+#endif - element = hardware_platform; - } - #endif diff --git a/testing/coreutils/coreutils.install b/testing/coreutils/coreutils.install deleted file mode 100644 index 8caae6686..000000000 --- a/testing/coreutils/coreutils.install +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -infodir=usr/share/info -filelist=(coreutils.info) - -post_install() { - [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0 - for file in ${filelist[@]}; do - usr/bin/install-info $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null - done -} - -post_upgrade() { - post_install $1 -} - -pre_remove() { - [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0 - for file in ${filelist[@]}; do - usr/bin/install-info --delete $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null - done -} - diff --git a/testing/coreutils/su.pam b/testing/coreutils/su.pam deleted file mode 100644 index cf15f40f1..000000000 --- a/testing/coreutils/su.pam +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -#%PAM-1.0 -auth sufficient pam_rootok.so -# Uncomment the following line to implicitly trust users in the "wheel" group. -#auth sufficient pam_wheel.so trust use_uid -# Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group. -#auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid -auth required pam_unix.so -account required pam_unix.so -session required pam_unix.so |