diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'core/coreutils')
| -rw-r--r-- | core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch | 135 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch | 428 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | core/coreutils/su.pam | 9 |
3 files changed, 0 insertions, 572 deletions
diff --git a/core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch b/core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 087b87cdb..000000000 --- a/core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -From 6124a3842dfa8484b52e067a8ab8105c3875a4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 19:43:00 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ls: color each symlink-to-relative-name in / properly - -In order for ls --color to color each symlink, it must form the name -of each referent and then stat it to see if the link is dangling, to -a directory, to a file, etc. When the symlink is to a relative name, -ls must concatenate the starting directory name and that relative name. -When, in addition, the starting directory was "/" or "/some-name", -the result was ill-formed, and the subsequent stat would usually fail, -making the caller color it as a dangling symlink. -* src/ls.c (make_link_name): Don't botch the case in which -dir_name(NAME) == "/" and LINKNAME is relative. -* tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color: New file. Test for the above. -* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add it. -* NEWS (Bug fixes): Mention it. -Reported by Mike Frysinger in http://bugs.gnu.org/11453 -Bug introduced by commit v8.16-23-gbcb9078. ---- - NEWS | 5 ++++ - src/ls.c | 9 +++++++- - tests/Makefile.am | 1 + - tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100755 tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color - -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS -index 6c620b3..f9e9c70 100644 ---- a/NEWS -+++ b/NEWS -@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*- - - * Noteworthy changes in release ?.? (????-??-??) [?] - -+** Bug fixes -+ -+ ls --color would mis-color relative-named symlinks in / -+ [bug introduced in coreutils-8.17] -+ - - * Noteworthy changes in release 8.17 (2012-05-10) [stable] - -diff --git a/src/ls.c b/src/ls.c -index 397e4ea..9494ae9 100644 ---- a/src/ls.c -+++ b/src/ls.c -@@ -3213,7 +3213,14 @@ make_link_name (char const *name, char const *linkname) - return xstrdup (linkname); - - char *p = xmalloc (prefix_len + 1 + strlen (linkname) + 1); -- stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len + 1), linkname); -+ -+ /* PREFIX_LEN usually specifies a string not ending in slash. -+ In that case, extend it by one, since the next byte *is* a slash. -+ Otherwise, the prefix is "/", so leave the length unchanged. */ -+ if ( ! ISSLASH (name[prefix_len - 1])) -+ ++prefix_len; -+ -+ stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len), linkname); - return p; - } - -diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am -index a4370a6..0bafc5f 100644 ---- a/tests/Makefile.am -+++ b/tests/Makefile.am -@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ TESTS = \ - ls/proc-selinux-segfault \ - ls/readdir-mountpoint-inode \ - ls/recursive \ -+ ls/root-rel-symlink-color \ - ls/rt-1 \ - ls/slink-acl \ - ls/stat-dtype \ -diff --git a/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color b/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color -new file mode 100755 -index 0000000..d795432 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color -@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ -+#!/bin/sh -+# Exercise the 8.17 ls bug with coloring relative-named symlinks in "/". -+ -+# Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. -+ -+# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify -+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by -+# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or -+# (at your option) any later version. -+ -+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -+# GNU General Public License for more details. -+ -+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License -+# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. -+ -+. "${srcdir=.}/init.sh"; path_prepend_ ../src -+print_ver_ ls -+ -+symlink_to_rel= -+for i in /*; do -+ # Skip non-symlinks: -+ env test -h "$i" || continue -+ -+ # Skip dangling symlinks: -+ env test -e "$i" || continue -+ -+ # Skip any symlink-to-absolute-name: -+ case $(readlink "$i") in /*) continue ;; esac -+ -+ symlink_to_rel=$i -+ break -+done -+ -+test -z "$symlink_to_rel" \ -+ && skip_ no relative symlink in / -+ -+e='\33' -+color_code='01;36' -+c_pre="$e[0m$e[${color_code}m" -+c_post="$e[0m" -+printf "$c_pre$symlink_to_rel$c_post\n" > exp || framework_failure_ -+ -+env TERM=xterm LS_COLORS="ln=$color_code:or=1;31;42" \ -+ ls -d --color=always "$symlink_to_rel" > out || fail=1 -+ -+compare exp out || fail=1 -+ -+Exit $fail --- -1.7.11.2 - diff --git a/core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch b/core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e61908f3f..000000000 --- a/core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,428 +0,0 @@ -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac 2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100 -@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then - AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS]) - fi - -+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM -+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl -+[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries], -+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM]) -+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc" -+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)]) -+ - AC_FUNC_FORK - - optional_bin_progs= -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100 -@@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.). - @findex syslog - @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report - failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts. (If the system --supports @code{syslog}.) However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the --user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below. -+supports @code{syslog}.) -+ -+This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for -+authentication. You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its -+behaviour. - - The program accepts the following options. Also see @ref{Common options}. - -@@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM}, - @env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value. Change to @var{user}'s home - directory. Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it - read its login startup file(s). -+Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables -+are preserved as well for PAM functionality. - - @item -m - @itemx -p -@@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status: - the exit status of the subshell otherwise - @end display - --@cindex wheel group, not supported --@cindex group wheel, not supported --@cindex fascism --@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group -- --(This section is by Richard Stallman.) -- --@cindex Twenex --@cindex MIT AI lab --Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the --rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to --seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and --keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup --and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I --wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.) -- --However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual --@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who --sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The --``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the --power of the rulers. -- --I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are --used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you --might find this idea strange at first. -- -- - @node timeout invocation - @section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit - -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100 -@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP) - uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS) - - # for crypt --su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) -+su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@ - - # for various ACL functions - copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL) -diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c ---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100 -+++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100 -@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ - restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to - be fascist. - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ -+ Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a -+ wheel group is enforced by su. RMS tries to restrict your access -+ to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that -+ to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to -+ enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf -+ -+#endif -+ - Compile-time options: - -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog. - -DSYSLOG_FAILURE Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog. -@@ -53,6 +63,15 @@ - #include <pwd.h> - #include <grp.h> - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+# include <signal.h> -+# include <sys/wait.h> -+# include <sys/fsuid.h> -+# include <unistd.h> -+# include <security/pam_appl.h> -+# include <security/pam_misc.h> -+#endif /* USE_PAM */ -+ - #include "system.h" - #include "getpass.h" - -@@ -120,10 +139,17 @@ - /* The user to become if none is specified. */ - #define DEFAULT_USER "root" - -+#ifndef USE_PAM - char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt); -+#endif - --static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t) -+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t, -+ const struct passwd *) -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ ; -+#else - ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN; -+#endif - - /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell. */ - static bool fast_startup; -@@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su - } - #endif - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+static int retval; -+static struct pam_conv conv = { -+ misc_conv, -+ NULL -+}; -+ -+#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \ -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \ -+ return 0; \ -+} -+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) { \ -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \ -+return; \ -+} -+#endif -+ - /* Ask the user for a password. -+ If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary. - Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW, - false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0 - or if PW has an empty password. */ -@@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su - static bool - correct_password (const struct passwd *pw) - { -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ struct passwd *caller; -+ char *tty_name, *ttyn; -+ retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ -+ if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ caller = getpwuid(getuid()); -+ if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) { -+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ } -+ -+ ttyn = ttyname(0); -+ if (ttyn) { -+ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0) -+ tty_name = ttyn+5; -+ else -+ tty_name = ttyn; -+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ } -+ retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); -+ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { -+ /* password has expired. Offer option to change it. */ -+ retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ } -+ PAM_BAIL_P; -+ /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */ -+ return 1; -+#else /* !USE_PAM */ - char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct; - #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP - /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */ -@@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p - encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct); - memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted)); - return STREQ (encrypted, correct); -+#endif /* !USE_PAM */ - } - - /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being -@@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd - /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH. - Unset all other environment variables. */ - char const *term = getenv ("TERM"); -+ char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY"); -+ char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY"); - if (term) - term = xstrdup (term); - environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *)); - environ[0] = NULL; - if (term) - xsetenv ("TERM", term); -+ if (display) -+ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display); -+ if (xauthority) -+ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority); - xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir); - xsetenv ("SHELL", shell); - xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name); -@@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw - { - #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS - errno = 0; -- if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) -+ if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) { -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT); -+#endif - error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups")); -+ } - endgrent (); - #endif - if (setgid (pw->pw_gid)) -@@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw - error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id")); - } - -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static int caught=0; -+/* Signal handler for parent process later */ -+static void su_catch_sig(int sig) -+{ -+ ++caught; -+} -+ -+int -+pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh) -+{ -+ char **env; -+ -+ env = pam_getenvlist(pamh); -+ if(env) { -+ while(*env) { -+ if (putenv (*env)) -+ xalloc_die (); -+ env++; -+ } -+ } -+ return(0); -+} -+#endif -+ - /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty. - If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option. - Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there -@@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw - - static void - run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args, -- size_t n_additional_args) -+ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw) - { - size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1; - char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args); - size_t argno = 1; -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ int child; -+ sigset_t ourset; -+ int status; -+ -+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n"); -+ exit (1); -+ } -+ -+/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may -+ be passed even in the session phase -+*/ -+ if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS) -+ fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n"); -+ -+ /* Credentials should be set in the parent */ -+ if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ child = fork(); -+ if (child == 0) { /* child shell */ -+ change_identity (pw); -+ pam_end(pamh, 0); -+#endif - - if (simulate_login) - { - char *arg0; - char *shell_basename; - -+ if(chdir(pw->pw_dir)) -+ error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir); -+ - shell_basename = last_component (shell); - arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2); - arg0[0] = '-'; -@@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const - error (0, errno, "%s", shell); - exit (exit_status); - } -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ } else if (child == -1) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT); -+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ /* parent only */ -+ sigfillset(&ourset); -+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME); -+ caught = 1; -+ } -+ if (!caught) { -+ struct sigaction action; -+ action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig; -+ sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask); -+ action.sa_flags = 0; -+ sigemptyset(&ourset); -+ if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM) -+ || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM) -+ || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL) -+ || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME); -+ caught = 1; -+ } -+ } -+ if (!caught) { -+ do { -+ int pid; -+ -+ pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED); -+ -+ if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) { -+ kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status)); -+ /* once we get here, we must have resumed */ -+ kill(pid, SIGCONT); -+ } -+ } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status)); -+ } -+ -+ if (caught) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell..."); -+ kill (child, SIGTERM); -+ } -+ /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */ -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT); -+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0); -+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID; -+ retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); -+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID; -+ if (caught) { -+ sleep(2); -+ kill(child, SIGKILL); -+ fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n"); -+ exit(-1); -+ } -+ exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status) -+ : WTERMSIG (status) + 128); -+#endif /* USE_PAM */ - } - - /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by -@@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) - shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell); - modify_environment (pw, shell); - -+#ifndef USE_PAM - change_identity (pw); -- if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0) -- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir); -+#endif - - /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure. - Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of -@@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) - if (ferror (stderr)) - exit (EXIT_CANCELED); - -- run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind)); -+ run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw); - } diff --git a/core/coreutils/su.pam b/core/coreutils/su.pam deleted file mode 100644 index cf15f40f1..000000000 --- a/core/coreutils/su.pam +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -#%PAM-1.0 -auth sufficient pam_rootok.so -# Uncomment the following line to implicitly trust users in the "wheel" group. -#auth sufficient pam_wheel.so trust use_uid -# Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group. -#auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid -auth required pam_unix.so -account required pam_unix.so -session required pam_unix.so |