From 8d87c082149a6574a1d17d3c28ab2cb65a1e1d96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: root Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2013 01:08:06 -0700 Subject: Sun Jun 23 01:07:36 PDT 2013 --- extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+) create mode 100644 extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch (limited to 'extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch') diff --git a/extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch b/extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..00f723d35 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/mesa/CVE-2013-1993.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 80ac3b279e776b3d9f45a209e52c5bd34ba7e7df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith +Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 23:31:58 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XF86DRIOpenConnection() [CVE-2013-1993 1/2] + +busIdStringLength is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before adding +one to it to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid integer +overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from the network past +the end of the allocated buffer. + +NOTE: This is a candidate for stable release branches. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith +Reviewed-by: Brian Paul +(cherry picked from commit 2e5a268f18be30df15aed0b44b01a18a37fb5df4) +--- +diff --git a/src/glx/XF86dri.c b/src/glx/XF86dri.c +index b1cdc9b..8f53bd7 100644 +--- a/src/glx/XF86dri.c ++++ b/src/glx/XF86dri.c +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + #include + #include + #include "xf86dristr.h" ++#include + + static XExtensionInfo _xf86dri_info_data; + static XExtensionInfo *xf86dri_info = &_xf86dri_info_data; +@@ -201,7 +202,11 @@ XF86DRIOpenConnection(Display * dpy, int screen, drm_handle_t * hSAREA, + } + + if (rep.length) { +- if (!(*busIdString = calloc(rep.busIdStringLength + 1, 1))) { ++ if (rep.busIdStringLength < INT_MAX) ++ *busIdString = calloc(rep.busIdStringLength + 1, 1); ++ else ++ *busIdString = NULL; ++ if (*busIdString == NULL) { + _XEatData(dpy, ((rep.busIdStringLength + 3) & ~3)); + UnlockDisplay(dpy); + SyncHandle(); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe +From 6de60ddf9ccac6f185d8f4e88ddfc63a94bd670f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith +Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 23:33:03 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XF86DRIGetClientDriverName() [CVE-2013-1993 2/2] + +clientDriverNameLength is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before +adding one to it to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid +integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from the +network past the end of the allocated buffer. + +NOTE: This is a candidate for stable release branches. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith +Reviewed-by: Brian Paul +(cherry picked from commit 306f630e676eb901789dd09a0f30d7e7fa941ebe) +--- +diff --git a/src/glx/XF86dri.c b/src/glx/XF86dri.c +index 8f53bd7..56e3557 100644 +--- a/src/glx/XF86dri.c ++++ b/src/glx/XF86dri.c +@@ -305,9 +305,11 @@ XF86DRIGetClientDriverName(Display * dpy, int screen, + *ddxDriverPatchVersion = rep.ddxDriverPatchVersion; + + if (rep.length) { +- if (! +- (*clientDriverName = +- calloc(rep.clientDriverNameLength + 1, 1))) { ++ if (rep.clientDriverNameLength < INT_MAX) ++ *clientDriverName = calloc(rep.clientDriverNameLength + 1, 1); ++ else ++ *clientDriverName = NULL; ++ if (*clientDriverName == NULL) { + _XEatData(dpy, ((rep.clientDriverNameLength + 3) & ~3)); + UnlockDisplay(dpy); + SyncHandle(); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf