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authorKay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>2015-06-09 14:27:33 +0200
committerKay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>2015-06-11 10:52:46 +0200
commita095315b3c31f7a419baceac82c26c3c5ac0cd12 (patch)
treea5a70cf5b5430c0a6873311437b8345d7071f249 /src/basic/capability.c
parent37c47e5e5b8e47dd886ed6e8355b1203082b4a3e (diff)
build-sys: split internal basic/ library from shared/
basic/ can be used by everything cannot use anything outside of basic/ libsystemd/ can use basic/ cannot use shared/ shared/ can use libsystemd/
Diffstat (limited to 'src/basic/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--src/basic/capability.c307
1 files changed, 307 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/basic/capability.c b/src/basic/capability.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58f00e6dae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/basic/capability.c
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/
+
+/***
+ This file is part of systemd.
+
+ Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
+
+ systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+***/
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include "grp.h"
+
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "capability.h"
+
+int have_effective_cap(int value) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t cap;
+ cap_flag_value_t fv;
+
+ cap = cap_get_proc();
+ if (!cap)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_get_flag(cap, value, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &fv) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ else
+ return fv == CAP_SET;
+}
+
+unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) {
+ static thread_local unsigned long saved;
+ static thread_local bool valid = false;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *content = NULL;
+ unsigned long p = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valid)
+ return saved;
+
+ /* available since linux-3.2 */
+ r = read_one_line_file("/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap", &content);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ r = safe_atolu(content, &p);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ saved = p;
+ valid = true;
+ return p;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* fall back to syscall-probing for pre linux-3.2 */
+ p = (unsigned long) CAP_LAST_CAP;
+
+ if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) < 0) {
+
+ /* Hmm, look downwards, until we find one that
+ * works */
+ for (p--; p > 0; p --)
+ if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) >= 0)
+ break;
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* Hmm, look upwards, until we find one that doesn't
+ * work */
+ for (;; p++)
+ if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p+1) < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ saved = p;
+ valid = true;
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+int capability_bounding_set_drop(uint64_t drop, bool right_now) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t after_cap = NULL;
+ cap_flag_value_t fv;
+ unsigned long i;
+ int r;
+
+ /* If we are run as PID 1 we will lack CAP_SETPCAP by default
+ * in the effective set (yes, the kernel drops that when
+ * executing init!), so get it back temporarily so that we can
+ * call PR_CAPBSET_DROP. */
+
+ after_cap = cap_get_proc();
+ if (!after_cap)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_get_flag(after_cap, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &fv) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (fv != CAP_SET) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t temp_cap = NULL;
+ static const cap_value_t v = CAP_SETPCAP;
+
+ temp_cap = cap_dup(after_cap);
+ if (!temp_cap) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (cap_set_flag(temp_cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &v, CAP_SET) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (cap_set_proc(temp_cap) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= cap_last_cap(); i++) {
+
+ if (drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) i)) {
+ cap_value_t v;
+
+ /* Drop it from the bounding set */
+ if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ v = (cap_value_t) i;
+
+ /* Also drop it from the inheritable set, so
+ * that anything we exec() loses the
+ * capability for good. */
+ if (cap_set_flag(after_cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, &v, CAP_CLEAR) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ /* If we shall apply this right now drop it
+ * also from our own capability sets. */
+ if (right_now) {
+ if (cap_set_flag(after_cap, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, &v, CAP_CLEAR) < 0 ||
+ cap_set_flag(after_cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &v, CAP_CLEAR) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+
+finish:
+ if (cap_set_proc(after_cap) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int drop_from_file(const char *fn, uint64_t drop) {
+ int r, k;
+ uint32_t hi, lo;
+ uint64_t current, after;
+ char *p;
+
+ r = read_one_line_file(fn, &p);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ assert_cc(sizeof(hi) == sizeof(unsigned));
+ assert_cc(sizeof(lo) == sizeof(unsigned));
+
+ k = sscanf(p, "%u %u", &lo, &hi);
+ free(p);
+
+ if (k != 2)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ current = (uint64_t) lo | ((uint64_t) hi << 32ULL);
+ after = current & ~drop;
+
+ if (current == after)
+ return 0;
+
+ lo = (unsigned) (after & 0xFFFFFFFFULL);
+ hi = (unsigned) ((after >> 32ULL) & 0xFFFFFFFFULL);
+
+ if (asprintf(&p, "%u %u", lo, hi) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = write_string_file(fn, p);
+ free(p);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int capability_bounding_set_drop_usermode(uint64_t drop) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = drop_from_file("/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritable", drop);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = drop_from_file("/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset", drop);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilities) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
+ unsigned i, j = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1
+ * here, since we want to run as user but want to keep some
+ * capabilities. Since file capabilities have been introduced
+ * this cannot be done across exec() anymore, unless our
+ * binary has the capability configured in the file system,
+ * which we want to avoid. */
+
+ if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to change group ID: %m");
+
+ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to drop auxiliary groups list: %m");
+
+ /* Ensure we keep the permitted caps across the setresuid() */
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to enable keep capabilities flag: %m");
+
+ r = setresuid(uid, uid, uid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to change user ID: %m");
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 0) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to disable keep capabilities flag: %m");
+
+ /* Drop all caps from the bounding set, except the ones we want */
+ r = capability_bounding_set_drop(~keep_capabilities, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
+
+ /* Now upgrade the permitted caps we still kept to effective caps */
+ d = cap_init();
+ if (!d)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (keep_capabilities) {
+ cap_value_t bits[u64log2(keep_capabilities) + 1];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(bits); i++)
+ if (keep_capabilities & (1ULL << i))
+ bits[j++] = i;
+
+ /* use enough bits */
+ assert(i == 64 || (keep_capabilities >> i) == 0);
+ /* don't use too many bits */
+ assert(keep_capabilities & (1ULL << (i - 1)));
+
+ if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, j, bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
+ cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, j, bits, CAP_SET) < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to enable capabilities bits: %m");
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to increase capabilities: %m");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int drop_capability(cap_value_t cv) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t tmp_cap = NULL;
+
+ tmp_cap = cap_get_proc();
+ if (!tmp_cap)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if ((cap_set_flag(tmp_cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, &cv, CAP_CLEAR) < 0) ||
+ (cap_set_flag(tmp_cap, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, &cv, CAP_CLEAR) < 0) ||
+ (cap_set_flag(tmp_cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &cv, CAP_CLEAR) < 0))
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_set_proc(tmp_cap) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 0;
+}