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From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c
index 602cd63..750f44f 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;
--
1.7.6.5
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