diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernels/linux-libre-xen/CVE-2013-1763.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernels/linux-libre-xen/CVE-2013-1763.patch | 35 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernels/linux-libre-xen/CVE-2013-1763.patch b/kernels/linux-libre-xen/CVE-2013-1763.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..82b59a6dc --- /dev/null +++ b/kernels/linux-libre-xen/CVE-2013-1763.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> +Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[] + +Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY +with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of +sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this +condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening +doors for a privilege escalation. + +Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> +Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> +--- + net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 +++ + 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c +index 602cd63..750f44f 100644 +--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c ++++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c +@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) + return -EINVAL; + ++ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); + if (hndl == NULL) + err = -ENOENT; +-- +1.7.6.5 + |