Mon Oct 17 14:16:38 UTC 2011

5 files changed, 0 insertions, 701 deletions

diff --git a/testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD b/testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD
deleted file mode 100644
index 12ce11d7a..000000000
--- a/testing/coreutils/PKGBUILD
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 140397 2011-10-12 12:51:32Z allan $
-# Maintainer: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
-# Contributor: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org>
-
-pkgname=coreutils
-pkgver=8.14
-pkgrel=1
-pkgdesc="The basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities of the GNU operating system"
-arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
-license=('GPL3')
-url="http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils"
-groups=('base')
-depends=('glibc' 'shadow' 'pam' 'acl' 'gmp' 'libcap')
-replaces=('mktemp')
-backup=('etc/pam.d/su')
-install=${pkgname}.install
-options=('!emptydirs')
-source=(ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz{,.sig}
-	coreutils-uname.patch
-	coreutils-pam.patch
-	su.pam)
-md5sums=('bcb135ce553493a45aba01b39eb3920a'
-         '279712f9afc954beaff0d99194c8f462'
-         'c4fcca138b6abf6d443d48a6f0cd8833'
-         'aad79a2aa6d566c375d7bdd1b0767278'
-         'fa85e5cce5d723275b14365ba71a8aad')
-
-build() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-
-  # added su wheel group pam patch (from fedora git)
-  patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-pam.patch
-
-  # linux specific uname improvement (from gentoo portage)
-  patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-uname.patch
-
-  autoreconf -v
-  ./configure --prefix=/usr --libexecdir=/usr/lib/coreutils \
-              --enable-install-program=su \
-              --enable-no-install-program=groups,hostname,kill,uptime \
-              --enable-pam
-  make
-}
-
-check() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make RUN_EXPENSIVE_TESTS=yes check
-}
-
-package() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make DESTDIR=${pkgdir} install
-  
-  cd ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
-  install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/{bin,usr/sbin}
-  
-  # binaries required by FHS
-  _fhs="cat chgrp chmod chown cp date dd df echo false ln ls \
-        mkdir mknod mv pwd rm rmdir stty su sync true uname"
-  mv ${_fhs} ${pkgdir}/bin
-
-  # binaries required by various Arch scripts
-  _bin="cut dir dircolors du install mkfifo readlink shred \
-        sleep touch tr vdir"
-  mv ${_bin} ${pkgdir}/bin
-  ln -sf /bin/sleep ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/sleep
-
-  mv chroot ${pkgdir}/usr/sbin
-  install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/su.pam ${pkgdir}/etc/pam.d/su
-}
diff --git a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch b/testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e61908f3f..000000000
--- a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac	2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac	2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then
-   AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS])
- fi
- 
-+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
-+[  --enable-pam              Enable use of the PAM libraries],
-+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
-+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
-+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)])
-+
- AC_FUNC_FORK
- 
- optional_bin_progs=
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi	2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi	2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.).
- @findex syslog
- @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report
- failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts.  (If the system
--supports @code{syslog}.)  However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the
--user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below.
-+supports @code{syslog}.)
-+
-+This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for
-+authentication.  You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its
-+behaviour.
- 
- The program accepts the following options.  Also see @ref{Common options}.
- 
-@@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM},
- @env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value.  Change to @var{user}'s home
- directory.  Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it
- read its login startup file(s).
-+Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables 
-+are preserved as well for PAM functionality.
- 
- @item -m
- @itemx -p
-@@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status:
- the exit status of the subshell otherwise
- @end display
- 
--@cindex wheel group, not supported
--@cindex group wheel, not supported
--@cindex fascism
--@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
--
--(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
--
--@cindex Twenex
--@cindex MIT AI lab
--Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
--rest.  For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
--seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
--keeping it secret from everyone else.  (I was able to thwart this coup
--and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
--wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
--
--However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone.  Under the usual
--@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
--sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest.  The
--``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
--power of the rulers.
--
--I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers.  If you are
--used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
--might find this idea strange at first.
--
--
- @node timeout invocation
- @section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit
- 
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am	2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am	2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP)
- uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
- 
- # for crypt
--su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
-+su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@
- 
- # for various ACL functions
- copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c	2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c	2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100
-@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
-    restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts.  RMS considers that to
-    be fascist.
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+
-+   Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a
-+   wheel group is enforced by su.  RMS tries to restrict your access
-+   to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that
-+   to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to
-+   enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf
-+
-+#endif
-+
-    Compile-time options:
-    -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS	Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-    -DSYSLOG_FAILURE	Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-@@ -53,6 +63,15 @@
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <grp.h>
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+# include <signal.h>
-+# include <sys/wait.h>
-+# include <sys/fsuid.h>
-+# include <unistd.h>
-+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
-+# include <security/pam_misc.h>
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
-+
- #include "system.h"
- #include "getpass.h"
- 
-@@ -120,10 +139,17 @@
- /* The user to become if none is specified.  */
- #define DEFAULT_USER "root"
- 
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
-+#endif
- 
--static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
-+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
-+	const struct passwd *)
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	;
-+#else
-      ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
-+#endif
- 
- /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell.  */
- static bool fast_startup;
-@@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
- }
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+static int retval;
-+static struct pam_conv conv = {
-+  misc_conv,
-+  NULL
-+};
-+
-+#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \
-+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
-+  return 0; \
-+}
-+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) {		\
-+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);			\
-+return;						\
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Ask the user for a password.
-+   If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary.
-    Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
-    false if not.  Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
-    or if PW has an empty password.  */
-@@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
- static bool
- correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
- {
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+  struct passwd *caller;
-+  char *tty_name, *ttyn;
-+  retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+
-+  if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) {
-+	fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n");
-+	exit(1);
-+  }
-+
-+  caller = getpwuid(getuid());
-+  if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) {
-+	  retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name);
-+	  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  }
-+
-+  ttyn = ttyname(0);
-+  if (ttyn) {
-+    if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
-+       tty_name = ttyn+5;
-+    else
-+       tty_name = ttyn;
-+    retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
-+    PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  }
-+  retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
-+  if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
-+    /* password has expired.  Offer option to change it. */
-+    retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
-+    PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  }
-+  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */
-+  return 1;
-+#else /* !USE_PAM */
-   char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
- #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
-   /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems.  */
-@@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p
-   encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
-   memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
-   return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
-+#endif /* !USE_PAM */
- }
- 
- /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
-@@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd 
-       /* Leave TERM unchanged.  Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
-          Unset all other environment variables.  */
-       char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
-+      char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
-+      char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
-       if (term)
-         term = xstrdup (term);
-       environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
-       environ[0] = NULL;
-       if (term)
-         xsetenv ("TERM", term);
-+      if (display)
-+        xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
-+      if (xauthority)
-+        xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
-       xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
-       xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
-       xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
-@@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
- {
- #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
-   errno = 0;
--  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
-+  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+    pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
-+#endif
-     error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
-+  }
-   endgrent ();
- #endif
-   if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
-@@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
-     error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
- }
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int caught=0;
-+/* Signal handler for parent process later */
-+static void su_catch_sig(int sig)
-+{
-+  ++caught;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh)
-+{
-+  char **env;
-+
-+  env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
-+  if(env) {
-+    while(*env) {
-+	if (putenv (*env))
-+	  xalloc_die ();
-+	env++;
-+    }
-+  }
-+  return(0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
-    If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
-    Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
-@@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
- 
- static void
- run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
--           size_t n_additional_args)
-+           size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
- {
-   size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
-   char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
-   size_t argno = 1;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+  int child;
-+  sigset_t ourset;
-+  int status;
-+
-+  retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0);
-+  if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+    fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n");
-+    exit (1);
-+  }
-+
-+/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may
-+   be passed even in the session phase
-+*/
-+  if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+     fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n");
-+  
-+  /* Credentials should be set in the parent */ 
-+  if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+    fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n");
-+    exit(1);
-+  }
-+
-+  child = fork();
-+  if (child == 0) {  /* child shell */
-+  change_identity (pw);
-+  pam_end(pamh, 0);
-+#endif
- 
-   if (simulate_login)
-     {
-       char *arg0;
-       char *shell_basename;
- 
-+      if(chdir(pw->pw_dir))
-+	      error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-+
-       shell_basename = last_component (shell);
-       arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
-       arg0[0] = '-';
-@@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const
-     error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
-     exit (exit_status);
-   }
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+  } else if (child == -1) {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno));
-+      pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
-+      pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+      pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
-+      exit(1);
-+  }
-+  /* parent only */
-+  sigfillset(&ourset);
-+  if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
-+    fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
-+    caught = 1;
-+  }
-+  if (!caught) {
-+    struct sigaction action;
-+    action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig;
-+    sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask);
-+    action.sa_flags = 0;
-+    sigemptyset(&ourset);
-+    if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM)
-+        || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM)
-+        || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL)
-+        || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
-+      caught = 1;
-+    }
-+  }
-+  if (!caught) {
-+    do {
-+      int pid;
-+
-+      pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
-+
-+      if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) {
-+          kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status));
-+          /* once we get here, we must have resumed */
-+          kill(pid, SIGCONT);
-+      }
-+    } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status));
-+  }
-+
-+  if (caught) {
-+    fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell...");
-+    kill (child, SIGTERM);
-+  }
-+  /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
-+  pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
-+  retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
-+  retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
-+  if (caught) {
-+    sleep(2);
-+    kill(child, SIGKILL);
-+    fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n");
-+    exit(-1);
-+  }
-+  exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status)
-+                                  : WTERMSIG (status) + 128);
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
- }
- 
- /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
-@@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
-   modify_environment (pw, shell);
- 
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
-   change_identity (pw);
--  if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
--    error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-+#endif
- 
-   /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
-      Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
-@@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   if (ferror (stderr))
-     exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
- 
--  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
-+  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
- }
diff --git a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch b/testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b458abeba..000000000
--- a/testing/coreutils/coreutils-uname.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-On linux platforms, grok /proc/cpuinfo for the CPU/vendor info.
-
-Prob not suitable for upstream seeing as how it's 100% linux-specific
-http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-coreutils/2005-09/msg00063.html
-
-Patch originally by Carlos E. Gorges <carlos@techlinux.com.br>, but 
-heavily reworked to suck less.
-
-To add support for additional platforms, check out the show_cpuinfo()
-func in the linux/arch/<ARCH>/ source tree of the kernel.
-
---- coreutils/src/uname.c
-+++ coreutils/src/uname.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@
- # include <mach-o/arch.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#if defined(__linux__)
-+# define USE_PROCINFO
-+# define UNAME_HARDWARE_PLATFORM
-+#endif
-+
- #include "system.h"
- #include "error.h"
- #include "quote.h"
-@@ -138,6 +143,117 @@
-   exit (status);
- }
- 
-+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO)
-+
-+# if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
-+#  define CPUINFO_FILE    "/proc/sysinfo"
-+#  define CPUINFO_FORMAT  "%64[^\t :]%*[ :]%256[^\n]%c"
-+# else
-+#  define CPUINFO_FILE    "/proc/cpuinfo"
-+#  define CPUINFO_FORMAT  "%64[^\t:]\t:%256[^\n]%c"
-+# endif
-+
-+# define PROCINFO_PROCESSOR      0
-+# define PROCINFO_HARDWARE_PLATFORM 1
-+
-+static void __eat_cpuinfo_space(char *buf)
-+{
-+	/* first eat trailing space */
-+	char *tmp = buf + strlen(buf) - 1;
-+	while (tmp > buf && isspace(*tmp))
-+		*tmp-- = '\0';
-+	/* then eat leading space */
-+	tmp = buf;
-+	while (*tmp && isspace(*tmp))
-+		tmp++;
-+	if (tmp != buf)
-+		memmove(buf, tmp, strlen(tmp)+1);
-+	/* finally collapse whitespace */
-+	tmp = buf;
-+	while (tmp[0] && tmp[1]) {
-+		if (isspace(tmp[0]) && isspace(tmp[1])) {
-+			memmove(tmp, tmp+1, strlen(tmp));
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		++tmp;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static int __linux_procinfo(int x, char *fstr, size_t s)
-+{
-+	FILE *fp;
-+
-+	char *procinfo_keys[] = {
-+		/* --processor --hardware-platform */
-+		#if defined(__alpha__)
-+			"cpu model", "system type"
-+		#elif defined(__arm__)
-+			"Processor", "Hardware"
-+		#elif defined(__avr32__)
-+			"processor", "cpu family"
-+		#elif defined(__bfin__)
-+			"CPU", "BOARD Name"
-+		#elif defined(__cris__)
-+			"cpu", "cpu model"
-+		#elif defined(__frv__)
-+			"CPU-Core", "System"
-+		#elif defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-+			"model name", "vendor_id"
-+		#elif defined(__ia64__)
-+			"family", "vendor"
-+		#elif defined(__hppa__)
-+			"cpu", "model"
-+		#elif defined(__m68k__)
-+			"CPU", "MMU"
-+		#elif defined(__mips__)
-+			"cpu model", "system type"
-+		#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
-+			"cpu", "machine"
-+		#elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
-+			"Type", "Manufacturer"
-+		#elif defined(__sh__)
-+			"cpu type", "machine"
-+		#elif defined(sparc) || defined(__sparc__)
-+			"type", "cpu"
-+		#elif defined(__vax__)
-+			"cpu type", "cpu"
-+		#else
-+			"unknown", "unknown"
-+		#endif
-+	};
-+
-+	if ((fp = fopen(CPUINFO_FILE, "r")) != NULL) {
-+		char key[65], value[257], eol, *ret = NULL;
-+
-+		while (fscanf(fp, CPUINFO_FORMAT, key, value, &eol) != EOF) {
-+			__eat_cpuinfo_space(key);
-+			if (!strcmp(key, procinfo_keys[x])) {
-+				__eat_cpuinfo_space(value);
-+				ret = value;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+			if (eol != '\n') {
-+				/* we need two fscanf's here in case the previous
-+				 * length limit caused us to read right up to the
-+				 * newline ... doing "%*[^\n]\n" wont eat the newline
-+				 */
-+				fscanf(fp, "%*[^\n]");
-+				fscanf(fp, "\n");
-+			}
-+		}
-+		fclose(fp);
-+
-+		if (ret) {
-+			strncpy(fstr, ret, s);
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+#endif
-+
- /* Print ELEMENT, preceded by a space if something has already been
-    printed.  */
- 
-@@ -250,10 +344,14 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   if (toprint & PRINT_PROCESSOR)
-     {
-       char const *element = unknown;
--#if HAVE_SYSINFO && defined SI_ARCHITECTURE
-+#if ( HAVE_SYSINFO && defined SI_ARCHITECTURE ) || defined(USE_PROCINFO)
-       {
-         static char processor[257];
-+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO)
-+        if (0 <= __linux_procinfo (PROCINFO_PROCESSOR, processor, sizeof processor))
-+#else
-         if (0 <= sysinfo (SI_ARCHITECTURE, processor, sizeof processor))
-+#endif
-           element = processor;
-       }
- #endif
-@@ -306,9 +404,13 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-       if (element == unknown)
-         {
-           static char hardware_platform[257];
-+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO)
-+          if (0 <= __linux_procinfo (PROCINFO_HARDWARE_PLATFORM, hardware_platform, sizeof hardware_platform))
-+#else
-           size_t s = sizeof hardware_platform;
-           static int mib[] = { CTL_HW, UNAME_HARDWARE_PLATFORM };
-           if (sysctl (mib, 2, hardware_platform, &s, 0, 0) >= 0)
-+#endif
-             element = hardware_platform;
-         }
- #endif
diff --git a/testing/coreutils/coreutils.install b/testing/coreutils/coreutils.install
deleted file mode 100644
index 8caae6686..000000000
--- a/testing/coreutils/coreutils.install
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-infodir=usr/share/info
-filelist=(coreutils.info)
-
-post_install() {
- [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
- for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
-    usr/bin/install-info $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
- done
-}
-
-post_upgrade() {
-  post_install $1
-}
-
-pre_remove() {
- [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
-  for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
-    usr/bin/install-info --delete $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
-  done
-}
-
diff --git a/testing/coreutils/su.pam b/testing/coreutils/su.pam
deleted file mode 100644
index cf15f40f1..000000000
--- a/testing/coreutils/su.pam
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-# Uncomment the following line to implicitly trust users in the "wheel" group.
-#auth		sufficient	pam_wheel.so trust use_uid
-# Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group.
-#auth		required	pam_wheel.so use_uid
-auth		required	pam_unix.so
-account		required	pam_unix.so
-session		required	pam_unix.so