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-rw-r--r--extra/libseccomp/PKGBUILD6
-rw-r--r--extra/libxi/PKGBUILD24
-rw-r--r--extra/libxi/git-fixes.diff1352
-rw-r--r--extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch82
-rw-r--r--extra/mesa/PKGBUILD29
-rw-r--r--extra/r/PKGBUILD6
-rw-r--r--extra/vc/PKGBUILD17
-rw-r--r--extra/x2goserver/PKGBUILD6
8 files changed, 1486 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/extra/libseccomp/PKGBUILD b/extra/libseccomp/PKGBUILD
index 9bdaee4fc..ccca4c4b5 100644
--- a/extra/libseccomp/PKGBUILD
+++ b/extra/libseccomp/PKGBUILD
@@ -2,15 +2,14 @@
# Contributor: Patryk Kowalczyk < patryk at kowalczyk dot ws>
pkgname=libseccomp
-pkgver=2.0.0
-pkgrel=2
+pkgver=2.1.0
+pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Enhanced seccomp library'
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
license=('LGPL2.1')
url="http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/"
depends=('glibc')
source=("http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz")
-md5sums=('f988feac6a3425f2c918f32b28df1caa')
build() {
cd $pkgname-$pkgver
@@ -22,3 +21,4 @@ package() {
cd $pkgname-$pkgver
make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
}
+md5sums=('3961103c1234c13a810f6a12e60c797f')
diff --git a/extra/libxi/PKGBUILD b/extra/libxi/PKGBUILD
index d65f5cee3..2188d0230 100644
--- a/extra/libxi/PKGBUILD
+++ b/extra/libxi/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,28 +1,42 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 182037 2013-04-05 19:09:17Z andyrtr $
+# $Id: PKGBUILD 188841 2013-06-22 12:22:10Z lcarlier $
# Maintainer: AndyRTR <andyrtr@archlinux.org>
# Maintainer: Jan de Groot <jgc@archlinux.org>
pkgname=libxi
pkgver=1.7.1
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="X11 Input extension library"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://xorg.freedesktop.org"
depends=('libxext' 'inputproto')
-makedepends=('pkgconfig' 'xorg-util-macros' 'libxfixes')
+makedepends=('pkgconfig' 'xorg-util-macros' 'libxfixes' 'automake')
options=(!libtool)
license=('custom')
-source=(${url}/releases/individual/lib/libXi-${pkgver}.tar.bz2)
-sha256sums=('e92adb6b69c53c51e05c1e65db97e23751b935a693000fb0606c11b88c0066c5')
+source=(${url}/releases/individual/lib/libXi-${pkgver}.tar.bz2
+ git-fixes.diff)
+sha256sums=('e92adb6b69c53c51e05c1e65db97e23751b935a693000fb0606c11b88c0066c5'
+ '23e10f8a8a078dd109acbd5a66fe62a45233d3a2368649d5114107a790594c07')
+
+prepare() {
+ cd "${srcdir}/libXi-${pkgver}"
+
+ # fix CVE-2013-1998 CVE-2013-1984 CVE-2013-1995 merged upstream
+ patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/git-fixes.diff
+
+ # a patch change configure.ac
+ autoreconf -fiv
+}
build() {
cd "${srcdir}/libXi-${pkgver}"
+
./configure --prefix=/usr --sysconfdir=/etc --disable-static
make
}
package() {
cd "${srcdir}/libXi-${pkgver}"
+
make DESTDIR="${pkgdir}" install
install -m755 -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
diff --git a/extra/libxi/git-fixes.diff b/extra/libxi/git-fixes.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4c542d980
--- /dev/null
+++ b/extra/libxi/git-fixes.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,1352 @@
+From bb82c72a1d69eaf60b7586570faf797df967f661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 18:39:34 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 01/15] Expand comment on the memory vs. reply ordering in
+ XIGetSelectedEvents()
+
+Unpacking from the wire involves un-interleaving the structs & masks,
+which wasn't obvious to me the first time I read it, so make notes
+before I forget again.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XISelEv.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XISelEv.c b/src/XISelEv.c
+index fa7eb54..f871222 100644
+--- a/src/XISelEv.c
++++ b/src/XISelEv.c
+@@ -135,8 +135,14 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+
+ _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, reply.length * 4);
+
+- /* Memory layout of the XIEventMask for a 3 mask reply:
+- * [struct a][struct b][struct c][masks a][masks b][masks c]
++ /*
++ * This function takes interleaved xXIEventMask structs & masks off
++ * the wire, such as this 3 mask reply:
++ * [struct a][masks a][struct b][masks b][struct c][masks c]
++ * And generates a memory buffer to be returned to callers in which
++ * they are not interleaved, so that callers can treat the returned
++ * pointer as a simple array of XIEventMask structs, such as:
++ * [struct a][struct b][struct c][masks a][masks b][masks c]
+ */
+ len = reply.num_masks * sizeof(XIEventMask);
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 5d43d4914dcabb6de69859567061e99300e56ef4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Fri, 17 May 2013 09:07:44 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 02/15] Copy the sequence number into the target event too
+ (#64687)
+
+X.Org Bug 64687 <http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64687>
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Reviewed-by: Jasper St. Pierre <jstpierre@mecheye.net>
+---
+ src/XExtInt.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/XExtInt.c b/src/XExtInt.c
+index 507573b..8e19b97 100644
+--- a/src/XExtInt.c
++++ b/src/XExtInt.c
+@@ -915,6 +915,7 @@ static void xge_copy_to_cookie(xGenericEvent* ev,
+ cookie->type = ev->type;
+ cookie->evtype = ev->evtype;
+ cookie->extension = ev->extension;
++ cookie->serial = ev->sequenceNumber;
+ }
+
+ static Bool
+@@ -1521,6 +1522,7 @@ wireToDeviceEvent(xXIDeviceEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie* cookie)
+ out = next_block(&ptr_lib, sizeof(XIDeviceEvent));
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+ out->send_event = ((in->type & 0x80) != 0);
+@@ -1793,6 +1795,7 @@ wireToDeviceChangedEvent(xXIDeviceChangedEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie *cookie)
+ cookie->data = out = malloc(sizeof(XIDeviceChangedEvent) + len);
+
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+@@ -1825,6 +1828,7 @@ wireToHierarchyChangedEvent(xXIHierarchyEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie *cookie)
+ out->info = (XIHierarchyInfo*)&out[1];
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+ out->send_event = ((in->type & 0x80) != 0);
+@@ -1865,6 +1869,7 @@ wireToRawEvent(XExtDisplayInfo *info, xXIRawEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie *cook
+
+ out = next_block(&ptr, sizeof(XIRawEvent));
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+@@ -1915,6 +1920,7 @@ wireToEnterLeave(xXIEnterEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie *cookie)
+ out->buttons.mask = (unsigned char*)&out[1];
+
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+@@ -1957,6 +1963,7 @@ wireToPropertyEvent(xXIPropertyEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie *cookie)
+ cookie->data = out;
+
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+ out->send_event = ((in->type & 0x80) != 0);
+@@ -1977,6 +1984,7 @@ wireToTouchOwnershipEvent(xXITouchOwnershipEvent *in,
+ cookie->data = out;
+
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+@@ -2004,6 +2012,7 @@ wireToBarrierEvent(xXIBarrierEvent *in, XGenericEventCookie *cookie)
+
+ out->display = cookie->display;
+ out->type = in->type;
++ out->serial = in->sequenceNumber;
+ out->extension = in->extension;
+ out->evtype = in->evtype;
+ out->send_event = ((in->type & 0x80) != 0);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 59b8e1388a687f871831ac5a9e0ac11de75e2516 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 May 2013 23:58:39 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 03/15] Use _XEatDataWords to avoid overflow of rep.length bit
+ shifting
+
+rep.length is a CARD32, so rep.length << 2 could overflow in 32-bit builds
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ configure.ac | 6 ++++++
+ src/XGMotion.c | 2 +-
+ src/XGetDCtl.c | 2 +-
+ src/XGetDProp.c | 5 ++---
+ src/XGetFCtl.c | 2 +-
+ src/XGetKMap.c | 2 +-
+ src/XGetMMap.c | 2 +-
+ src/XGetProp.c | 4 +---
+ src/XGtSelect.c | 2 +-
+ src/XIProperties.c | 7 +++----
+ src/XIint.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ src/XListDProp.c | 2 +-
+ src/XListDev.c | 2 +-
+ src/XOpenDev.c | 2 +-
+ src/XQueryDv.c | 2 +-
+ 15 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 8dbca38..f5ef1e2 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(XI, [xproto >= 7.0.13] [x11 >= 1.4.99.1] [xextproto >= 7.0.3]
+ # CFLAGS only for PointerBarrier typedef
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(XFIXES, [xfixes >= 5])
+
++# Check for _XEatDataWords function that may be patched into older Xlib releases
++SAVE_LIBS="$LIBS"
++LIBS="$XI_LIBS"
++AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_XEatDataWords])
++LIBS="$SAVE_LIBS"
++
+ # Check for xmlto and asciidoc for man page conversion
+ # (only needed by people building tarballs)
+ if test "$have_xmlto" = yes && test "$have_asciidoc" = yes; then
+diff --git a/src/XGMotion.c b/src/XGMotion.c
+index 99b1c44..5feac85 100644
+--- a/src/XGMotion.c
++++ b/src/XGMotion.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+ Xfree(bufp);
+ Xfree(savp);
+ *nEvents = 0;
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)size);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return (NULL);
+diff --git a/src/XGetDCtl.c b/src/XGetDCtl.c
+index c66212d..f73a4e8 100644
+--- a/src/XGetDCtl.c
++++ b/src/XGetDCtl.c
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+ d = (xDeviceState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes);
+ if (!d) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sav = d;
+diff --git a/src/XGetDProp.c b/src/XGetDProp.c
+index 5d44f91..f9e8f0c 100644
+--- a/src/XGetDProp.c
++++ b/src/XGetDProp.c
+@@ -112,14 +112,13 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+ * This part of the code should never be reached. If it is,
+ * the server sent back a property with an invalid format.
+ */
+- nbytes = rep.length << 2;
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return(BadImplementation);
+ }
+ if (! *prop) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return(BadAlloc);
+diff --git a/src/XGetFCtl.c b/src/XGetFCtl.c
+index 43afa00..28fab4d 100644
+--- a/src/XGetFCtl.c
++++ b/src/XGetFCtl.c
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+ f = (xFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes);
+ if (!f) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sav = f;
+diff --git a/src/XGetKMap.c b/src/XGetKMap.c
+index 9431fbb..00dde06 100644
+--- a/src/XGetKMap.c
++++ b/src/XGetKMap.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ XGetDeviceKeyMapping(register Display * dpy, XDevice * dev,
+ if (mapping)
+ _XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
+ else
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ }
+
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+diff --git a/src/XGetMMap.c b/src/XGetMMap.c
+index 8a1cdb2..ce10c2d 100644
+--- a/src/XGetMMap.c
++++ b/src/XGetMMap.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ XGetDeviceModifierMapping(
+ if (res->modifiermap)
+ _XReadPad(dpy, (char *)res->modifiermap, nbytes);
+ else
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/src/XGetProp.c b/src/XGetProp.c
+index c5d088b..34bc581 100644
+--- a/src/XGetProp.c
++++ b/src/XGetProp.c
+@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+ int *count)
+ {
+ XEventClass *list = NULL;
+- int rlen;
+ xGetDeviceDontPropagateListReq *req;
+ xGetDeviceDontPropagateListReply rep;
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+@@ -90,7 +89,6 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+ *count = rep.count;
+
+ if (*count) {
+- rlen = rep.length << 2;
+ list = (XEventClass *) Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass));
+ if (list) {
+ int i;
+@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+ list[i] = (XEventClass) ec;
+ }
+ } else
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ }
+
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+diff --git a/src/XGtSelect.c b/src/XGtSelect.c
+index f890db7..5c0f812 100644
+--- a/src/XGtSelect.c
++++ b/src/XGtSelect.c
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ XGetSelectedExtensionEvents(
+ (XEventClass *) Xmalloc(*this_client_count *
+ sizeof(XEventClass));
+ if (!*this_client_list) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)tlen + alen);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return (Success);
+diff --git a/src/XIProperties.c b/src/XIProperties.c
+index 83a7a68..5e58fb6 100644
+--- a/src/XIProperties.c
++++ b/src/XIProperties.c
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ XIListProperties(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int *num_props_return)
+ props = (Atom*)Xmalloc(rep.num_properties * sizeof(Atom));
+ if (!props)
+ {
+- _XEatData(dpy, rep.num_properties << 2);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+@@ -203,8 +203,7 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset,
+ * This part of the code should never be reached. If it is,
+ * the server sent back a property with an invalid format.
+ */
+- nbytes = rep.length << 2;
+- _XEatData(dpy, nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return(BadImplementation);
+@@ -222,7 +221,7 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset,
+ *data = Xmalloc(rbytes);
+
+ if (!(*data)) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, nbytes);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return(BadAlloc);
+diff --git a/src/XIint.h b/src/XIint.h
+index 571bb23..3ddc3c5 100644
+--- a/src/XIint.h
++++ b/src/XIint.h
+@@ -83,4 +83,18 @@ next_block(void **ptr, int size) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++#ifndef HAVE__XEATDATAWORDS
++#include <X11/Xmd.h> /* for LONG64 on 64-bit platforms */
++#include <limits.h>
++
++static inline void _XEatDataWords(Display *dpy, unsigned long n)
++{
++# ifndef LONG64
++ if (n >= (ULONG_MAX >> 2))
++ _XIOError(dpy);
++# endif
++ _XEatData (dpy, n << 2);
++}
++#endif
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/src/XListDProp.c b/src/XListDProp.c
+index 8667350..bde6cb5 100644
+--- a/src/XListDProp.c
++++ b/src/XListDProp.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ XListDeviceProperties(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev, int *nprops_return)
+ props = (Atom*)Xmalloc(rep.nAtoms * sizeof(Atom));
+ if (!props)
+ {
+- _XEatData(dpy, rep.nAtoms << 2);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/src/XListDev.c b/src/XListDev.c
+index bd6e70a..1fa4747 100644
+--- a/src/XListDev.c
++++ b/src/XListDev.c
+@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ list = (xDeviceInfo *) Xmalloc(rlen);
+ slist = list;
+ if (!slist) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+ return (XDeviceInfo *) NULL;
+diff --git a/src/XOpenDev.c b/src/XOpenDev.c
+index 74f18ac..e784f8b 100644
+--- a/src/XOpenDev.c
++++ b/src/XOpenDev.c
+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ XOpenDevice(
+ if (rlen - dlen > 0)
+ _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen - dlen);
+ } else
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+diff --git a/src/XQueryDv.c b/src/XQueryDv.c
+index 24d4e4e..69c285b 100644
+--- a/src/XQueryDv.c
++++ b/src/XQueryDv.c
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+ if (rlen > 0) {
+ data = Xmalloc(rlen);
+ if (!data) {
+- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen);
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ _XRead(dpy, data, rlen);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From f3e08e4fbe40016484ba795feecf1a742170ffc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:26:52 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 04/15] Stack buffer overflow in XGetDeviceButtonMapping()
+ [CVE-2013-1998 1/3]
+
+We copy the entire reply sent by the server into the fixed size
+mapping[] array on the stack, even if the server says it's a larger
+size than the mapping array can hold. HULK SMASH STACK!
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XGetBMap.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XGetBMap.c b/src/XGetBMap.c
+index 211c9ca..002daba 100644
+--- a/src/XGetBMap.c
++++ b/src/XGetBMap.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ #ifdef MIN /* some systems define this in <sys/param.h> */
+ #undef MIN
+@@ -75,7 +76,6 @@ XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
+ {
+ int status = 0;
+ unsigned char mapping[256]; /* known fixed size */
+- long nbytes;
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+
+ register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req;
+@@ -92,13 +92,18 @@ XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
+
+ status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse);
+ if (status == 1) {
+- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+- _XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
+-
+- /* don't return more data than the user asked for. */
+- if (rep.nElts)
+- memcpy((char *)map, (char *)mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
+- status = rep.nElts;
++ if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2)) {
++ unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2;
++ _XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
++
++ /* don't return more data than the user asked for. */
++ if (rep.nElts)
++ memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
++ status = rep.nElts;
++ } else {
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
++ status = 0;
++ }
+ } else
+ status = 0;
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 91434737f592e8f5cc1762383882a582b55fc03a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 23:37:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 05/15] memory corruption in _XIPassiveGrabDevice()
+ [CVE-2013-1998 2/3]
+
+If the server returned more modifiers than the caller asked for,
+we'd just keep copying past the end of the array provided by the
+caller, writing over who-knows-what happened to be there.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XIPassiveGrab.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XIPassiveGrab.c b/src/XIPassiveGrab.c
+index ac17c01..53b4084 100644
+--- a/src/XIPassiveGrab.c
++++ b/src/XIPassiveGrab.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ _XIPassiveGrabDevice(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int grabtype, int detail,
+ return -1;
+ _XRead(dpy, (char*)failed_mods, reply.num_modifiers * sizeof(xXIGrabModifierInfo));
+
+- for (i = 0; i < reply.num_modifiers; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < reply.num_modifiers && i < num_modifiers; i++)
+ {
+ modifiers_inout[i].status = failed_mods[i].status;
+ modifiers_inout[i].modifiers = failed_mods[i].modifiers;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 5398ac0797f7516f2c9b8f2869a6c6d071437352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 22:48:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 06/15] unvalidated lengths in XQueryDeviceState()
+ [CVE-2013-1998 3/3]
+
+If the lengths given for each class state in the reply add up to more
+than the rep.length, we could read past the end of the buffer allocated
+to hold the data read from the server.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XQueryDv.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XQueryDv.c b/src/XQueryDv.c
+index 69c285b..3836777 100644
+--- a/src/XQueryDv.c
++++ b/src/XQueryDv.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ XDeviceState *
+ XQueryDeviceState(
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+ XDevice *dev)
+ {
+ int i, j;
+- int rlen;
+- int size = 0;
++ unsigned long rlen;
++ size_t size = 0;
+ xQueryDeviceStateReq *req;
+ xQueryDeviceStateReply rep;
+ XDeviceState *state = NULL;
+@@ -87,9 +88,11 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+ if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse))
+ goto out;
+
+- rlen = rep.length << 2;
+- if (rlen > 0) {
+- data = Xmalloc(rlen);
++ if (rep.length > 0) {
++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++ rlen = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
++ data = Xmalloc(rlen);
++ }
+ if (!data) {
+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto out;
+@@ -97,6 +100,10 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+ _XRead(dpy, data, rlen);
+
+ for (i = 0, any = (XInputClass *) data; i < (int)rep.num_classes; i++) {
++ if (any->length > rlen)
++ goto out;
++ rlen -= any->length;
++
+ switch (any->class) {
+ case KeyClass:
+ size += sizeof(XKeyState);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From b0b13c12a8079a5a0e7f43b2b8983699057b2cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:55:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 07/15] integer overflow in XGetDeviceControl() [CVE-2013-1984
+ 1/8]
+
+If the number of valuators reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then
+memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the X server
+reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so
+we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XGetDCtl.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XGetDCtl.c b/src/XGetDCtl.c
+index f73a4e8..51ed0ae 100644
+--- a/src/XGetDCtl.c
++++ b/src/XGetDCtl.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ XDeviceControl *
+ XGetDeviceControl(
+@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ XDevice *dev,
+ int control)
+ {
+- int size = 0;
+- int nbytes, i;
+ XDeviceControl *Device = NULL;
+ XDeviceControl *Sav = NULL;
+ xDeviceState *d = NULL;
+@@ -92,8 +91,12 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ goto out;
+
+ if (rep.length > 0) {
+- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+- d = (xDeviceState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes);
++ unsigned long nbytes;
++ size_t size = 0;
++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++ nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
++ d = Xmalloc(nbytes);
++ }
+ if (!d) {
+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto out;
+@@ -111,33 +114,46 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ case DEVICE_RESOLUTION:
+ {
+ xDeviceResolutionState *r;
++ size_t val_size;
+
+ r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
+- size += sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState) +
+- (3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators);
++ if (r->num_valuators >= (INT_MAX / (3 * sizeof(int))))
++ goto out;
++ val_size = 3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators;
++ if ((sizeof(xDeviceResolutionState) + val_size) > nbytes)
++ goto out;
++ size += sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState) + val_size;
+ break;
+ }
+ case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB:
+ {
++ if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsCalibState) > nbytes)
++ goto out;
+ size += sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState);
+ break;
+ }
+ case DEVICE_ABS_AREA:
+ {
++ if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsAreaState) > nbytes)
++ goto out;
+ size += sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState);
+ break;
+ }
+ case DEVICE_CORE:
+ {
++ if (sizeof(xDeviceCoreState) > nbytes)
++ goto out;
+ size += sizeof(XDeviceCoreState);
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
++ if (d->length > nbytes)
++ goto out;
+ size += d->length;
+ break;
+ }
+
+- Device = (XDeviceControl *) Xmalloc((unsigned)size);
++ Device = Xmalloc(size);
+ if (!Device)
+ goto out;
+
+@@ -150,6 +166,7 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ int *iptr, *iptr2;
+ xDeviceResolutionState *r;
+ XDeviceResolutionState *R;
++ unsigned int i;
+
+ r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
+ R = (XDeviceResolutionState *) Device;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 322ee3576789380222d4403366e4fd12fb24cb6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:55:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 08/15] integer overflow in XGetFeedbackControl()
+ [CVE-2013-1984 2/8]
+
+If the number of feedbacks reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, or
+if the total size of all the feedback structures overflows when added
+together, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from
+the X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so
+ we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XGetFCtl.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XGetFCtl.c b/src/XGetFCtl.c
+index 28fab4d..bb50bf3 100644
+--- a/src/XGetFCtl.c
++++ b/src/XGetFCtl.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ XFeedbackState *
+ XGetFeedbackControl(
+@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ XDevice *dev,
+ int *num_feedbacks)
+ {
+- int size = 0;
+- int nbytes, i;
+ XFeedbackState *Feedback = NULL;
+ XFeedbackState *Sav = NULL;
+ xFeedbackState *f = NULL;
+@@ -91,9 +90,16 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ goto out;
+
+ if (rep.length > 0) {
++ unsigned long nbytes;
++ size_t size = 0;
++ int i;
++
+ *num_feedbacks = rep.num_feedbacks;
+- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+- f = (xFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes);
++
++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++ nbytes = rep.length << 2;
++ f = Xmalloc(nbytes);
++ }
+ if (!f) {
+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ goto out;
+@@ -102,6 +108,10 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ _XRead(dpy, (char *)f, nbytes);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *num_feedbacks; i++) {
++ if (f->length > nbytes)
++ goto out;
++ nbytes -= f->length;
++
+ switch (f->class) {
+ case KbdFeedbackClass:
+ size += sizeof(XKbdFeedbackState);
+@@ -116,6 +126,8 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ {
+ xStringFeedbackState *strf = (xStringFeedbackState *) f;
+
++ if (strf->num_syms_supported >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(KeySym)))
++ goto out;
+ size += sizeof(XStringFeedbackState) +
+ (strf->num_syms_supported * sizeof(KeySym));
+ }
+@@ -130,10 +142,12 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ size += f->length;
+ break;
+ }
++ if (size > INT_MAX)
++ goto out;
+ f = (xFeedbackState *) ((char *)f + f->length);
+ }
+
+- Feedback = (XFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)size);
++ Feedback = Xmalloc(size);
+ if (!Feedback)
+ goto out;
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 6dd6dc51a2935c72774be81e5cc2ba2c30e9feff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:55:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 09/15] integer overflow in XGetDeviceDontPropagateList()
+ [CVE-2013-1984 3/8]
+
+If the number of event classes reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the
+X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+V2: EatData if count is 0 but length is > 0 to avoid XIOErrors
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XGetProp.c | 8 +++++---
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XGetProp.c b/src/XGetProp.c
+index 34bc581..b49328c 100644
+--- a/src/XGetProp.c
++++ b/src/XGetProp.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ XEventClass *
+ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+@@ -88,10 +89,11 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+ }
+ *count = rep.count;
+
+- if (*count) {
+- list = (XEventClass *) Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass));
++ if (rep.length != 0) {
++ if ((rep.count != 0) && (rep.length < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XEventClass))))
++ list = Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass));
+ if (list) {
+- int i;
++ unsigned int i;
+ CARD32 ec;
+
+ /* read and assign each XEventClass separately because
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From bb922ed4253b35590f0369f32a917ff89ade0830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:55:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 10/15] integer overflow in XGetDeviceMotionEvents()
+ [CVE-2013-1984 4/8]
+
+If the number of events or axes reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the
+X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XGMotion.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XGMotion.c b/src/XGMotion.c
+index 5feac85..a4c75b6 100644
+--- a/src/XGMotion.c
++++ b/src/XGMotion.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ XDeviceTimeCoord *
+ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+ xGetDeviceMotionEventsReply rep;
+ XDeviceTimeCoord *tc;
+ int *data, *bufp, *readp, *savp;
+- long size, size2;
++ unsigned long size;
+ int i, j;
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+
+@@ -104,10 +105,21 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+ SyncHandle();
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+- size = rep.length << 2;
+- size2 = rep.nEvents * (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (rep.axes * sizeof(int)));
+- savp = readp = (int *)Xmalloc(size);
+- bufp = (int *)Xmalloc(size2);
++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++ size = rep.length << 2;
++ savp = readp = Xmalloc(size);
++ } else {
++ size = 0;
++ savp = readp = NULL;
++ }
++ /* rep.axes is a CARD8, so assume max number of axes for bounds check */
++ if (rep.nEvents <
++ (INT_MAX / (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (UCHAR_MAX * sizeof(int))))) {
++ size_t bsize = rep.nEvents *
++ (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (rep.axes * sizeof(int)));
++ bufp = Xmalloc(bsize);
++ } else
++ bufp = NULL;
+ if (!bufp || !savp) {
+ Xfree(bufp);
+ Xfree(savp);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 242f92b490a695fbab244af5bad11b71f897c732 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:55:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 11/15] integer overflow in XIGetProperty() [CVE-2013-1984 5/8]
+
+If the number of items reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate item type,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the
+X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XIProperties.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XIProperties.c b/src/XIProperties.c
+index 5e58fb6..32436d1 100644
+--- a/src/XIProperties.c
++++ b/src/XIProperties.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput2.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ Atom*
+ XIListProperties(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int *num_props_return)
+@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset,
+ {
+ xXIGetPropertyReq *req;
+ xXIGetPropertyReply rep;
+- long nbytes, rbytes;
++ unsigned long nbytes, rbytes;
+
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+
+@@ -216,9 +217,11 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset,
+ * recopy the string to make it null terminated.
+ */
+
+- nbytes = rep.num_items * rep.format/8;
+- rbytes = nbytes + 1;
+- *data = Xmalloc(rbytes);
++ if (rep.num_items < (INT_MAX / (rep.format/8))) {
++ nbytes = rep.num_items * rep.format/8;
++ rbytes = nbytes + 1;
++ *data = Xmalloc(rbytes);
++ }
+
+ if (!(*data)) {
+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 528419b9ef437e7eeafb41bf45e8ff7d818bd845 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 22:55:23 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 12/15] integer overflow in XIGetSelectedEvents()
+ [CVE-2013-1984 6/8]
+
+If the number of events or masks reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+or the sizes overflow as they are totaled up, then memory corruption can
+occur when more bytes are copied from the X server reply than the size
+of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server,
+ so that we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XISelEv.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XISelEv.c b/src/XISelEv.c
+index f871222..0471bef 100644
+--- a/src/XISelEv.c
++++ b/src/XISelEv.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from the author.
+ #include <X11/extensions/ge.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/geproto.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ int
+ XISelectEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, XIEventMask* masks, int num_masks)
+@@ -101,13 +102,14 @@ out:
+ XIEventMask*
+ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+ {
+- int i, len = 0;
++ unsigned int i, len = 0;
+ unsigned char *mask;
+ XIEventMask *mask_out = NULL;
+ xXIEventMask *mask_in = NULL, *mi;
+ xXIGetSelectedEventsReq *req;
+ xXIGetSelectedEventsReply reply;
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
++ size_t rbytes;
+
+ *num_masks_return = -1;
+ LockDisplay(dpy);
+@@ -129,11 +131,16 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- mask_in = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
+- if (!mask_in)
++ if (reply.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++ rbytes = (unsigned long) reply.length << 2;
++ mask_in = Xmalloc(rbytes);
++ }
++ if (!mask_in) {
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, reply.length);
+ goto out;
++ }
+
+- _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, reply.length * 4);
++ _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, rbytes);
+
+ /*
+ * This function takes interleaved xXIEventMask structs & masks off
+@@ -148,8 +155,14 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+
+ for (i = 0, mi = mask_in; i < reply.num_masks; i++)
+ {
+- len += mi->mask_len * 4;
+- mi = (xXIEventMask*)((char*)mi + mi->mask_len * 4);
++ unsigned int mask_bytes = mi->mask_len * 4;
++ len += mask_bytes;
++ if (len > INT_MAX)
++ goto out;
++ if ((sizeof(xXIEventMask) + mask_bytes) > rbytes)
++ goto out;
++ rbytes -= (sizeof(xXIEventMask) + mask_bytes);
++ mi = (xXIEventMask*)((char*)mi + mask_bytes);
+ mi++;
+ }
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 17071c1c608247800b2ca03a35b1fcc9c4cabe6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 13:30:55 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 13/15] Avoid integer overflow in XGetDeviceProperties()
+ [CVE-2013-1984 7/8]
+
+If the number of items as reported by the Xserver is too large, it
+could overflow the calculation for the size of the buffer to copy the
+reply into, causing memory corruption.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XGetDProp.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XGetDProp.c b/src/XGetDProp.c
+index f9e8f0c..3691122 100644
+--- a/src/XGetDProp.c
++++ b/src/XGetDProp.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from the author.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ int
+ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+@@ -48,7 +49,8 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+ {
+ xGetDevicePropertyReq *req;
+ xGetDevicePropertyReply rep;
+- long nbytes, rbytes;
++ unsigned long nbytes, rbytes;
++ int ret = Success;
+
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+
+@@ -81,30 +83,43 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+ * data, but this last byte is null terminated and convenient for
+ * returning string properties, so the client doesn't then have to
+ * recopy the string to make it null terminated.
++ *
++ * Maximum item limits are set to both prevent integer overflow when
++ * calculating the amount of memory to malloc, and to limit how much
++ * memory will be used if a server provides an insanely high count.
+ */
+ switch (rep.format) {
+ case 8:
+- nbytes = rep.nItems;
+- rbytes = rep.nItems + 1;
+- if (rbytes > 0 &&
+- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
+- _XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes);
++ if (rep.nItems < INT_MAX) {
++ nbytes = rep.nItems;
++ rbytes = rep.nItems + 1;
++ if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
++ _XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes);
++ else
++ ret = BadAlloc;
++ }
+ break;
+
+ case 16:
+- nbytes = rep.nItems << 1;
+- rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1;
+- if (rbytes > 0 &&
+- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
+- _XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes);
++ if (rep.nItems < (INT_MAX / sizeof (short))) {
++ nbytes = rep.nItems << 1;
++ rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1;
++ if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
++ _XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes);
++ else
++ ret = BadAlloc;
++ }
+ break;
+
+ case 32:
+- nbytes = rep.nItems << 2;
+- rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1;
+- if (rbytes > 0 &&
+- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
+- _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes);
++ if (rep.nItems < (INT_MAX / sizeof (long))) {
++ nbytes = rep.nItems << 2;
++ rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1;
++ if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
++ _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes);
++ else
++ ret = BadAlloc;
++ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+@@ -112,16 +127,13 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+ * This part of the code should never be reached. If it is,
+ * the server sent back a property with an invalid format.
+ */
+- _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+- UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+- SyncHandle();
+- return(BadImplementation);
++ ret = BadImplementation;
+ }
+ if (! *prop) {
+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+- UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+- SyncHandle();
+- return(BadAlloc);
++ if (ret == Success)
++ ret = BadAlloc;
++ goto out;
+ }
+ (*prop)[rbytes - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+@@ -130,9 +142,10 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+ *actual_format = rep.format;
+ *nitems = rep.nItems;
+ *bytes_after = rep.bytesAfter;
++ out:
+ UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+ SyncHandle ();
+
+- return Success;
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From ef82512288d8ca36ac0beeb289f158195b0a8cae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 00:22:14 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 14/15] Avoid integer overflow in XListInputDevices()
+ [CVE-2013-1984 8/8]
+
+If the length of the reply as reported by the Xserver is too long, it
+could overflow the calculation for the size of the buffer to copy the
+reply into, causing memory corruption.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XListDev.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XListDev.c b/src/XListDev.c
+index 1fa4747..1c14b96 100644
+--- a/src/XListDev.c
++++ b/src/XListDev.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ /* Calculate length field to a multiples of sizeof(XID). XIDs are typedefs
+ * to ulong and thus may be 8 bytes on some platforms. This can trigger a
+@@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ XAnyClassPtr Any;
+ char *nptr, *Nptr;
+ int i;
+- long rlen;
++ unsigned long rlen;
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+
+ LockDisplay(dpy);
+@@ -198,9 +199,10 @@ XListInputDevices(
+
+ if ((*ndevices = rep.ndevices)) { /* at least 1 input device */
+ size = *ndevices * sizeof(XDeviceInfo);
+- rlen = rep.length << 2; /* multiply length by 4 */
+- list = (xDeviceInfo *) Xmalloc(rlen);
+- slist = list;
++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++ rlen = rep.length << 2; /* multiply length by 4 */
++ slist = list = Xmalloc(rlen);
++ }
+ if (!slist) {
+ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 81b4df8ac6aa1520c41c3526961014a6f115cc46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 00:16:22 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 15/15] sign extension issue in XListInputDevices()
+ [CVE-2013-1995]
+
+nptr is (signed) char, which can be negative, and will sign extend
+when added to the int size, which means size can be subtracted from,
+leading to allocating too small a buffer to hold the data being copied
+from the X server's reply.
+
+v2: check that string size fits inside the data read from the server,
+ so that we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ src/XListDev.c | 16 ++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/XListDev.c b/src/XListDev.c
+index 1c14b96..b85ff3c 100644
+--- a/src/XListDev.c
++++ b/src/XListDev.c
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int pad_to_xid(int base_size)
+ return ((base_size + padsize - 1)/padsize) * padsize;
+ }
+
+-static int
++static size_t
+ SizeClassInfo(xAnyClassPtr *any, int num_classes)
+ {
+ int size = 0;
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ register Display *dpy,
+ int *ndevices)
+ {
+- int size;
++ size_t size;
+ xListInputDevicesReq *req;
+ xListInputDevicesReply rep;
+ xDeviceInfo *list, *slist = NULL;
+@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ XDeviceInfo *clist = NULL;
+ xAnyClassPtr any, sav_any;
+ XAnyClassPtr Any;
+- char *nptr, *Nptr;
++ unsigned char *nptr, *Nptr;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long rlen;
+ XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+@@ -217,9 +217,12 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ size += SizeClassInfo(&any, (int)list->num_classes);
+ }
+
+- for (i = 0, nptr = (char *)any; i < *ndevices; i++) {
++ Nptr = ((unsigned char *)list) + rlen + 1;
++ for (i = 0, nptr = (unsigned char *)any; i < *ndevices; i++) {
+ size += *nptr + 1;
+ nptr += (*nptr + 1);
++ if (nptr > Nptr)
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ clist = (XDeviceInfoPtr) Xmalloc(size);
+@@ -245,8 +248,8 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ }
+
+ clist = sclist;
+- nptr = (char *)any;
+- Nptr = (char *)Any;
++ nptr = (unsigned char *)any;
++ Nptr = (unsigned char *)Any;
+ for (i = 0; i < *ndevices; i++, clist++) {
+ clist->name = (char *)Nptr;
+ memcpy(Nptr, nptr + 1, *nptr);
+@@ -256,6 +259,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ }
+ }
+
++ out:
+ XFree((char *)slist);
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch b/extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00f723d35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 80ac3b279e776b3d9f45a209e52c5bd34ba7e7df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 23:31:58 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XF86DRIOpenConnection() [CVE-2013-1993 1/2]
+
+busIdStringLength is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before adding
+one to it to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid integer
+overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from the network past
+the end of the allocated buffer.
+
+NOTE: This is a candidate for stable release branches.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Brian Paul <brianp@vmware.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2e5a268f18be30df15aed0b44b01a18a37fb5df4)
+---
+diff --git a/src/glx/XF86dri.c b/src/glx/XF86dri.c
+index b1cdc9b..8f53bd7 100644
+--- a/src/glx/XF86dri.c
++++ b/src/glx/XF86dri.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/Xext.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "xf86dristr.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ static XExtensionInfo _xf86dri_info_data;
+ static XExtensionInfo *xf86dri_info = &_xf86dri_info_data;
+@@ -201,7 +202,11 @@ XF86DRIOpenConnection(Display * dpy, int screen, drm_handle_t * hSAREA,
+ }
+
+ if (rep.length) {
+- if (!(*busIdString = calloc(rep.busIdStringLength + 1, 1))) {
++ if (rep.busIdStringLength < INT_MAX)
++ *busIdString = calloc(rep.busIdStringLength + 1, 1);
++ else
++ *busIdString = NULL;
++ if (*busIdString == NULL) {
+ _XEatData(dpy, ((rep.busIdStringLength + 3) & ~3));
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
+From 6de60ddf9ccac6f185d8f4e88ddfc63a94bd670f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 23:33:03 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XF86DRIGetClientDriverName() [CVE-2013-1993 2/2]
+
+clientDriverNameLength is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before
+adding one to it to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid
+integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from the
+network past the end of the allocated buffer.
+
+NOTE: This is a candidate for stable release branches.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Brian Paul <brianp@vmware.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 306f630e676eb901789dd09a0f30d7e7fa941ebe)
+---
+diff --git a/src/glx/XF86dri.c b/src/glx/XF86dri.c
+index 8f53bd7..56e3557 100644
+--- a/src/glx/XF86dri.c
++++ b/src/glx/XF86dri.c
+@@ -305,9 +305,11 @@ XF86DRIGetClientDriverName(Display * dpy, int screen,
+ *ddxDriverPatchVersion = rep.ddxDriverPatchVersion;
+
+ if (rep.length) {
+- if (!
+- (*clientDriverName =
+- calloc(rep.clientDriverNameLength + 1, 1))) {
++ if (rep.clientDriverNameLength < INT_MAX)
++ *clientDriverName = calloc(rep.clientDriverNameLength + 1, 1);
++ else
++ *clientDriverName = NULL;
++ if (*clientDriverName == NULL) {
+ _XEatData(dpy, ((rep.clientDriverNameLength + 3) & ~3));
+ UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+ SyncHandle();
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/extra/mesa/PKGBUILD b/extra/mesa/PKGBUILD
index 4fd8cbc0b..6990f754e 100644
--- a/extra/mesa/PKGBUILD
+++ b/extra/mesa/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 186351 2013-05-25 08:49:44Z andyrtr $
+# $Id: PKGBUILD 188839 2013-06-22 10:51:37Z lcarlier $
# Maintainer: Jan de Groot <jgc@archlinux.org>
# Maintainer: Andreas Radke <andyrtr@archlinux.org>
pkgbase=mesa
pkgname=('ati-dri' 'intel-dri' 'nouveau-dri' 'svga-dri' 'mesa' 'mesa-libgl')
pkgver=9.1.3
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
makedepends=('python2' 'libxml2' 'libx11' 'glproto' 'libdrm' 'dri2proto' 'libxxf86vm' 'libxdamage'
'libvdpau' 'wayland' 'llvm-amdgpu-snapshot' 'systemd')
@@ -13,18 +13,21 @@ url="http://mesa3d.sourceforge.net"
license=('custom')
options=('!libtool')
source=(ftp://ftp.freedesktop.org/pub/mesa/${pkgver}/MesaLib-${pkgver}.tar.bz2
- #ftp://ftp.freedesktop.org/pub/mesa/9.1/MesaLib-9.1-rc2.tar.bz2 # for RC testing
- LICENSE)
+ LICENSE
+ CVE-2013-1993.patch)
md5sums=('952ccd03547ed72333b64e1746cf8ada'
- '5c65a0fe315dd347e09b1f2826a1df5a')
+ '5c65a0fe315dd347e09b1f2826a1df5a'
+ 'dc8dad7c9bc6a92bd9c33b27b9da825e')
-build() {
+prepare() {
cd ${srcdir}/?esa-*
- # pick 2 commits from master to
- # fix a nouveau crash: http://cgit.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/commit/?id=17f1cb1d99e66227d1e05925ef937643f5c1089a
- # and intel kwin slowness http://cgit.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/commit/?id=e062a4187d8ea518a39c913ae7562cf1d8ac3205
- #patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/git-fixes.patch
+ # fix CVE-2013-1993 merged upstream
+ patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/CVE-2013-1993.patch
+}
+
+build() {
+ cd ${srcdir}/?esa-*
autoreconf -vfi # our automake is far too new for their build system :)
@@ -60,7 +63,7 @@ build() {
package_ati-dri() {
pkgdesc="Mesa drivers for AMD/ATI Radeon"
- depends=("mesa-libgl=${pkgver}" 'llvm-amdgpu-lib-snapshot')
+ depends=("mesa-libgl=${pkgver}")
conflicts=('xf86-video-ati<6.9.0-6')
install -m755 -d ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/vdpau/
@@ -89,7 +92,7 @@ package_intel-dri() {
package_nouveau-dri() {
pkgdesc="Mesa drivers for Nouveau"
- depends=("mesa-libgl=${pkgver}" 'llvm-amdgpu-lib-snapshot')
+ depends=("mesa-libgl=${pkgver}")
install -m755 -d ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/vdpau/
mv -v ${srcdir}/fakeinstall/usr/lib/vdpau/libvdpau_nouveau.* ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/vdpau/
@@ -106,7 +109,7 @@ package_nouveau-dri() {
package_svga-dri() {
pkgdesc="Gallium3D VMware guest GL driver"
- depends=('gcc-libs' 'libdrm' 'expat' 'libffi' 'llvm-amdgpu-lib-snapshot')
+ depends=('libdrm' 'expat' 'llvm-amdgpu-lib-snapshot')
install -m755 -d ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri
mv -v ${srcdir}/fakeinstall/usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri/vmwgfx_dri.so ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri/
diff --git a/extra/r/PKGBUILD b/extra/r/PKGBUILD
index 7db7535ec..b9f19bb44 100644
--- a/extra/r/PKGBUILD
+++ b/extra/r/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 184431 2013-05-06 19:39:38Z foutrelis $
+# $Id: PKGBUILD 188821 2013-06-22 06:15:43Z foutrelis $
# Maintainer: Ronald van Haren <ronald.archlinux.org>
# Contributor: Damir Perisa <damir.perisa@bluewin.ch>
# Contributor: K. Piche <kpiche@rogers.com>
pkgname=r
-pkgver=3.0.0
+pkgver=3.0.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Language and environment for statistical computing and graphics"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ source=("http://cran.r-project.org/src/base/R-${pkgver%%.*}/R-${pkgver}.tar.gz"
'r.desktop'
'r.png'
'R.conf')
-sha1sums=('0cb1d1b815af4ce640ceafd5402a2eb94924c945'
+sha1sums=('5cc65476837926fdf04105954ea94efa53ac85ce'
'13aa29219bcaa102e575de8c1c8e0833d233e836'
'a69a07ec363440efc18ce0a7f2af103375dea978'
'43668da6cfd1b4455a99f23e79e2059294dddac9')
diff --git a/extra/vc/PKGBUILD b/extra/vc/PKGBUILD
index 19e6366d9..77a4e49f9 100644
--- a/extra/vc/PKGBUILD
+++ b/extra/vc/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 183664 2013-04-26 12:12:30Z andrea $
+# $Id: PKGBUILD 188826 2013-06-22 07:21:35Z andrea $
# Maintainer: Andrea Scarpino <andrea@archlinux.org>
# Contributor: PedsXing <pedsxing at gmx dot net>
pkgname=vc
-pkgver=0.7.1
+pkgver=0.7.2
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A library to ease explicit vectorization of C++ code"
url='http://code.compeng.uni-frankfurt.de/projects/vc/'
arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
license=('LGPL3')
makedepends=('cmake')
-source=("http://code.compeng.uni-frankfurt.de/attachments/download/161/Vc-${pkgver}.tar.gz")
-md5sums=('a7bc94838e55b5e0cdf5a02e1b52f8dc')
+source=("http://code.compeng.uni-frankfurt.de/attachments/download/164/Vc-${pkgver}.tar.gz")
+md5sums=('f54dd2945f9e5a38945e50b4a3f7a901')
build() {
mkdir build
@@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ build() {
make
}
-# check() {
-# cd build
-# make test
-#}
+check() {
+ cd build
+ make test
+}
package() {
cd build
make DESTDIR="${pkgdir}" install
}
-
diff --git a/extra/x2goserver/PKGBUILD b/extra/x2goserver/PKGBUILD
index db8bd3503..baa568b8b 100644
--- a/extra/x2goserver/PKGBUILD
+++ b/extra/x2goserver/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 188542 2013-06-15 10:17:06Z andyrtr $
+# $Id: PKGBUILD 188846 2013-06-22 19:39:32Z andyrtr $
# Maintainer: AndyRTR <andyrtr@archlinux.org>
# Contributor: Gerhard Brauer <gerbra@archlinux.de>
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
# Contributor: Milan Knížek <knizek@volny.cz>
pkgname=x2goserver
-pkgver=4.0.1.1
+pkgver=4.0.1.3
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Open source terminal server"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ install=x2goserver.install
backup=('etc/x2go/x2goserver.conf' 'etc/x2go/x2gosql/sql')
source=(http://code.x2go.org/releases/source/${pkgname}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz
x2goserver.service)
-md5sums=('d970699f1df8d7096a7d3151c0ede447'
+md5sums=('494b2d0435f7a11bc68a5d1d2a8a5f33'
'f76081c01e40b6206895d194dc949707')
build() {
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.45.2) at 2024-11-25 06:40:48 +0000