Linux-libre 4.7.1-gnupck-4.7.1-gnu

24 files changed, 785 insertions, 516 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index 147069c9a..80a0f1a78 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  * any later version.
  */
 
-#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <crypto/if_alg.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
@@ -29,15 +29,24 @@ struct aead_sg_list {
 	struct scatterlist sg[ALG_MAX_PAGES];
 };
 
+struct aead_async_rsgl {
+	struct af_alg_sgl sgl;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct aead_async_req {
+	struct scatterlist *tsgl;
+	struct aead_async_rsgl first_rsgl;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct kiocb *iocb;
+	unsigned int tsgls;
+	char iv[];
+};
+
 struct aead_ctx {
 	struct aead_sg_list tsgl;
-	/*
-	 * RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES is an artificial limit where user space at maximum
-	 * can cause the kernel to allocate RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES * ALG_MAX_PAGES
-	 * pages
-	 */
-#define RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES ALG_MAX_PAGES
-	struct af_alg_sgl rsgl[RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES];
+	struct aead_async_rsgl first_rsgl;
+	struct list_head list;
 
 	void *iv;
 
@@ -75,6 +84,17 @@ static inline bool aead_sufficient_data(struct aead_ctx *ctx)
 	return ctx->used >= ctx->aead_assoclen + as;
 }
 
+static void aead_reset_ctx(struct aead_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+
+	sg_init_table(sgl->sg, ALG_MAX_PAGES);
+	sgl->cur = 0;
+	ctx->used = 0;
+	ctx->more = 0;
+	ctx->merge = 0;
+}
+
 static void aead_put_sgl(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
@@ -90,11 +110,7 @@ static void aead_put_sgl(struct sock *sk)
 		put_page(sg_page(sg + i));
 		sg_assign_page(sg + i, NULL);
 	}
-	sg_init_table(sg, ALG_MAX_PAGES);
-	sgl->cur = 0;
-	ctx->used = 0;
-	ctx->more = 0;
-	ctx->merge = 0;
+	aead_reset_ctx(ctx);
 }
 
 static void aead_wmem_wakeup(struct sock *sk)
@@ -349,23 +365,188 @@ unlock:
 	return err ?: size;
 }
 
-static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored, int flags)
+#define GET_ASYM_REQ(req, tfm) (struct aead_async_req *) \
+		((char *)req + sizeof(struct aead_request) + \
+		 crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm))
+
+ #define GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm) sizeof(struct aead_async_req) + \
+	crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm) + crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) + \
+	sizeof(struct aead_request)
+
+static void aead_async_cb(struct crypto_async_request *_req, int err)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = _req->data;
+	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
+	struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req);
+	struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(_req);
+	struct aead_async_req *areq = GET_ASYM_REQ(req, tfm);
+	struct scatterlist *sg = areq->tsgl;
+	struct aead_async_rsgl *rsgl;
+	struct kiocb *iocb = areq->iocb;
+	unsigned int i, reqlen = GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(rsgl, &areq->list, list) {
+		af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
+		if (rsgl != &areq->first_rsgl)
+			sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < areq->tsgls; i++)
+		put_page(sg_page(sg + i));
+
+	sock_kfree_s(sk, areq->tsgl, sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * areq->tsgls);
+	sock_kfree_s(sk, req, reqlen);
+	__sock_put(sk);
+	iocb->ki_complete(iocb, err, err);
+}
+
+static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+			      int flags)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
+	struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req);
+	struct aead_async_req *areq;
+	struct aead_request *req = NULL;
+	struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+	struct aead_async_rsgl *last_rsgl = NULL, *rsgl;
+	unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+	unsigned int i, reqlen = GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm);
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	unsigned long used;
+	size_t outlen;
+	size_t usedpages = 0;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	if (ctx->more) {
+		err = aead_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
+		if (err)
+			goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	used = ctx->used;
+	outlen = used;
+
+	if (!aead_sufficient_data(ctx))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	req = sock_kmalloc(sk, reqlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!req))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	areq = GET_ASYM_REQ(req, tfm);
+	memset(&areq->first_rsgl, '\0', sizeof(areq->first_rsgl));
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&areq->list);
+	areq->iocb = msg->msg_iocb;
+	memcpy(areq->iv, ctx->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm));
+	aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+	aead_request_set_ad(req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				  aead_async_cb, sk);
+	used -= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? as : 0);
+
+	/* take over all tx sgls from ctx */
+	areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * sgl->cur,
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!areq->tsgl))
+		goto free;
+
+	sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, sgl->cur);
+	for (i = 0; i < sgl->cur; i++)
+		sg_set_page(&areq->tsgl[i], sg_page(&sgl->sg[i]),
+			    sgl->sg[i].length, sgl->sg[i].offset);
+
+	areq->tsgls = sgl->cur;
+
+	/* create rx sgls */
+	while (iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
+		size_t seglen = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter),
+				      (outlen - usedpages));
+
+		if (list_empty(&areq->list)) {
+			rsgl = &areq->first_rsgl;
+
+		} else {
+			rsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*rsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (unlikely(!rsgl)) {
+				err = -ENOMEM;
+				goto free;
+			}
+		}
+		rsgl->sgl.npages = 0;
+		list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &areq->list);
+
+		/* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
+		err = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, seglen);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto free;
+
+		usedpages += err;
+
+		/* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
+		if (last_rsgl)
+			af_alg_link_sg(&last_rsgl->sgl, &rsgl->sgl);
+
+		last_rsgl = rsgl;
+
+		/* we do not need more iovecs as we have sufficient memory */
+		if (outlen <= usedpages)
+			break;
+
+		iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
+	}
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	/* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
+	if (usedpages < outlen)
+		goto free;
+
+	aead_request_set_crypt(req, areq->tsgl, areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used,
+			       areq->iv);
+	err = ctx->enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	if (err) {
+		if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+			sock_hold(sk);
+			err = -EIOCBQUEUED;
+			aead_reset_ctx(ctx);
+			goto unlock;
+		} else if (err == -EBADMSG) {
+			aead_put_sgl(sk);
+		}
+		goto free;
+	}
+	aead_put_sgl(sk);
+
+free:
+	list_for_each_entry(rsgl, &areq->list, list) {
+		af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
+		if (rsgl != &areq->first_rsgl)
+			sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
+	}
+	if (areq->tsgl)
+		sock_kfree_s(sk, areq->tsgl, sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * areq->tsgls);
+	if (req)
+		sock_kfree_s(sk, req, reqlen);
+unlock:
+	aead_wmem_wakeup(sk);
+	release_sock(sk);
+	return err ? err : outlen;
+}
+
+static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
 	struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
 	unsigned as = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
 	struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
-	unsigned int i = 0;
+	struct aead_async_rsgl *last_rsgl = NULL;
+	struct aead_async_rsgl *rsgl, *tmp;
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 	unsigned long used = 0;
 	size_t outlen = 0;
 	size_t usedpages = 0;
-	unsigned int cnt = 0;
-
-	/* Limit number of IOV blocks to be accessed below */
-	if (msg->msg_iter.nr_segs > RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES)
-		return -ENOMSG;
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
@@ -417,21 +598,33 @@ static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored,
 		size_t seglen = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter),
 				      (outlen - usedpages));
 
+		if (list_empty(&ctx->list)) {
+			rsgl = &ctx->first_rsgl;
+		} else {
+			rsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*rsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (unlikely(!rsgl)) {
+				err = -ENOMEM;
+				goto unlock;
+			}
+		}
+		rsgl->sgl.npages = 0;
+		list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &ctx->list);
+
 		/* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
-		err = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl[cnt], &msg->msg_iter,
-				     seglen);
+		err = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, seglen);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto unlock;
 		usedpages += err;
 		/* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
-		if (cnt)
-			af_alg_link_sg(&ctx->rsgl[cnt-1], &ctx->rsgl[cnt]);
+		if (last_rsgl)
+			af_alg_link_sg(&last_rsgl->sgl, &rsgl->sgl);
+
+		last_rsgl = rsgl;
 
 		/* we do not need more iovecs as we have sufficient memory */
 		if (outlen <= usedpages)
 			break;
 		iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
-		cnt++;
 	}
 
 	err = -EINVAL;
@@ -440,8 +633,7 @@ static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored,
 		goto unlock;
 
 	sg_mark_end(sgl->sg + sgl->cur - 1);
-
-	aead_request_set_crypt(&ctx->aead_req, sgl->sg, ctx->rsgl[0].sg,
+	aead_request_set_crypt(&ctx->aead_req, sgl->sg, ctx->first_rsgl.sgl.sg,
 			       used, ctx->iv);
 	aead_request_set_ad(&ctx->aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
 
@@ -454,23 +646,35 @@ static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored,
 		/* EBADMSG implies a valid cipher operation took place */
 		if (err == -EBADMSG)
 			aead_put_sgl(sk);
+
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	aead_put_sgl(sk);
-
 	err = 0;
 
 unlock:
-	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
-		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl[i]);
-
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(rsgl, tmp, &ctx->list, list) {
+		af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
+		if (rsgl != &ctx->first_rsgl)
+			sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
+		list_del(&rsgl->list);
+	}
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->list);
 	aead_wmem_wakeup(sk);
 	release_sock(sk);
 
 	return err ? err : outlen;
 }
 
+static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored,
+			int flags)
+{
+	return (msg->msg_iocb && !is_sync_kiocb(msg->msg_iocb)) ?
+		aead_recvmsg_async(sock, msg, flags) :
+		aead_recvmsg_sync(sock, msg, flags);
+}
+
 static unsigned int aead_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
 			      poll_table *wait)
 {
@@ -540,6 +744,7 @@ static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
 	unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(
 				crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
 
+	WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt) != 0);
 	aead_put_sgl(sk);
 	sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, ivlen);
 	sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
@@ -574,6 +779,7 @@ static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
 	ctx->aead_assoclen = 0;
 	af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
 	sg_init_table(ctx->tsgl.sg, ALG_MAX_PAGES);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->list);
 
 	ask->private = ctx;
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 477cbf39e..331f6baf2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 menuconfig ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
-	tristate "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type"
+	bool "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type"
 	depends on KEYS
 	help
 	  This option provides support for a key type that holds the data for
@@ -41,8 +41,7 @@ config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
 
 config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
 	tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type"
-	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
-	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 	help
 	  This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a
 	  PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key.  If
@@ -55,6 +54,7 @@ config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
 config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 	bool "Support for PE file signature verification"
 	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 	select ASN1
 	select OID_REGISTRY
 	help
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index f90486256..6516855be 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o
 
-asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
+asymmetric_keys-y := \
+	asymmetric_type.o \
+	restrict.o \
+	signature.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index 1d450b580..ca8e9ac34 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
  */
 
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
 extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
 
 extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 9f2165b27..6600181d5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -35,6 +35,95 @@ static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
 
 /**
+ * find_asymmetric_key - Find a key by ID.
+ * @keyring: The keys to search.
+ * @id_0: The first ID to look for or NULL.
+ * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL.
+ * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
+ *
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier.  The preferred identifier is
+ * the id_0 and the fallback identifier is the id_1.  If both are given, the
+ * lookup is by the former, but the latter must also match.
+ */
+struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0,
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1,
+				bool partial)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t ref;
+	const char *lookup;
+	char *req, *p;
+	int len;
+
+	if (id_0) {
+		lookup = id_0->data;
+		len = id_0->len;
+	} else {
+		lookup = id_1->data;
+		len = id_1->len;
+	}
+
+	/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
+	p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (partial) {
+		*p++ = 'i';
+		*p++ = 'd';
+	} else {
+		*p++ = 'e';
+		*p++ = 'x';
+	}
+	*p++ = ':';
+	p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
+	*p = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
+
+	ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, req);
+	if (IS_ERR(ref))
+		pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+	kfree(req);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(ref);
+		}
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+	if (id_0 && id_1) {
+		const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+
+		if (!kids->id[0]) {
+			pr_debug("First ID matches, but second is missing\n");
+			goto reject;
+		}
+		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(id_1, kids->id[1])) {
+			pr_debug("First ID matches, but second does not\n");
+			goto reject;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+	return key;
+
+reject:
+	key_put(key);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_asymmetric_key);
+
+/**
  * asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID
  * @val_1: First binary blob
  * @len_1: Length of first binary blob
@@ -331,7 +420,8 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
 	if (subtype) {
-		subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto]);
+		subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto],
+				 prep->payload.data[asym_auth]);
 		module_put(subtype->owner);
 	}
 	asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
@@ -346,13 +436,15 @@ static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 	struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
 	struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
 	void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+	void *auth = key->payload.data[asym_auth];
 
 	key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL;
 	key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL;
 	key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+	key->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
 
 	if (subtype) {
-		subtype->destroy(data);
+		subtype->destroy(data, auth);
 		module_put(subtype->owner);
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
index 3242cbfae..9492e1c22 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -21,19 +21,13 @@
 /*
  * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
  */
-int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx)
+int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len,
+		 size_t asn1hdrlen)
 {
-	const void *content_data;
-	size_t data_len;
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1);
-
-	if (ret) {
-		pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
-		return ret;
-	}
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = _ctx;
 
+	content_data -= asn1hdrlen;
+	data_len += asn1hdrlen;
 	pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len),
 		 content_data);
 
@@ -129,7 +123,11 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 {
 	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
 
-	ctx->digest = value;
+	ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->digest)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index e2d0edbbc..1063b644e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -13,12 +13,9 @@
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type");
@@ -29,60 +26,47 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
 		 "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
 
 /*
- * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ * Retrieve the PKCS#7 message content.
  */
-static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int pkcs7_view_content(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len,
+			      size_t asn1hdrlen)
 {
-	enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
-	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
-	const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
-	size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
-	bool trusted;
+	struct key_preparsed_payload *prep = ctx;
+	const void *saved_prep_data;
+	size_t saved_prep_datalen;
 	int ret;
 
-	kenter("");
-
-	if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
-		pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	saved_prep_data = prep->data;
 	saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
-	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
-	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-		goto error;
-	}
-
-	ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error_free;
-
-	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error_free;
-	if (!trusted)
-		pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n");
-
-	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error_free;
-
 	prep->data = data;
-	prep->datalen = datalen;
+	prep->datalen = len;
+
 	ret = user_preparse(prep);
+
 	prep->data = saved_prep_data;
 	prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
-
-error_free:
-	pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
-error:
-	kleave(" = %d", ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
+ * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
+
+	if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+		pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
+				      prep->data, prep->datalen,
+				      (void *)1UL, usage,
+				      pkcs7_view_content, prep);
+}
+
+/*
  * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
  * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
  */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index bdd0d753c..af4cd8649 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -44,9 +44,7 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
 static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
 {
 	if (sinfo) {
-		kfree(sinfo->sig.s);
-		kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
-		kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
+		public_key_signature_free(sinfo->sig);
 		kfree(sinfo);
 	}
 }
@@ -125,6 +123,10 @@ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx->sinfo)
 		goto out_no_sinfo;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig)
+		goto out_no_sig;
 
 	ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
 	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
@@ -150,6 +152,7 @@ out:
 		ctx->certs = cert->next;
 		x509_free_certificate(cert);
 	}
+out_no_sig:
 	pkcs7_free_signed_info(ctx->sinfo);
 out_no_sinfo:
 	pkcs7_free_message(ctx->msg);
@@ -165,24 +168,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
  * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access
  * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data
  * @_data_len: Place to return the data length
- * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data
+ * @_headerlen: Size of ASN.1 header not included in _data
  *
- * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally,
- * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it.  Returns -ENODATA if the
- * data object was missing from the message.
+ * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message.  The size of the
+ * header of the ASN.1 object that contains it is also provided and can be used
+ * to adjust *_data and *_data_len to get the entire object.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENODATA if the data object was missing from the message.
  */
 int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			   const void **_data, size_t *_data_len,
-			   bool want_wrapper)
+			   size_t *_headerlen)
 {
-	size_t wrapper;
-
 	if (!pkcs7->data)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
-	wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0;
-	*_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper;
-	*_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper;
+	*_data = pkcs7->data;
+	*_data_len = pkcs7->data_len;
+	if (_headerlen)
+		*_headerlen = pkcs7->data_hdrlen;
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data);
@@ -218,25 +222,25 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 
 	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
 	case OID_md4:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "md4";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
 		break;
 	case OID_md5:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "md5";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "md5";
 		break;
 	case OID_sha1:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha1";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
 		break;
 	case OID_sha256:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha256";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
 		break;
 	case OID_sha384:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha384";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
 		break;
 	case OID_sha512:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha512";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
 		break;
 	case OID_sha224:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha224";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
 		break;
 	default:
 		printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -256,7 +260,7 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 
 	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
 	case OID_rsaEncryption:
-		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 	default:
 		printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -616,11 +620,11 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 {
 	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
 
-	ctx->sinfo->sig.s = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig.s)
+	ctx->sinfo->sig->s = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig->s)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx->sinfo->sig.s_size = vlen;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig->s_size = vlen;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -656,12 +660,16 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 
 	pr_devel("SINFO KID: %u [%*phN]\n", kid->len, kid->len, kid->data);
 
-	sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
+	sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
 	sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
 	*ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
 	ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
 	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx->sinfo)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index a66b19ebc..f4e81074f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
 	struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
 	struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
 	unsigned	index;
-	bool		trusted;
 	bool		unsupported_crypto;	/* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
 
 	/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
@@ -41,19 +40,17 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
 #define	sinfo_has_ms_statement_type	5
 	time64_t	signing_time;
 
-	/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
-	 * or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
-	 */
-	struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
-
 	/* Message signature.
 	 *
 	 * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
 	 * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3].  If the latter, one of
 	 * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within
 	 * it.
+	 *
+	 * THis also contains the issuing cert serial number and issuer's name
+	 * [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1] or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
 	 */
-	struct public_key_signature sig;
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;
 };
 
 struct pkcs7_message {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 7d7a39b47..f6a009d88 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
 				    struct key *trust_keyring)
 {
-	struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
 	struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
 	struct key *key;
-	bool trusted;
 	int ret;
 
 	kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
@@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 	for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
 		if (x509->seen) {
-			if (x509->verified) {
-				trusted = x509->trusted;
+			if (x509->verified)
 				goto verified;
-			}
 			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
 			return -ENOKEY;
 		}
@@ -54,9 +51,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
 		 * keys.
 		 */
-		key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-						  x509->id, x509->skid,
-						  false);
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  x509->id, x509->skid, false);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
 			/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
 			 * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
@@ -80,17 +76,17 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 		might_sleep();
 		last = x509;
-		sig = &last->sig;
+		sig = last->sig;
 	}
 
 	/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
 	 * trusted keys.
 	 */
-	if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) {
-		key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-						  last->akid_id,
-						  last->akid_skid,
-						  false);
+	if (last && (last->sig->auth_ids[0] || last->sig->auth_ids[1])) {
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  last->sig->auth_ids[0],
+					  last->sig->auth_ids[1],
+					  false);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
 			x509 = last;
 			pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
@@ -104,10 +100,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	/* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches
 	 * the signed info directly.
 	 */
-	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-					  sinfo->signing_cert_id,
-					  NULL,
-					  false);
+	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+				  sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, false);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
 		pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
 			 sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
@@ -122,7 +116,6 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 matched:
 	ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
-	trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
 	key_put(key);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret == -ENOMEM)
@@ -134,12 +127,9 @@ matched:
 verified:
 	if (x509) {
 		x509->verified = true;
-		for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+		for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
 			p->verified = true;
-			p->trusted = trusted;
-		}
 	}
-	sinfo->trusted = trusted;
 	kleave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -148,7 +138,6 @@ verified:
  * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
  * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
  * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
- * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
  *
  * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
  * keys we already know and trust.
@@ -170,16 +159,13 @@ verified:
  * May also return -ENOMEM.
  */
 int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
-			 struct key *trust_keyring,
-			 bool *_trusted)
+			 struct key *trust_keyring)
 {
 	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
 	struct x509_certificate *p;
 	int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
 	int ret;
 
-	*_trusted = false;
-
 	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
 		p->seen = false;
 
@@ -193,7 +179,6 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
 			continue;
 		case 0:
-			*_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
 			cached_ret = 0;
 			continue;
 		default:
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 50be2a15e..2ffd69769 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -25,34 +25,36 @@
 static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
 {
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
-	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
-	void *digest;
+	size_t desc_size;
 	int ret;
 
-	kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.hash_algo);
+	kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
 
-	if (!sinfo->sig.hash_algo)
+	if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
 	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
-	sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size,
-			 GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!digest)
+	sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->digest)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
 		goto error_no_desc;
 
-	desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc));
 	desc->tfm   = tfm;
 	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
 
@@ -60,10 +62,11 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
-	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
+				 sig->digest);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
-	pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+	pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
 
 	/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
 	 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
@@ -78,14 +81,15 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			goto error;
 		}
 
-		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
+		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
 			pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
 				 sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
 			ret = -EBADMSG;
 			goto error;
 		}
 
-		if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+		if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
+			   sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
 			pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
 				 sinfo->index);
 			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -97,7 +101,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
 		 * hash it.
 		 */
-		memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size);
+		memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
 
 		ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -107,17 +111,14 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error;
 		ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
-					 sinfo->authattrs_len, digest);
+					 sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error;
-		pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+		pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
 	}
 
-	sinfo->sig.digest = digest;
-	digest = NULL;
-
 error:
-	kfree(digest);
+	kfree(desc);
 error_no_desc:
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 	kleave(" = %d", ret);
@@ -144,12 +145,12 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		 * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
 		 * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
 		 */
-		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
+		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]))
 			continue;
 		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
 			 sinfo->index, certix);
 
-		if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
+		if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) {
 			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
 				sinfo->index);
 			continue;
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	 */
 	pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
 		 sinfo->index,
-		 sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
+		 sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
 {
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;
 	struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
 	int ret;
@@ -188,34 +190,26 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			 x509->subject,
 			 x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
 		x509->seen = true;
-		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
+		if (x509->unsupported_key)
+			goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
 
 		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
-		if (x509->akid_id)
+		sig = x509->sig;
+		if (sig->auth_ids[0])
 			pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
-				 x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data);
-		if (x509->akid_skid)
+				 sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
+		if (sig->auth_ids[1])
 			pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
-				 x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
+				 sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
 
-		if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) ||
-		    strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
+		if (x509->self_signed) {
 			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
 			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
 			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
 			 * authority.
 			 */
-			pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
-			if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
-			    memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
-				   x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
-				return 0;
-
-			ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
-			if (ret < 0)
-				goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
+			if (x509->unsupported_sig)
+				goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
 			x509->signer = x509;
 			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
 			return 0;
@@ -224,7 +218,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
 		 * list to see if the next one is there.
 		 */
-		auth = x509->akid_id;
+		auth = sig->auth_ids[0];
 		if (auth) {
 			pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
 			for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
@@ -233,8 +227,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
 					goto found_issuer_check_skid;
 			}
-		} else {
-			auth = x509->akid_skid;
+		} else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+			auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
 			pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
 			for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
 				if (!p->skid)
@@ -254,8 +248,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		/* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
 		 * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
 		 */
-		if (x509->akid_skid &&
-		    !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) {
+		if (sig->auth_ids[1] &&
+		    !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) {
 			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
 				sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
 			return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -267,7 +261,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				sinfo->index);
 			return 0;
 		}
-		ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+		ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, p->sig);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 		x509->signer = p;
@@ -279,16 +273,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		might_sleep();
 	}
 
-maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509:
+unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
 	/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
 	 * crypto module to go further.  Note, however, we don't want to set
-	 * sinfo->missing_crypto as the signed info block may still be
+	 * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
 	 * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
 	 * trusted copy of.
 	 */
-	if (ret == -ENOPKG)
-		return 0;
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -332,7 +324,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	}
 
 	/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
-	ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, sinfo->sig);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -375,9 +367,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		 enum key_being_used_for usage)
 {
 	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
-	struct x509_certificate *x509;
 	int enopkg = -ENOPKG;
-	int ret, n;
+	int ret;
 
 	kenter("");
 
@@ -419,12 +410,6 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
-		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return ret;
-	}
-
 	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
 		ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
 		if (ret < 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 0f8b264b3..fd76b5fc3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -39,15 +39,23 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
 /*
  * Destroy a public key algorithm key.
  */
-void public_key_destroy(void *payload)
+void public_key_free(struct public_key *key)
 {
-	struct public_key *key = payload;
-
-	if (key)
+	if (key) {
 		kfree(key->key);
-	kfree(key);
+		kfree(key);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free);
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key algorithm key.
+ */
+static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
+{
+	public_key_free(payload0);
+	public_key_signature_free(payload3);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
 
 struct public_key_completion {
 	struct completion completion;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19d1afb98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
+			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
+		use_builtin_keys = true;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
+ * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
+ * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
+			       const struct key_type *type,
+			       const union key_payload *payload)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!trust_keyring)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+				  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
+				  false);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+	else
+		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index 004d5fc8e..11b7ba170 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -15,9 +15,27 @@
 #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key signature.
+ */
+void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (sig) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++)
+			kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]);
+		kfree(sig->s);
+		kfree(sig->digest);
+		kfree(sig);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_signature_free);
+
 /**
  * verify_signature - Initiate the use of an asymmetric key to verify a signature
  * @key: The asymmetric key to verify against
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 7e8c2338a..672a94c2c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/asn1.h>
-#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "verify_pefile.h"
 
@@ -392,9 +392,8 @@ error_no_desc:
  * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
  * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
  * @pelen: Length of the binary image
- * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @trust_keys: Signing certificate(s) to use as starting points
  * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
- * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
  *
  * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
  * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust.
@@ -418,14 +417,10 @@ error_no_desc:
  * May also return -ENOMEM.
  */
 int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
-			    struct key *trusted_keyring,
-			    enum key_being_used_for usage,
-			    bool *_trusted)
+			    struct key *trusted_keys,
+			    enum key_being_used_for usage)
 {
-	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 	struct pefile_context ctx;
-	const void *data;
-	size_t datalen;
 	int ret;
 
 	kenter("");
@@ -439,19 +434,10 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
-		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-	ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7;
-
-	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
-	if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) {
-		pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
-		ret = -EBADMSG;
-		goto error;
-	}
-
-	ret = mscode_parse(&ctx);
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
+				     pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len,
+				     trusted_keys, usage,
+				     mscode_parse, &ctx);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
@@ -462,16 +448,8 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 	 * contents.
 	 */
 	ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted);
 
 error:
-	pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
+	kfree(ctx.digest);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
index a133eb81a..cd4d20930 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
  */
 
-#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
 #include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ struct pefile_context {
 	unsigned	sig_offset;
 	unsigned	sig_len;
 	const struct section_header *secs;
-	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 
 	/* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
 	const void	*digest;		/* Digest */
@@ -39,4 +37,5 @@ struct pefile_context {
 /*
  * mscode_parser.c
  */
-extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx);
+extern int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len,
+			size_t asn1hdrlen);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 4a29bac70..865f46ea7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -47,15 +47,12 @@ struct x509_parse_context {
 void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 {
 	if (cert) {
-		public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
+		public_key_free(cert->pub);
+		public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
 		kfree(cert->issuer);
 		kfree(cert->subject);
 		kfree(cert->id);
 		kfree(cert->skid);
-		kfree(cert->akid_id);
-		kfree(cert->akid_skid);
-		kfree(cert->sig.digest);
-		kfree(cert->sig.s);
 		kfree(cert);
 	}
 }
@@ -78,6 +75,9 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 	cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cert->pub)
 		goto error_no_ctx;
+	cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert->sig)
+		goto error_no_ctx;
 	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx)
 		goto error_no_ctx;
@@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 
 	cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
 
+	/* Grab the signature bits */
+	ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
 	/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
 	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
 					 cert->raw_serial_size,
@@ -119,6 +124,11 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 	}
 	cert->id = kid;
 
+	/* Detect self-signed certificates */
+	ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
 	kfree(ctx);
 	return cert;
 
@@ -188,33 +198,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
 
 	case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "md4";
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
+		ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha1";
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
+		ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha256";
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
+		ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha384";
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
+		ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha512";
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
+		ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha224";
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
+		ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -572,14 +582,14 @@ int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 
 	pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
 
-	if (ctx->cert->akid_skid)
+	if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
 		return 0;
 
 	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(kid))
 		return PTR_ERR(kid);
 	pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
-	ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid;
+	ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -611,7 +621,7 @@ int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 
 	pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
 
-	if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id)
+	if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])
 		return 0;
 
 	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
@@ -622,6 +632,6 @@ int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return PTR_ERR(kid);
 
 	pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
-	ctx->cert->akid_id = kid;
+	ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index dbeed6018..05eef1c68 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	struct x509_certificate *next;
 	struct x509_certificate *signer;	/* Certificate that signed this one */
 	struct public_key *pub;			/* Public key details */
-	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;	/* Signature parameters */
 	char		*issuer;		/* Name of certificate issuer */
 	char		*subject;		/* Name of certificate subject */
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *id;		/* Issuer + Serial number */
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;		/* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
-	struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id;	/* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */
-	struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid;	/* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */
 	time64_t	valid_from;
 	time64_t	valid_to;
 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
@@ -41,8 +39,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	index;
 	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
 	bool		verified;
-	bool		trusted;
-	bool		unsupported_crypto;	/* T if can't be verified due to missing crypto */
+	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
+	bool		unsupported_key;	/* T if key uses unsupported crypto */
+	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -58,5 +57,4 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
  * x509_public_key.c
  */
 extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
-extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
-				struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 733c046aa..fb732296c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -20,256 +20,133 @@
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
-static bool use_builtin_keys;
-static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-static struct {
-	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
-	unsigned char data[10];
-} cakey;
-
-static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
-{
-	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
-		return 1;
-
-	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
-		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
-		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
-		int ret;
-
-		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
-			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
-			return 1;
-		}
-
-		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
-		else
-			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
-	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
-		use_builtin_keys = true;
-	}
-
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
-#endif
-
-/**
- * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
- * @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
- * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
- * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
- *
- * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier.  The preferred identifier is
- * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
- * subjectKeyIdentifier.  If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
- * the latter must also match.
- */
-struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
-					const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
-					const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
-					bool partial)
-{
-	struct key *key;
-	key_ref_t ref;
-	const char *lookup;
-	char *req, *p;
-	int len;
-
-	if (id) {
-		lookup = id->data;
-		len = id->len;
-	} else {
-		lookup = skid->data;
-		len = skid->len;
-	}
-	
-	/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
-	p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!req)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
-	if (partial) {
-		*p++ = 'i';
-		*p++ = 'd';
-	} else {
-		*p++ = 'e';
-		*p++ = 'x';
-	}
-	*p++ = ':';
-	p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
-	*p = 0;
-
-	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
-
-	ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
-			     &key_type_asymmetric, req);
-	if (IS_ERR(ref))
-		pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
-	kfree(req);
-
-	if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
-		switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
-			/* Hide some search errors */
-		case -EACCES:
-		case -ENOTDIR:
-		case -EAGAIN:
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-		default:
-			return ERR_CAST(ref);
-		}
-	}
-
-	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
-	if (id && skid) {
-		const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
-		if (!kids->id[1]) {
-			pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
-			goto reject;
-		}
-		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
-			pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
-			goto reject;
-		}
-	}
-	
-	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
-	return key;
-
-reject:
-	key_put(key);
-	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
-
 /*
  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
  */
 int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 {
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
-	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
-	void *digest;
+	size_t desc_size;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
-	if (cert->unsupported_crypto)
-		return -ENOPKG;
-	if (cert->sig.s)
+	if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo)
+		cert->unsupported_key = true;
+
+	if (!sig->pkey_algo)
+		cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+
+	/* We check the hash if we can - even if we can't then verify it */
+	if (!sig->hash_algo) {
+		cert->unsupported_sig = true;
 		return 0;
+	}
 
-	cert->sig.s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size,
-			      GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cert->sig.s)
+	sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->s)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cert->sig.s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
+	sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
 
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(cert->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
 		if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
-			cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
-			return -ENOPKG;
+			cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+			return 0;
 		}
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 	}
 
 	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
-	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
-	/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the
-	 * digest storage space.
-	 */
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size,
-			 GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!digest)
+	sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->digest)
 		goto error;
 
-	cert->sig.digest = digest;
-	cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size;
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error;
 
-	desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc));
 	desc->tfm = tfm;
 	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
 
 	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_2;
 	might_sleep();
-	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest);
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
+
+error_2:
+	kfree(desc);
 error:
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_sig_params);
 
 /*
- * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
+ * Check for self-signedness in an X.509 cert and if found, check the signature
+ * immediately if we can.
  */
-int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
-			 struct x509_certificate *cert)
+int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 {
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
-	ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+	if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
+	    memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
+		   cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+		goto not_self_signed;
+
+	if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+		/* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts.  If
+		 * both are supplied, both must match.
+		 */
+		bool a = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]);
+		bool b = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0]);
+
+		if (!a && !b)
+			goto not_self_signed;
+
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+		if (((a && !b) || (b && !a)) &&
+		    cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
+			goto out;
+	}
 
-	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig);
-	if (ret == -ENOPKG)
-		cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
-	pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
-	return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
+	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	if (cert->pub->pkey_algo != cert->sig->pkey_algo)
+		goto out;
 
-/*
- * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
- * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
- * new certificate as being trusted.
- *
- * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
- * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
- * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
- */
-static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
-			       struct key *trust_keyring)
-{
-	struct key *key;
-	int ret = 1;
-
-	if (!trust_keyring)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-					  cert->akid_id, cert->akid_skid,
-					  false);
-	if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
-		if (!use_builtin_keys
-		    || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
-			ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data[asym_crypto],
-						   cert);
-		key_put(key);
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+			cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+		goto out;
 	}
+
+	pr_devel("Cert Self-signature verified");
+	cert->self_signed = true;
+
+out:
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
+
+not_self_signed:
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [not]\n", __func__);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -291,34 +168,22 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
 
-	if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo ||
-	    !cert->sig.pkey_algo ||
-	    !cert->sig.hash_algo) {
+	if (cert->unsupported_key) {
 		ret = -ENOPKG;
 		goto error_free_cert;
 	}
 
 	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
 	pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
-	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
-		 cert->sig.pkey_algo,
-		 cert->sig.hash_algo);
 
 	cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
 
-	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
-	if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) ||
-	    asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) ||
-	    asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) {
-		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto error_free_cert;
-	} else if (!prep->trusted) {
-		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
-		if (ret)
-			ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());
-		if (!ret)
-			prep->trusted = 1;
+	if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
+		public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
+		cert->sig = NULL;
+	} else {
+		pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
+			 cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
 	}
 
 	/* Propose a description */
@@ -353,6 +218,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
 	prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
 	prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig;
 	prep->description = desc;
 	prep->quotalen = 100;
 
@@ -360,6 +226,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	cert->pub = NULL;
 	cert->id = NULL;
 	cert->skid = NULL;
+	cert->sig = NULL;
 	desc = NULL;
 	ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 1b86310db..0a3538f6c 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -592,8 +592,10 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_ctr_ops = {
  ******************************************************************/
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC)
-static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, const unsigned char *key,
-			   unsigned char *outval, const struct list_head *in);
+static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval,
+			   const struct list_head *in);
+static void drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+				  const unsigned char *key);
 static int drbg_init_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg);
 static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg);
 #endif /* (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH || CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) */
@@ -619,9 +621,11 @@ static int drbg_hmac_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
 	LIST_HEAD(vdatalist);
 
-	if (!reseed)
+	if (!reseed) {
 		/* 10.1.2.3 step 2 -- memset(0) of C is implicit with kzalloc */
 		memset(drbg->V, 1, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+		drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(drbg, drbg->C);
+	}
 
 	drbg_string_fill(&seed1, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
 	list_add_tail(&seed1.list, &seedlist);
@@ -641,12 +645,13 @@ static int drbg_hmac_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
 			prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
 		/* 10.1.2.2 step 1 and 4 -- concatenation and HMAC for key */
 		seed2.buf = &prefix;
-		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->C, &seedlist);
+		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, &seedlist);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
+		drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(drbg, drbg->C);
 
 		/* 10.1.2.2 step 2 and 5 -- HMAC for V */
-		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->V, &vdatalist);
+		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->V, &vdatalist);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
@@ -681,7 +686,7 @@ static int drbg_hmac_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	while (len < buflen) {
 		unsigned int outlen = 0;
 		/* 10.1.2.5 step 4.1 */
-		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->V, &datalist);
+		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->V, &datalist);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 		outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
@@ -796,7 +801,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_df(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	while (len < outlen) {
 		short blocklen = 0;
 		/* 10.4.1 step 4.1 */
-		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, tmp, entropylist);
+		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, tmp, entropylist);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 		/* 10.4.1 step 4.2 */
@@ -874,7 +879,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_process_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	list_add_tail(&data1.list, &datalist);
 	list_add_tail(&data2.list, &datalist);
 	list_splice_tail(addtl, &datalist);
-	ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, drbg->scratchpad, &datalist);
+	ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->scratchpad, &datalist);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -907,7 +912,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_hashgen(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	while (len < buflen) {
 		unsigned int outlen = 0;
 		/* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.1 */
-		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, dst, &datalist);
+		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, dst, &datalist);
 		if (ret) {
 			len = ret;
 			goto out;
@@ -956,7 +961,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	list_add_tail(&data1.list, &datalist);
 	drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
 	list_add_tail(&data2.list, &datalist);
-	ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, drbg->scratchpad, &datalist);
+	ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->scratchpad, &datalist);
 	if (ret) {
 		len = ret;
 		goto out;
@@ -1600,14 +1605,20 @@ static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, const unsigned char *key,
-			   unsigned char *outval, const struct list_head *in)
+static void drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+				  const unsigned char *key)
+{
+	struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
+
+	crypto_shash_setkey(sdesc->shash.tfm, key, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+}
+
+static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval,
+			   const struct list_head *in)
 {
 	struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
 	struct drbg_string *input = NULL;
 
-	if (key)
-		crypto_shash_setkey(sdesc->shash.tfm, key, drbg_statelen(drbg));
 	crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
 	list_for_each_entry(input, in, list)
 		crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, input->buf, input->len);
diff --git a/crypto/gcm.c b/crypto/gcm.c
index bec329b3d..d9ea5f9c0 100644
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -639,7 +639,9 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
 
 	ghash_alg = crypto_find_alg(ghash_name, &crypto_ahash_type,
 				    CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_HASH,
-				    CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK);
+				    CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK |
+				    crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							 algt->mask));
 	if (IS_ERR(ghash_alg))
 		return PTR_ERR(ghash_alg);
 
diff --git a/crypto/lzo.c b/crypto/lzo.c
index 4b3e92525..c3f3dd9a2 100644
--- a/crypto/lzo.c
+++ b/crypto/lzo.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static int lzo_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 	struct lzo_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
 	ctx->lzo_comp_mem = kmalloc(LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS,
-				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
+				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (!ctx->lzo_comp_mem)
 		ctx->lzo_comp_mem = vmalloc(LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS);
 	if (!ctx->lzo_comp_mem)
diff --git a/crypto/scatterwalk.c b/crypto/scatterwalk.c
index ea5815c5e..bc769c448 100644
--- a/crypto/scatterwalk.c
+++ b/crypto/scatterwalk.c
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ static void scatterwalk_pagedone(struct scatter_walk *walk, int out,
 
 void scatterwalk_done(struct scatter_walk *walk, int out, int more)
 {
-	if (!(scatterwalk_pagelen(walk) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) || !more)
+	if (!more || walk->offset >= walk->sg->offset + walk->sg->length ||
+	    !(walk->offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
 		scatterwalk_pagedone(walk, out, more);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(scatterwalk_done);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 7d4acc449..c727fb0cb 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static bool notests;
+module_param(notests, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(notests, "disable crypto self-tests");
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
 
 /* a perfect nop */
@@ -3885,6 +3889,11 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
 	int j;
 	int rc;
 
+	if (!fips_enabled && notests) {
+		printk_once(KERN_INFO "alg: self-tests disabled\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	alg_test_descs_check_order();
 
 	if ((type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER) {