Tue May 20 04:04:22 UTC 2014

3 files changed, 129 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/core/pam/PKGBUILD b/core/pam/PKGBUILD
index 9f4968505..426f91d3f 100644
--- a/core/pam/PKGBUILD
+++ b/core/pam/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 205604 2014-02-09 10:29:31Z andyrtr $
+# $Id: PKGBUILD 213313 2014-05-19 17:03:12Z tpowa $
 # Maintainer: Tobias Powalowski <tpowa@archlinux.org>
 # Contributor: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org>
 
 pkgname=pam
 pkgver=1.1.8
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=4
 pkgdesc="PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library"
 arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
 license=('GPL2')
@@ -13,13 +13,28 @@ depends=('glibc' 'cracklib' 'libtirpc' 'pambase')
 makedepends=('flex' 'w3m' 'docbook-xml>=4.4' 'docbook-xsl')
 backup=(etc/security/{access.conf,group.conf,limits.conf,namespace.conf,namespace.init,pam_env.conf,time.conf} etc/default/passwd etc/environment)
 source=(https://fedorahosted.org/releases/l/i/linux-pam/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.bz2
-        #http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/library/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.bz2
         ftp://ftp.archlinux.org/other/pam_unix2/pam_unix2-2.9.1.tar.bz2
-        pam_unix2-glibc216.patch)
-options=('!emptydirs')
+        pam_unix2-glibc216.patch
+        pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch
+        pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch)
 md5sums=('35b6091af95981b1b2cd60d813b5e4ee'
          'da6a46e5f8cd3eaa7cbc4fc3a7e2b555'
-         'dac109f68e04a4df37575fda6001ea17')
+         'dac109f68e04a4df37575fda6001ea17'
+         '653661bea920de3bb2713bb85b408bc2'
+         '144ea8e2f9d49a0f4021027ca2c1558f')
+
+options=('!emptydirs')
+
+prepare () {
+  cd $srcdir/Linux-PAM-$pkgver
+  # fix CVEs in pam
+  patch -Np1 -i  "${srcdir}/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch"
+  patch -Np1 -i  "${srcdir}/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch"
+
+  # fix pam_unix2 building
+  cd $srcdir/pam_unix2-2.9.1
+  patch -Np1 -i "${srcdir}/pam_unix2-glibc216.patch"
+}
 
 build() {
   cd $srcdir/Linux-PAM-$pkgver
@@ -27,8 +42,6 @@ build() {
   make
 
   cd $srcdir/pam_unix2-2.9.1
-  patch -Np1 -i ../pam_unix2-glibc216.patch
-
   # modify flags to build against the pam compiled here, not a system lib.
   ./configure \
       CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I$srcdir/Linux-PAM-$pkgver/libpam/include/" \
diff --git a/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch b/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..96fa9160b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 57a1e2b274d0a6376d92ada9926e5c5741e7da20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
+Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 22:18:32 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_userdb: fix password hash comparison
+
+Starting with commit Linux-PAM-0-77-28-g0b3e583 that introduced hashed
+passwords support in pam_userdb, hashes are compared case-insensitively.
+This bug leads to accepting hashes for completely different passwords in
+addition to those that should be accepted.
+
+Additionally, commit Linux-PAM-1_1_6-13-ge2a8187 that added support for
+modern password hashes with different lengths and settings, did not
+update the hash comparison accordingly, which leads to accepting
+computed hashes longer than stored hashes when the latter is a prefix
+of the former.
+
+* modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c (user_lookup): Reject the computed
+hash whose length differs from the stored hash length.
+Compare computed and stored hashes case-sensitively.
+Fixes CVE-2013-7041.
+
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/731368
+---
+ modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
+index de8b5b1..ff040e6 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
++++ b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
+@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *database, const char *cryptmode,
+ 	  } else {
+ 	    cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr);
+ 
+-	    if (cryptpw) {
+-	      compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
++	    if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) {
++	      compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
+ 	    } else {
+ 	      compare = -2;
+ 	      if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+-		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
++		if (cryptpw)
++		  pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ");
++		else
++		  pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
+ 	      }
+ 	    };
+ 
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch b/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2aa2de8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue
+ (ticket #27)
+
+pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of
+the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to
+avoid potential directory traversal issues.
+
+* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat
+"." and ".." tty values as invalid.
+(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser
+value containing '/', as invalid.
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-2583.
+
+Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
+---
+ modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
+index 5193733..b3f08b1 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
++++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty)
+ 		tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1;
+ 	}
+ 	/* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */
+-	if (strlen(tty) == 0) {
++	if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) {
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+ 	return tty;
+@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen)
+ 		if (pwd != NULL) {
+ 			ruser = pwd->pw_name;
+ 		}
++	} else {
++		/*
++		 * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component
++		 * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/'
++		 * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues.
++		 */
++		if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") ||
++		    !strcmp(ruser, "..") ||
++		    strchr(ruser, '/')) {
++			ruser = NULL;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) {
+ 		*ruserbuf = '\0';
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+