diff options
author | André Fabian Silva Delgado <emulatorman@parabola.nu> | 2015-12-15 14:52:16 -0300 |
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committer | André Fabian Silva Delgado <emulatorman@parabola.nu> | 2015-12-15 14:52:16 -0300 |
commit | 8d91c1e411f55d7ea91b1183a2e9f8088fb4d5be (patch) | |
tree | e9891aa6c295060d065adffd610c4f49ecf884f3 /certs | |
parent | a71852147516bc1cb5b0b3cbd13639bfd4022dc8 (diff) |
Linux-libre 4.3.2-gnu
Diffstat (limited to 'certs')
-rw-r--r-- | certs/Kconfig | 42 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/Makefile | 94 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/system_certificates.S | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/system_keyring.c | 157 |
4 files changed, 316 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b030b9c7e --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +menu "Certificates for signature checking" + +config MODULE_SIG_KEY + string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key" + default "certs/signing_key.pem" + depends on MODULE_SIG + help + Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format, + or a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The file should contain, or + the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding + private key. + + If this option is unchanged from its default "certs/signing_key.pem", + then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and + certificate as described in Documentation/module-signing.txt + +config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys" + depends on KEYS + help + Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in + the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will + by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but + userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by + keys already in the keyring. + + Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking. + +config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS + string "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file + containing trusted X.509 certificates to be included in the default + system keyring. Any certificate used for module signing is implicitly + also trusted. + + NOTE: If you previously provided keys for the system keyring in the + form of DER-encoded *.x509 files in the top-level build directory, + those are no longer used. You will need to set this option instead. + +endmenu diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..28ac694dd --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +# +# Makefile for the linux kernel signature checking certificates. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y) + +$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)) + +# GCC doesn't include .incbin files in -MD generated dependencies (PR#66871) +$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list + +# Cope with signing_key.x509 existing in $(srctree) not $(objtree) +AFLAGS_system_certificates.o := -I$(srctree) + +quiet_cmd_extract_certs = EXTRACT_CERTS $(patsubst "%",%,$(2)) + cmd_extract_certs = scripts/extract-cert $(2) $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1) + +targets += x509_certificate_list +$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME) FORCE + $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)) +endif + +clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) +############################################################################### +# +# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been +# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not +# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards. +# +############################################################################### +ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH +$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config) +endif + +# We do it this way rather than having a boolean option for enabling an +# external private key, because 'make randconfig' might enable such a +# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG. +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"certs/signing_key.pem") +$(obj)/signing_key.pem: $(obj)/x509.genkey + @echo "###" + @echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules." + @echo "###" + @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the" + @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It" + @echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random" + @echo "### number generator if one is available." + @echo "###" + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \ + -batch -x509 -config $(obj)/x509.genkey \ + -outform PEM -out $(obj)/signing_key.pem \ + -keyout $(obj)/signing_key.pem 2>&1 + @echo "###" + @echo "### Key pair generated." + @echo "###" + +$(obj)/x509.genkey: + @echo Generating X.509 key generation config + @echo >$@ "[ req ]" + @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" + @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" + @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" + @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" + @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" + @echo >>$@ + @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" + @echo >>$@ "#O = Unspecified company" + @echo >>$@ "CN = Build time autogenerated kernel key" + @echo >>$@ "#emailAddress = unspecified.user@unspecified.company" + @echo >>$@ + @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" + @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE" + @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature" + @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" + @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" +endif + +$(eval $(call config_filename,MODULE_SIG_KEY)) + +# If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY isn't a PKCS#11 URI, depend on it +ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))),$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))) +X509_DEP := $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME) +endif + +# GCC PR#66871 again. +$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/signing_key.x509 + +targets += signing_key.x509 +$(obj)/signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert $(X509_DEP) FORCE + $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)) +endif diff --git a/certs/system_certificates.S b/certs/system_certificates.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9216e8c81 --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/system_certificates.S @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/init.h> + + __INITRODATA + + .align 8 + .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list) +VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list): +__cert_list_start: +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG + .incbin "certs/signing_key.x509" +#endif + .incbin "certs/x509_certificate_list" +__cert_list_end: + + .align 8 + .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size) +VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size): +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + .quad __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start +#else + .long __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start +#endif diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2570598b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> + +struct key *system_trusted_keyring; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring); + +extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[]; +extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size; + +/* + * Load the compiled-in keys + */ +static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) +{ + pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n"); + + system_trusted_keyring = + keyring_alloc(".system_keyring", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n"); + + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. + */ +device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init); + +/* + * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates. + */ +static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) +{ + key_ref_t key; + const u8 *p, *end; + size_t plen; + + pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n"); + + p = system_certificate_list; + end = p + system_certificate_list_size; + while (p < end) { + /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more + * than 256 bytes in size. + */ + if (end - p < 4) + goto dodgy_cert; + if (p[0] != 0x30 && + p[1] != 0x82) + goto dodgy_cert; + plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + plen += 4; + if (plen > end - p) + goto dodgy_cert; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1), + "asymmetric", + NULL, + p, + plen, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", + PTR_ERR(key)); + } else { + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags); + pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); + key_ref_put(key); + } + p += plen; + } + + return 0; + +dodgy_cert: + pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + +/** + * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. + * @data: The data to be verified. + * @len: Size of @data. + * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. + * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. + * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. + */ +int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len, + const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, + enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + bool trusted; + int ret; + + pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); + if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) + return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); + + /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */ + if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) { + pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n"); + ret = -EBADMSG; + goto error; + } + + ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + if (!trusted) { + pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); + ret = -ENOKEY; + } + +error: + pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7); + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data); + +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ |