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-rw-r--r--src/libcore/execute.c3165
1 files changed, 3165 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/libcore/execute.c b/src/libcore/execute.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6fd35c8350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/libcore/execute.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3165 @@
+/***
+ This file is part of systemd.
+
+ Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
+
+ systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+***/
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <glob.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/personality.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#include <seccomp.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#include <sys/apparmor.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <systemd/sd-messages.h>
+
+#include "af-list.h"
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#include "apparmor-util.h"
+#endif
+#include "async.h"
+#include "barrier.h"
+#include "bus-endpoint.h"
+#include "cap-list.h"
+#include "capability-util.h"
+#include "def.h"
+#include "env-util.h"
+#include "errno-list.h"
+#include "execute.h"
+#include "exit-status.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "formats-util.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "glob-util.h"
+#include "io-util.h"
+#include "ioprio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "missing.h"
+#include "mkdir.h"
+#include "namespace.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "process-util.h"
+#include "rlimit-util.h"
+#include "rm-rf.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#include "seccomp-util.h"
+#endif
+#include "securebits.h"
+#include "selinux-util.h"
+#include "signal-util.h"
+#include "smack-util.h"
+#include "string-table.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+#include "syslog-util.h"
+#include "terminal-util.h"
+#include "unit.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "utmp-wtmp.h"
+
+#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
+#define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
+
+/* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
+#define TTY_MODE 0620
+
+#define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
+
+static int shift_fds(int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
+ int start, restart_from;
+
+ if (n_fds <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
+
+ assert(fds);
+
+ start = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ int i;
+
+ restart_from = -1;
+
+ for (i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) {
+ int nfd;
+
+ /* Already at right index? */
+ if (fds[i] == i+3)
+ continue;
+
+ nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3);
+ if (nfd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ safe_close(fds[i]);
+ fds[i] = nfd;
+
+ /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
+ * let's remember that and try again from here */
+ if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0)
+ restart_from = i;
+ }
+
+ if (restart_from < 0)
+ break;
+
+ start = restart_from;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int flags_fds(const int fds[], unsigned n_fds, bool nonblock) {
+ unsigned i;
+ int r;
+
+ if (n_fds <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ assert(fds);
+
+ /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) {
+
+ r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
+ * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
+ * children */
+
+ r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) {
+ assert(context);
+
+ if (context->stdio_as_fds)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (context->tty_path)
+ return context->tty_path;
+
+ return "/dev/console";
+}
+
+static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) {
+ const char *path;
+
+ assert(context);
+
+ path = exec_context_tty_path(context);
+
+ if (context->tty_vhangup) {
+ if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0)
+ (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd);
+ else if (path)
+ (void) terminal_vhangup(path);
+ }
+
+ if (context->tty_reset) {
+ if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0)
+ (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true);
+ else if (path)
+ (void) reset_terminal(path);
+ }
+
+ if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path)
+ (void) vt_disallocate(path);
+}
+
+static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) {
+ return
+ o == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
+ o == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ o == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ o == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE;
+}
+
+static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) {
+ int fd, r;
+
+ assert(nfd >= 0);
+
+ fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (fd != nfd) {
+ r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
+ safe_close(fd);
+ } else
+ r = nfd;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int connect_journal_socket(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+ union sockaddr_union sa = {
+ .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+ .un.sun_path = "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
+ };
+ uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID;
+ gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID;
+ int r;
+
+ if (gid != GID_INVALID) {
+ oldgid = getgid();
+
+ r = setegid(gid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (uid != UID_INVALID) {
+ olduid = getuid();
+
+ r = seteuid(uid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto restore_gid;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sa.un.sun_path));
+ if (r < 0)
+ r = -errno;
+
+ /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
+ fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
+
+ if (uid != UID_INVALID)
+ (void) seteuid(olduid);
+
+ restore_gid:
+ if (gid != GID_INVALID)
+ (void) setegid(oldgid);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, int nfd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+ int fd, r;
+
+ assert(context);
+ assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX);
+ assert(ident);
+ assert(nfd >= 0);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ r = connect_journal_socket(fd, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) {
+ safe_close(fd);
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE);
+
+ dprintf(fd,
+ "%s\n"
+ "%s\n"
+ "%i\n"
+ "%i\n"
+ "%i\n"
+ "%i\n"
+ "%i\n",
+ context->syslog_identifier ? context->syslog_identifier : ident,
+ unit_id,
+ context->syslog_priority,
+ !!context->syslog_level_prefix,
+ output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
+ output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
+ is_terminal_output(output));
+
+ if (fd != nfd) {
+ r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
+ safe_close(fd);
+ } else
+ r = nfd;
+
+ return r;
+}
+static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, mode_t mode, int nfd) {
+ int fd, r;
+
+ assert(path);
+ assert(nfd >= 0);
+
+ fd = open_terminal(path, mode | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ if (fd != nfd) {
+ r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
+ safe_close(fd);
+ } else
+ r = nfd;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) {
+ return
+ i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY ||
+ i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ||
+ i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) {
+
+ if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin)
+ return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
+
+ if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
+ return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
+
+ return std_input;
+}
+
+static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) {
+
+ if (std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
+ return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT;
+
+ return std_output;
+}
+
+static int setup_input(
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ int socket_fd) {
+
+ ExecInput i;
+
+ assert(context);
+ assert(params);
+
+ if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) {
+ if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
+ (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE);
+ (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true);
+
+ return STDIN_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
+
+ switch (i) {
+
+ case EXEC_INPUT_NULL:
+ return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO);
+
+ case EXEC_INPUT_TTY:
+ case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE:
+ case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: {
+ int fd, r;
+
+ fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context),
+ i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL,
+ i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE,
+ false,
+ USEC_INFINITY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
+ r = dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
+ safe_close(fd);
+ } else
+ r = STDIN_FILENO;
+
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET:
+ return dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
+
+ default:
+ assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
+ }
+}
+
+static int setup_output(
+ Unit *unit,
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ int fileno,
+ int socket_fd,
+ const char *ident,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+
+ ExecOutput o;
+ ExecInput i;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(unit);
+ assert(context);
+ assert(params);
+ assert(ident);
+
+ if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) {
+
+ if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return STDOUT_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) {
+ if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return STDERR_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
+ o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd);
+
+ if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) {
+ ExecOutput e;
+ e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd);
+
+ /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
+
+ /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
+ * the way and are not on a tty */
+ if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
+ o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
+ i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL &&
+ !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) &&
+ getppid () != 1)
+ return fileno;
+
+ /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
+ if (e == o || e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT)
+ return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
+
+ o = e;
+
+ } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) {
+ /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
+ if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input))
+ return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
+
+ /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
+ if (i != EXEC_INPUT_NULL)
+ return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
+
+ /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
+ if (getppid() != 1)
+ return fileno;
+
+ /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
+ return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
+ }
+
+ switch (o) {
+
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL:
+ return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
+
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY:
+ if (is_terminal_input(i))
+ return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
+
+ /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
+ return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
+
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG:
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE:
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG:
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE:
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL:
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE:
+ r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit->id, fileno, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr");
+ r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
+ }
+ return r;
+
+ case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET:
+ assert(socket_fd >= 0);
+ return dup2(socket_fd, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
+
+ default:
+ assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
+ }
+}
+
+static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
+ (void) fchown(fd, uid, -1);
+ (void) fchmod(fd, TTY_MODE);
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (st.st_uid != uid || (st.st_mode & 0777) != TTY_MODE)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin, int *_saved_stdout) {
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, saved_stdin = -1, saved_stdout = -1;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(_saved_stdin);
+ assert(_saved_stdout);
+
+ saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
+ if (saved_stdin < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
+ if (saved_stdout < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ fd = acquire_terminal(
+ "/dev/console",
+ false,
+ false,
+ false,
+ DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid());
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (fd >= 2)
+ safe_close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
+
+ *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin;
+ *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout;
+
+ saved_stdin = saved_stdout = -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+_printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) {
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ assert(format);
+
+ fd = open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ va_start(ap, format);
+ vdprintf(fd, format, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) {
+ int r = 0;
+
+ assert(saved_stdin);
+ assert(saved_stdout);
+
+ release_terminal();
+
+ if (*saved_stdin >= 0)
+ if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+ r = -errno;
+
+ if (*saved_stdout >= 0)
+ if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ r = -errno;
+
+ *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin);
+ *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response, char **argv) {
+ int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+
+ r = setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ line = exec_command_line(argv);
+ if (!line)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = ask_char(response, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line);
+
+ restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext *context, const char *username, gid_t gid) {
+ bool keep_groups = false;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(context);
+
+ /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too
+ * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
+
+ if (context->group || username) {
+ /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
+ if (username && gid != 0) {
+ if (initgroups(username, gid) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ keep_groups = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Second step, set our gids */
+ if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->supplementary_groups) {
+ int ngroups_max, k;
+ gid_t *gids;
+ char **i;
+
+ /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */
+ assert_se((ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) > 0);
+
+ if (!(gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (keep_groups) {
+ k = getgroups(ngroups_max, gids);
+ if (k < 0) {
+ free(gids);
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ } else
+ k = 0;
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, context->supplementary_groups) {
+ const char *g;
+
+ if (k >= ngroups_max) {
+ free(gids);
+ return -E2BIG;
+ }
+
+ g = *i;
+ r = get_group_creds(&g, gids+k);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ free(gids);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ k++;
+ }
+
+ if (setgroups(k, gids) < 0) {
+ free(gids);
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ free(gids);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
+ assert(context);
+
+ /* Sets (but doesn't lookup) the uid and make sure we keep the
+ * capabilities while doing so. */
+
+ if (context->capabilities || context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+
+ /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
+ * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
+ * caps, while we drop privileges. */
+ if (uid != 0) {
+ int sb = context->secure_bits | 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
+
+ if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != sb)
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ /* Second step: set the capabilities. This will reduce
+ * the capabilities to the minimum we need. */
+
+ if (context->capabilities) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
+ static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
+ CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */
+ CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */
+ };
+
+ d = cap_dup(context->capabilities);
+ if (!d)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
+ cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Third step: actually set the uids */
+ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
+ are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
+ corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
+ later. This is done outside of this call. */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+
+static int null_conv(
+ int num_msg,
+ const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp,
+ void *appdata_ptr) {
+
+ /* We don't support conversations */
+
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+}
+
+static int setup_pam(
+ const char *name,
+ const char *user,
+ uid_t uid,
+ const char *tty,
+ char ***pam_env,
+ int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
+
+ static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+ .conv = null_conv,
+ .appdata_ptr = NULL
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL;
+ pam_handle_t *handle = NULL;
+ sigset_t old_ss;
+ int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r;
+ char **e = NULL;
+ bool close_session = false;
+ pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid;
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ assert(name);
+ assert(user);
+ assert(pam_env);
+
+ /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
+ * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
+ * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
+ * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
+ * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
+ * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
+
+ r = barrier_create(&barrier);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG)
+ flags |= PAM_SILENT;
+
+ pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle);
+ if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ handle = NULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (tty) {
+ pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
+ if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags);
+ if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto fail;
+
+ pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags);
+ if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto fail;
+
+ close_session = true;
+
+ e = pam_getenvlist(handle);
+ if (!e) {
+ pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
+ * the child */
+
+ assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0);
+
+ parent_pid = getpid();
+
+ pam_pid = fork();
+ if (pam_pid < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (pam_pid == 0) {
+ int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM;
+
+ /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
+ * termination */
+ barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD);
+
+ /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
+ * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
+ rename_process("(sd-pam)");
+
+ /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
+ child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
+ open here that have been opened by PAM. */
+ close_many(fds, n_fds);
+
+ /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
+ * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
+ * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
+ * to fail to exit normally */
+ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
+ log_error_errno(r, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
+
+ (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
+
+ /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
+ * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
+ * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
+ * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
+ * to do the rest for us. */
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0)
+ goto child_finish;
+
+ /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
+ * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
+ * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
+ barrier_place(&barrier);
+
+ /* Check if our parent process might already have
+ * died? */
+ if (getppid() == parent_pid) {
+ sigset_t ss;
+
+ assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+
+ goto child_finish;
+ }
+
+ assert(sig == SIGTERM);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
+ if (getppid() != parent_pid) {
+ pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
+ if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto child_finish;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ child_finish:
+ pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
+ _exit(ret);
+ }
+
+ barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT);
+
+ /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
+ * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
+ handle = NULL;
+
+ /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
+ assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0);
+
+ /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
+ * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
+ closelog();
+
+ /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
+ * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
+ if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier))
+ log_error("PAM initialization failed");
+
+ *pam_env = e;
+ e = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code));
+ r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
+ } else
+ log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m");
+
+ if (handle) {
+ if (close_session)
+ pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
+
+ pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
+ }
+
+ strv_free(e);
+ closelog();
+
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
+ char process_name[11];
+ const char *p;
+ size_t l;
+
+ /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
+ * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
+
+ p = basename(path);
+ if (isempty(p)) {
+ rename_process("(...)");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ l = strlen(p);
+ if (l > 8) {
+ /* The end of the process name is usually more
+ * interesting, since the first bit might just be
+ * "systemd-" */
+ p = p + l - 8;
+ l = 8;
+ }
+
+ process_name[0] = '(';
+ memcpy(process_name+1, p, l);
+ process_name[1+l] = ')';
+ process_name[1+l+1] = 0;
+
+ rename_process(process_name);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+
+static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
+ uint32_t negative_action, action;
+ scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+ Iterator i;
+ void *id;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno);
+
+ seccomp = seccomp_init(c->syscall_whitelist ? negative_action : SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+ if (!seccomp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (c->syscall_archs) {
+
+ SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, i) {
+ r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1);
+ if (r == -EEXIST)
+ continue;
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ action = c->syscall_whitelist ? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW : negative_action;
+ SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, i) {
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+ seccomp_release(seccomp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
+ scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+ Iterator i;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+ if (!seccomp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ if (c->address_families_whitelist) {
+ int af, first = 0, last = 0;
+ void *afp;
+
+ /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
+ * families that are out of range and then everything
+ * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
+ * and highest address family in the set. */
+
+ SET_FOREACH(afp, c->address_families, i) {
+ af = PTR_TO_INT(afp);
+
+ if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max())
+ continue;
+
+ if (first == 0 || af < first)
+ first = af;
+
+ if (last == 0 || af > last)
+ last = af;
+ }
+
+ assert((first == 0) == (last == 0));
+
+ if (first == 0) {
+
+ /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
+ SCMP_SYS(socket),
+ 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* Block everything below the first entry */
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
+ SCMP_SYS(socket),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ /* Block everything above the last entry */
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
+ SCMP_SYS(socket),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ /* Block everything between the first and last
+ * entry */
+ for (af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) {
+
+ if (set_contains(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af)))
+ continue;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
+ SCMP_SYS(socket),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ void *af;
+
+ /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
+ * each address family that are then combined in OR
+ * checks. */
+
+ SET_FOREACH(af, c->address_families, i) {
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
+ SCMP_SYS(socket),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af)));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+ seccomp_release(seccomp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) {
+ assert(idle_pipe);
+
+
+ idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
+ idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
+
+ if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC);
+
+ if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) {
+ ssize_t n;
+
+ /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
+ n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1);
+ if (n > 0)
+ /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
+ fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC);
+ }
+
+ idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]);
+
+ }
+
+ idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]);
+}
+
+static int build_environment(
+ const ExecContext *c,
+ const ExecParameters *p,
+ unsigned n_fds,
+ const char *home,
+ const char *username,
+ const char *shell,
+ char ***ret) {
+
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL;
+ unsigned n_env = 0;
+ char *x;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ our_env = new0(char*, 11);
+ if (!our_env)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (n_fds > 0) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL;
+
+ if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+
+ if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+
+ joined = strv_join(p->fd_names, ":");
+ if (!joined)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined, NULL);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ if (p->watchdog_usec > 0) {
+ if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+
+ if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ if (home) {
+ x = strappend("HOME=", home);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ if (username) {
+ x = strappend("LOGNAME=", username);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+
+ x = strappend("USER=", username);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ if (shell) {
+ x = strappend("SHELL=", shell);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input) ||
+ c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
+ c->tty_path) {
+
+ x = strdup(default_term_for_tty(exec_context_tty_path(c)));
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ our_env[n_env++] = NULL;
+ assert(n_env <= 11);
+
+ *ret = our_env;
+ our_env = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL;
+ size_t n_env = 0, n_bufsize = 0;
+ char **i;
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
+ char *v;
+
+ v = getenv(*i);
+ if (!v)
+ continue;
+ x = strjoin(*i, "=", v, NULL);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_bufsize, n_env + 2))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pass_env[n_env++] = x;
+ pass_env[n_env] = NULL;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *ret = pass_env;
+ pass_env = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ ExecRuntime *runtime) {
+
+ assert(context);
+ assert(params);
+
+ if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_dirs) ||
+ !strv_isempty(context->read_only_dirs) ||
+ !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs))
+ return true;
+
+ if (context->mount_flags != 0)
+ return true;
+
+ if (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir))
+ return true;
+
+ if (params->bus_endpoint_path)
+ return true;
+
+ if (context->private_devices ||
+ context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
+ context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int close_remaining_fds(
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ ExecRuntime *runtime,
+ int socket_fd,
+ int *fds, unsigned n_fds) {
+
+ unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
+ int dont_close[n_fds + 7];
+
+ assert(params);
+
+ if (params->stdin_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd;
+ if (params->stdout_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd;
+ if (params->stderr_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd;
+
+ if (socket_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
+ if (n_fds > 0) {
+ memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
+ n_dont_close += n_fds;
+ }
+
+ if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd;
+
+ if (runtime) {
+ if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
+ if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1];
+ }
+
+ return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
+}
+
+static int exec_child(
+ Unit *unit,
+ ExecCommand *command,
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ ExecRuntime *runtime,
+ char **argv,
+ int socket_fd,
+ int *fds, unsigned n_fds,
+ char **files_env,
+ int *exit_status) {
+
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
+ const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL, *wd;
+ uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
+ gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
+ int i, r;
+ bool needs_mount_namespace;
+
+ assert(unit);
+ assert(command);
+ assert(context);
+ assert(params);
+ assert(exit_status);
+
+ rename_process_from_path(command->path);
+
+ /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
+ * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
+ * others we leave untouched because we set them to
+ * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
+ * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
+ (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER,
+ SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1);
+
+ if (context->ignore_sigpipe)
+ (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
+
+ r = reset_signal_mask();
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (params->idle_pipe)
+ do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe);
+
+ /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
+ * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
+ * sockets */
+
+ log_forget_fds();
+
+ r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, fds, n_fds);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!context->same_pgrp)
+ if (setsid() < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ exec_context_tty_reset(context, params);
+
+ if (params->confirm_spawn) {
+ char response;
+
+ r = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv);
+ if (r == -ETIMEDOUT)
+ write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
+ else if (r < 0)
+ write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r));
+ else if (response == 's') {
+ write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n");
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM;
+ return -ECANCELED;
+ } else if (response == 'n') {
+ write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n");
+ *exit_status = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->user) {
+ username = context->user;
+ r = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->group) {
+ const char *g = context->group;
+
+ r = get_group_creds(&g, &gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
+ * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
+ if (socket_fd >= 0)
+ (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false);
+
+ r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (params->cgroup_path) {
+ r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) {
+ char t[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context->oom_score_adjust)];
+
+ /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
+ * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
+ * prohibit write access to this file, and we
+ * shouldn't trip up over that. */
+
+ sprintf(t, "%i", context->oom_score_adjust);
+ r = write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t, 0);
+ if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
+ log_open();
+ log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
+ log_close();
+ } else if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->nice_set)
+ if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_NICE;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->cpu_sched_set) {
+ struct sched_param param = {
+ .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority,
+ };
+
+ r = sched_setscheduler(0,
+ context->cpu_sched_policy |
+ (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ?
+ SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0),
+ &param);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->cpuset)
+ if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->ioprio_set)
+ if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID)
+ if (personality(context->personality) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->utmp_id)
+ utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path,
+ context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS :
+ context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS :
+ USER_PROCESS,
+ username ? "root" : context->user);
+
+ if (context->user && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) {
+ r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) {
+ uid_t ep_uid = (uid == UID_INVALID) ? 0 : uid;
+
+ r = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_BUS_ENDPOINT;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
+ * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
+ * user of the new process. */
+ if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && params->cgroup_delegate) {
+ r = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+
+ r = cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0755, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) {
+ char **rt;
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p;
+
+ p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL);
+ if (!p) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ r = mkdir_p_label(p, context->runtime_directory_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = chmod_and_chown(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ umask(context->umask);
+
+ if (params->apply_permissions) {
+ r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+ if (context->smack_process_label) {
+ r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
+ else {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
+
+ r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+ if (context->pam_name && username) {
+ r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
+ r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime);
+
+ if (needs_mount_namespace) {
+ char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
+
+ /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
+ * of the private /tmp, which is
+ * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
+ * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
+ * the one we want to use here. */
+
+ if (context->private_tmp && runtime) {
+ if (runtime->tmp_dir)
+ tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp");
+ if (runtime->var_tmp_dir)
+ var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
+ }
+
+ r = setup_namespace(
+ params->apply_chroot ? context->root_directory : NULL,
+ context->read_write_dirs,
+ context->read_only_dirs,
+ context->inaccessible_dirs,
+ tmp,
+ var,
+ params->bus_endpoint_path,
+ context->private_devices,
+ context->protect_home,
+ context->protect_system,
+ context->mount_flags);
+
+ /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
+ * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
+ * silently proceeed. */
+ if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
+ log_open();
+ log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
+ log_close();
+ } else if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->working_directory_home)
+ wd = home;
+ else if (context->working_directory)
+ wd = context->working_directory;
+ else
+ wd = "/";
+
+ if (params->apply_chroot) {
+ if (!needs_mount_namespace && context->root_directory)
+ if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (chdir(wd) < 0 &&
+ !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ } else {
+ const char *d;
+
+ d = strjoina(strempty(context->root_directory), "/", strempty(wd));
+ if (chdir(d) < 0 &&
+ !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
+ r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
+ * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
+ * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
+ * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
+ * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
+ * now be closed as well. */
+ r = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = flags_fds(fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (params->apply_permissions) {
+
+ int secure_bits = context->secure_bits;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) {
+ if (!context->rlimit[i])
+ continue;
+
+ if (setrlimit_closest(i, context->rlimit[i]) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!cap_test_all(context->capability_bounding_set)) {
+ r = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
+ * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
+ if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+ r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, true);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (context->capabilities) {
+
+ /* The capabilities in ambient set need to be also in the inherited
+ * set. If they aren't, trying to get them will fail. Add the ambient
+ * set inherited capabilities to the capability set in the context.
+ * This is needed because if capabilities are set (using "Capabilities="
+ * keyword), they will override whatever we set now. */
+
+ r = capability_update_inherited_set(context->capabilities, context->capability_ambient_set);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->user) {
+ r = enforce_user(context, uid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+
+ /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
+ r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
+ * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
+ * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
+ * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
+ * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
+ * drop the bit away next. */
+
+ secure_bits |= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
+ * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
+ * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
+ * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
+ if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits)
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->capabilities)
+ if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (context->no_new_privileges)
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+ if (context->address_families_whitelist ||
+ !set_isempty(context->address_families)) {
+ r = apply_address_families(context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->syscall_whitelist ||
+ !set_isempty(context->syscall_filter) ||
+ !set_isempty(context->syscall_archs)) {
+ r = apply_seccomp(context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
+
+ if (exec_context) {
+ r = setexeccon(exec_context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+ if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
+ r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
+ if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ r = build_environment(context, params, n_fds, home, username, shell, &our_env);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ final_env = strv_env_merge(6,
+ params->environment,
+ our_env,
+ pass_env,
+ context->environment,
+ files_env,
+ pam_env,
+ NULL);
+ if (!final_env) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, final_env);
+ if (!final_argv) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ final_env = strv_env_clean(final_env);
+
+ if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG)) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *line;
+
+ line = exec_command_line(final_argv);
+ if (line) {
+ log_open();
+ log_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
+ LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
+ "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
+ LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executing: %s", line),
+ NULL);
+ log_close();
+ }
+ }
+
+ execve(command->path, final_argv, final_env);
+ *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC;
+ return -errno;
+}
+
+int exec_spawn(Unit *unit,
+ ExecCommand *command,
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ ExecRuntime *runtime,
+ pid_t *ret) {
+
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL;
+ int *fds = NULL; unsigned n_fds = 0;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+ int socket_fd, r;
+ char **argv;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ assert(unit);
+ assert(command);
+ assert(context);
+ assert(ret);
+ assert(params);
+ assert(params->fds || params->n_fds <= 0);
+
+ if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET ||
+ context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET ||
+ context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) {
+
+ if (params->n_fds != 1) {
+ log_unit_error(unit, "Got more than one socket.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ socket_fd = params->fds[0];
+ } else {
+ socket_fd = -1;
+ fds = params->fds;
+ n_fds = params->n_fds;
+ }
+
+ r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
+
+ argv = params->argv ?: command->argv;
+ line = exec_command_line(argv);
+ if (!line)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ log_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
+ LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
+ LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "About to execute: %s", line),
+ "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
+ NULL);
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0)
+ return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m");
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ int exit_status;
+
+ r = exec_child(unit,
+ command,
+ context,
+ params,
+ runtime,
+ argv,
+ socket_fd,
+ fds, n_fds,
+ files_env,
+ &exit_status);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_open();
+ log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR, r,
+ LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED),
+ LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
+ LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
+ exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD),
+ command->path),
+ "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ _exit(exit_status);
+ }
+
+ log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid);
+
+ /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
+ * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
+ * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
+ * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
+ * killed too). */
+ if (params->cgroup_path)
+ (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, pid);
+
+ exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid);
+
+ *ret = pid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ c->umask = 0022;
+ c->ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 0);
+ c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER;
+ c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO;
+ c->syslog_level_prefix = true;
+ c->ignore_sigpipe = true;
+ c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY;
+ c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
+ c->runtime_directory_mode = 0755;
+ c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_ALL;
+}
+
+void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
+ unsigned l;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ c->environment = strv_free(c->environment);
+ c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files);
+ c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment);
+
+ for (l = 0; l < ELEMENTSOF(c->rlimit); l++)
+ c->rlimit[l] = mfree(c->rlimit[l]);
+
+ c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory);
+ c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory);
+ c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path);
+ c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier);
+ c->user = mfree(c->user);
+ c->group = mfree(c->group);
+
+ c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups);
+
+ c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name);
+
+ if (c->capabilities) {
+ cap_free(c->capabilities);
+ c->capabilities = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->read_only_dirs = strv_free(c->read_only_dirs);
+ c->read_write_dirs = strv_free(c->read_write_dirs);
+ c->inaccessible_dirs = strv_free(c->inaccessible_dirs);
+
+ if (c->cpuset)
+ CPU_FREE(c->cpuset);
+
+ c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id);
+ c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context);
+ c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile);
+
+ c->syscall_filter = set_free(c->syscall_filter);
+ c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs);
+ c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families);
+
+ c->runtime_directory = strv_free(c->runtime_directory);
+
+ bus_endpoint_free(c->bus_endpoint);
+ c->bus_endpoint = NULL;
+}
+
+int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) {
+ char **i;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ if (!runtime_prefix)
+ return 0;
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, c->runtime_directory) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p;
+
+ p = strjoin(runtime_prefix, "/", *i, NULL);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
+ * sure this is gone when we start the service
+ * next. */
+ (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ c->path = mfree(c->path);
+
+ c->argv = strv_free(c->argv);
+}
+
+void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, unsigned n) {
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ exec_command_done(c+i);
+}
+
+ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) {
+ ExecCommand *i;
+
+ while ((i = c)) {
+ LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i);
+ exec_command_done(i);
+ free(i);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) {
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]);
+}
+
+typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo {
+ Unit *unit;
+ const char *path;
+} InvalidEnvInfo;
+
+static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) {
+ InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata;
+
+ log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path);
+}
+
+int exec_context_load_environment(Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
+ char **i, **r = NULL;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(l);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) {
+ char *fn;
+ int k;
+ bool ignore = false;
+ char **p;
+ _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {};
+ int count, n;
+
+ fn = *i;
+
+ if (fn[0] == '-') {
+ ignore = true;
+ fn ++;
+ }
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) {
+ if (ignore)
+ continue;
+
+ strv_free(r);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
+ errno = 0;
+ if (glob(fn, 0, NULL, &pglob) != 0) {
+ if (ignore)
+ continue;
+
+ strv_free(r);
+ return errno > 0 ? -errno : -EINVAL;
+ }
+ count = pglob.gl_pathc;
+ if (count == 0) {
+ if (ignore)
+ continue;
+
+ strv_free(r);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ for (n = 0; n < count; n++) {
+ k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], NULL, &p);
+ if (k < 0) {
+ if (ignore)
+ continue;
+
+ strv_free(r);
+ return k;
+ }
+ /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
+ if (p) {
+ InvalidEnvInfo info = {
+ .unit = unit,
+ .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n]
+ };
+
+ p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info);
+ }
+
+ if (r == NULL)
+ r = p;
+ else {
+ char **m;
+
+ m = strv_env_merge(2, r, p);
+ strv_free(r);
+ strv_free(p);
+ if (!m)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = m;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *l = r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *active = NULL;
+ char *console;
+
+ if (!tty)
+ return true;
+
+ if (startswith(tty, "/dev/"))
+ tty += 5;
+
+ /* trivial identity? */
+ if (streq(tty, "console"))
+ return true;
+
+ console = resolve_dev_console(&active);
+ /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
+ if (!console)
+ return true;
+
+ /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
+ return streq(console, tty) || (streq(console, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty));
+}
+
+bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext *ec) {
+
+ return (ec->tty_reset ||
+ ec->tty_vhangup ||
+ ec->tty_vt_disallocate ||
+ is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) ||
+ is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) ||
+ is_terminal_output(ec->std_error)) &&
+ tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec));
+}
+
+static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) {
+ char **g;
+
+ assert(f);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(g, l)
+ fprintf(f, " %s", *g);
+}
+
+void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
+ char **e, **d;
+ unsigned i;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(f);
+
+ prefix = strempty(prefix);
+
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sUMask: %04o\n"
+ "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
+ "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
+ "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
+ "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
+ "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
+ "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
+ "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
+ "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
+ "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n",
+ prefix, c->umask,
+ prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/",
+ prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/",
+ prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
+ prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home),
+ prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe));
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment)
+ fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files)
+ fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment)
+ fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
+
+ fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix, c->runtime_directory_mode);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(d, c->runtime_directory)
+ fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix, *d);
+
+ if (c->nice_set)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sNice: %i\n",
+ prefix, c->nice);
+
+ if (c->oom_score_adjust_set)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
+ prefix, c->oom_score_adjust);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++)
+ if (c->rlimit[i]) {
+ fprintf(f, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
+ prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max);
+ fprintf(f, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
+ prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur);
+ }
+
+ if (c->ioprio_set) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL;
+
+ ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str);
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
+ "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
+ prefix, strna(class_str),
+ prefix, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio));
+ }
+
+ if (c->cpu_sched_set) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL;
+
+ sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str);
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
+ "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
+ "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
+ prefix, strna(policy_str),
+ prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority,
+ prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork));
+ }
+
+ if (c->cpuset) {
+ fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix);
+ for (i = 0; i < c->cpuset_ncpus; i++)
+ if (CPU_ISSET_S(i, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c->cpuset_ncpus), c->cpuset))
+ fprintf(f, " %u", i);
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
+ fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec);
+
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
+ "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
+ "%sStandardError: %s\n",
+ prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input),
+ prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output),
+ prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error));
+
+ if (c->tty_path)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sTTYPath: %s\n"
+ "%sTTYReset: %s\n"
+ "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
+ "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
+ prefix, c->tty_path,
+ prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate));
+
+ if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG ||
+ c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG ||
+ c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL ||
+ c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
+ c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL;
+
+ log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str);
+ log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str);
+
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
+ "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
+ prefix, strna(fac_str),
+ prefix, strna(lvl_str));
+ }
+
+ if (c->capabilities) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t;
+
+ t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL);
+ if (t)
+ fprintf(f, "%sCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, t);
+ }
+
+ if (c->secure_bits)
+ fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ prefix,
+ (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) ? " keep-caps" : "",
+ (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
+ (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
+ (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
+ (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT) ? " noroot" : "",
+ (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
+
+ if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_ALL) {
+ unsigned long l;
+ fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix);
+
+ for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
+ if (c->capability_bounding_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l))
+ fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
+
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+ unsigned long l;
+ fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix);
+
+ for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
+ if (c->capability_ambient_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l))
+ fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
+
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->user)
+ fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user);
+ if (c->group)
+ fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group);
+
+ if (strv_length(c->supplementary_groups) > 0) {
+ fprintf(f, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix);
+ strv_fprintf(f, c->supplementary_groups);
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->pam_name)
+ fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name);
+
+ if (strv_length(c->read_write_dirs) > 0) {
+ fprintf(f, "%sReadWriteDirs:", prefix);
+ strv_fprintf(f, c->read_write_dirs);
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (strv_length(c->read_only_dirs) > 0) {
+ fprintf(f, "%sReadOnlyDirs:", prefix);
+ strv_fprintf(f, c->read_only_dirs);
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (strv_length(c->inaccessible_dirs) > 0) {
+ fprintf(f, "%sInaccessibleDirs:", prefix);
+ strv_fprintf(f, c->inaccessible_dirs);
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->utmp_id)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
+ prefix, c->utmp_id);
+
+ if (c->selinux_context)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
+ prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context);
+
+ if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sPersonality: %s\n",
+ prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality)));
+
+ if (c->syscall_filter) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+ Iterator j;
+ void *id;
+ bool first = true;
+#endif
+
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
+ prefix);
+
+ if (!c->syscall_whitelist)
+ fputc('~', f);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+ SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, j) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
+
+ if (first)
+ first = false;
+ else
+ fputc(' ', f);
+
+ name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1);
+ fputs(strna(name), f);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ fputc('\n', f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->syscall_archs) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+ Iterator j;
+ void *id;
+#endif
+
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
+ prefix);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+ SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j)
+ fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1)));
+#endif
+ fputc('\n', f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->syscall_errno > 0)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
+ prefix, strna(errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno)));
+
+ if (c->apparmor_profile)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
+ prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile);
+}
+
+bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under
+ * an unchanged UID or as root. */
+
+ if (!c->user)
+ return true;
+
+ if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0"))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) {
+ assert(s);
+
+ zero(*s);
+ s->pid = pid;
+ dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp);
+}
+
+void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) {
+ assert(s);
+
+ if (s->pid && s->pid != pid)
+ zero(*s);
+
+ s->pid = pid;
+ dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp);
+
+ s->code = code;
+ s->status = status;
+
+ if (context) {
+ if (context->utmp_id)
+ utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status);
+
+ exec_context_tty_reset(context, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
+ char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX];
+
+ assert(s);
+ assert(f);
+
+ if (s->pid <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ prefix = strempty(prefix);
+
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n",
+ prefix, s->pid);
+
+ if (s->start_timestamp.realtime > 0)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
+ prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime));
+
+ if (s->exit_timestamp.realtime > 0)
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
+ "%sExit Code: %s\n"
+ "%sExit Status: %i\n",
+ prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->exit_timestamp.realtime),
+ prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code),
+ prefix, s->status);
+}
+
+char *exec_command_line(char **argv) {
+ size_t k;
+ char *n, *p, **a;
+ bool first = true;
+
+ assert(argv);
+
+ k = 1;
+ STRV_FOREACH(a, argv)
+ k += strlen(*a)+3;
+
+ if (!(n = new(char, k)))
+ return NULL;
+
+ p = n;
+ STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) {
+
+ if (!first)
+ *(p++) = ' ';
+ else
+ first = false;
+
+ if (strpbrk(*a, WHITESPACE)) {
+ *(p++) = '\'';
+ p = stpcpy(p, *a);
+ *(p++) = '\'';
+ } else
+ p = stpcpy(p, *a);
+
+ }
+
+ *p = 0;
+
+ /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
+ * spaces and ticks in them */
+
+ return n;
+}
+
+void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL;
+ const char *prefix2;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(f);
+
+ prefix = strempty(prefix);
+ prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t");
+
+ cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv);
+ fprintf(f,
+ "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
+ prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror(ENOMEM));
+
+ exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2);
+}
+
+void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
+ assert(f);
+
+ prefix = strempty(prefix);
+
+ LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c)
+ exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix);
+}
+
+void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) {
+ ExecCommand *end;
+
+ assert(l);
+ assert(e);
+
+ if (*l) {
+ /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
+ LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l, end);
+ LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e);
+ } else
+ *l = e;
+}
+
+int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
+ va_list ap;
+ char **l, *p;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(path);
+
+ va_start(ap, path);
+ l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (!l)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p = strdup(path);
+ if (!p) {
+ strv_free(l);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ free(c->path);
+ c->path = p;
+
+ strv_free(c->argv);
+ c->argv = l;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
+ va_list ap;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(path);
+
+ va_start(ap, path);
+ l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (!l)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) {
+
+ if (*rt)
+ return 0;
+
+ *rt = new0(ExecRuntime, 1);
+ if (!*rt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ (*rt)->n_ref = 1;
+ (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime **rt, ExecContext *c, const char *id) {
+ int r;
+
+ assert(rt);
+ assert(c);
+ assert(id);
+
+ if (*rt)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!c->private_network && !c->private_tmp)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (c->private_network && (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] < 0) {
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, (*rt)->netns_storage_socket) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (c->private_tmp && !(*rt)->tmp_dir) {
+ r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &(*rt)->tmp_dir, &(*rt)->var_tmp_dir);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime *r) {
+ assert(r);
+ assert(r->n_ref > 0);
+
+ r->n_ref++;
+ return r;
+}
+
+ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *r) {
+
+ if (!r)
+ return NULL;
+
+ assert(r->n_ref > 0);
+
+ r->n_ref--;
+ if (r->n_ref > 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ free(r->tmp_dir);
+ free(r->var_tmp_dir);
+ safe_close_pair(r->netns_storage_socket);
+ free(r);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit *u, ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
+ assert(u);
+ assert(f);
+ assert(fds);
+
+ if (!rt)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rt->tmp_dir)
+ unit_serialize_item(u, f, "tmp-dir", rt->tmp_dir);
+
+ if (rt->var_tmp_dir)
+ unit_serialize_item(u, f, "var-tmp-dir", rt->var_tmp_dir);
+
+ if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
+ int copy;
+
+ copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]);
+ if (copy < 0)
+ return copy;
+
+ unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy);
+ }
+
+ if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) {
+ int copy;
+
+ copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]);
+ if (copy < 0)
+ return copy;
+
+ unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit *u, ExecRuntime **rt, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) {
+ int r;
+
+ assert(rt);
+ assert(key);
+ assert(value);
+
+ if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) {
+ char *copy;
+
+ r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ copy = strdup(value);
+ if (!copy)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ free((*rt)->tmp_dir);
+ (*rt)->tmp_dir = copy;
+
+ } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) {
+ char *copy;
+
+ r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ copy = strdup(value);
+ if (!copy)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ free((*rt)->var_tmp_dir);
+ (*rt)->var_tmp_dir = copy;
+
+ } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) {
+ int fd;
+
+ r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
+ log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value);
+ else {
+ safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]);
+ (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
+ }
+ } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) {
+ int fd;
+
+ r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
+ log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value);
+ else {
+ safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]);
+ (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
+ }
+ } else
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *path = p;
+
+ (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) {
+ int r;
+
+ if (!rt)
+ return;
+
+ /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
+ if (rt->n_ref > 1)
+ return;
+
+ if (rt->tmp_dir) {
+ log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir);
+
+ r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir);
+ free(rt->tmp_dir);
+ }
+
+ rt->tmp_dir = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (rt->var_tmp_dir) {
+ log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir);
+
+ r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir);
+ free(rt->var_tmp_dir);
+ }
+
+ rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL;
+ }
+
+ safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket);
+}
+
+static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = {
+ [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null",
+ [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty",
+ [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force",
+ [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail",
+ [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket"
+};
+
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput);
+
+static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = {
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG] = "syslog",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE] = "syslog+console",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console",
+ [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket"
+};
+
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput);
+
+static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = {
+ [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init",
+ [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login",
+ [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user",
+};
+
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode);
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.45.2) at 2024-11-01 03:50:07 +0000