diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'community/quagga/0002-CVE-2012-1820.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | community/quagga/0002-CVE-2012-1820.patch | 74 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 74 deletions
diff --git a/community/quagga/0002-CVE-2012-1820.patch b/community/quagga/0002-CVE-2012-1820.patch deleted file mode 100644 index aae2d7b18..000000000 --- a/community/quagga/0002-CVE-2012-1820.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -@@ -, +, @@ - bgpd: CVE-2012-1820, DoS in bgp_capability_orf() - - An ORF (code 3) capability TLV is defined to contain exactly one - AFI/SAFI block. Function bgp_capability_orf(), which parses ORF - capability TLV, uses do-while cycle to call its helper function - bgp_capability_orf_entry(), which actually processes the AFI/SAFI data - block. The call is made at least once and repeated as long as the input - buffer has enough data for the next call. - - The helper function, bgp_capability_orf_entry(), uses "Number of ORFs" - field of the provided AFI/SAFI block to verify, if it fits the input - buffer. However, the check is made based on the total length of the ORF - TLV regardless of the data already consumed by the previous helper - function call(s). This way, the check condition is only valid for the - first AFI/SAFI block inside an ORF capability TLV. - - For the subsequent calls of the helper function, if any are made, the - check condition may erroneously tell, that the current "Number of ORFs" - field fits the buffer boundary, where in fact it does not. This makes it - possible to trigger an assertion by feeding an OPEN message with a - specially-crafted malformed ORF capability TLV. - - This commit fixes the vulnerability by making the implementation follow - the spec. ---- a/bgpd/bgp_open.c -+++ a/bgpd/bgp_open.c -@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ bgp_capability_orf_entry (struct peer *peer, struct capability_header *hdr) - } - - /* validate number field */ -- if (sizeof (struct capability_orf_entry) + (entry.num * 2) > hdr->length) -+ if (sizeof (struct capability_orf_entry) + (entry.num * 2) != hdr->length) - { - zlog_info ("%s ORF Capability entry length error," - " Cap length %u, num %u", -@@ -335,28 +335,6 @@ bgp_capability_orf_entry (struct peer *peer, struct capability_header *hdr) - } - - static int --bgp_capability_orf (struct peer *peer, struct capability_header *hdr) --{ -- struct stream *s = BGP_INPUT (peer); -- size_t end = stream_get_getp (s) + hdr->length; -- -- assert (stream_get_getp(s) + sizeof(struct capability_orf_entry) <= end); -- -- /* We must have at least one ORF entry, as the caller has already done -- * minimum length validation for the capability code - for ORF there must -- * at least one ORF entry (header and unknown number of pairs of bytes). -- */ -- do -- { -- if (bgp_capability_orf_entry (peer, hdr) == -1) -- return -1; -- } -- while (stream_get_getp(s) + sizeof(struct capability_orf_entry) < end); -- -- return 0; --} -- --static int - bgp_capability_restart (struct peer *peer, struct capability_header *caphdr) - { - struct stream *s = BGP_INPUT (peer); -@@ -573,7 +551,7 @@ bgp_capability_parse (struct peer *peer, size_t length, int *mp_capability, - break; - case CAPABILITY_CODE_ORF: - case CAPABILITY_CODE_ORF_OLD: -- if (bgp_capability_orf (peer, &caphdr)) -+ if (bgp_capability_orf_entry (peer, &caphdr)) - return -1; - break; - case CAPABILITY_CODE_RESTART: |